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The Banco de España has, through print and electronic means, provided the public with access 
to ample documentation on the international financial crisis that commenced in 2007. The purpose 
of this report is to offer an orderly and systematic analysis of its impact on the Spanish financial 
system and of the set of regulatory, supervisory and intervention measures adopted during the period 
2008-2014. The report uses a descriptive approach, analysing the development of the crisis and the 
actions carried out, with a view to providing broad references to readers and analysts.
This report, which was coordinated by Fernando Eguidazu, a Banco de España council member, 
includes contributions from the Banco de España’s Directorates General Banking Supervision, 
Economics, Statistics and Research, Financial Stability, Regulation and Resolution, and the General 
Secretariat. 
It comprises five chapters and two annexes. The first four chapters are ordered chronologically, 
identifying four stages: the years of economic expansion (2000-2007), the onset of the crisis (2008-2011), 
the worsening of the crisis (2012-2013) and the economic and financial normalisation (2014). Chapter 5 
includes an assessment of the Spanish banking system’s restructuring process.
The crisis can only be understood as a continuum, although different phases can be identified 
within each period. This classification has been adopted for clarity and because the stages identified 
mark significant changes in the economic cycle and in the restructuring process of the Spanish 
banking system, particularly the savings bank sector.
An analysis of the first period, spanning most of the years of economic expansion (2000-2007), 
is necessary to understand the build-up of imbalances and risks in the global, European and Spanish 
economies. The second period (2008-2011) is marked by the global financial crisis and by the policies 
adopted in response thereto, including an in-depth revision of financial regulations and the beginning 
of the clean-up and restructuring of the financial system. The third period (2012-2013) is characterised 
by the new measures adopted in view of the worsening of the crisis in Europe, resulting in the double-
dip recession, the first symptoms of which had already appeared in 2011, and, as regards the regulatory 
framework in Spain, by the agreement with the EU on the financial sector, in the form of the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2012. The report concludes in 2014, with the 
progressive normalisation of the economic situation and the launch of the Banking Union which 
entailed, from November that year, the transfer of a substantial portion of the supervisory powers of 
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the Banco de España, as well as of the other participant supervisory national authorities, to the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism.  
For the sake of a smooth narrative, all the chapters share the same structure. Each has four 
sections. The first section refers to the macroeconomic environment from an international, European 
and Spanish standpoint. It analyses macroeconomic developments and responses in respect of 
monetary and fiscal policy and of the institutional and structural reforms undertaken. 
The second section of each chapter describes, for the corresponding period, the performance of 
the banking system through a detailed review of its main variables. There is a particular focus on 
developments in credit, an essential item of the financial system’s activity, including an analysis of the 
different types of borrowers and of credit quality, i.e. loans deemed non-performing and their related 
non-performing loan (NPL) and coverage ratios. Other variables of financial institutions’ balance 
sheets are also analysed, including government debt and, on the liabilities side, changes in funding 
raised: deposits, issues of securities (covered bonds) and asset securitisations. Changes in profitability 
are also analysed and the section concludes with solvency indicators, measuring resilience in terms of 
institutions’ loss-absorption capacity.1 
Two matters should be clarified in connection with the second section of each chapter. First, the 
analysis is based on the financial statements of credit institutions with relevant adjustments to the 
data series for uniformity as regards definition and comparability. There were highly significant 
regulatory and accounting changes during the period analysed in the report which directly impacted 
the data included in the financial statements submitted by deposit institutions and on which the 
analysis was based; noteworthy among these was the new Banco de España Circular CBE 4/2004, 
which came into force on 1 January 2005, implementing the International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) adopted by the European Union (EU) from January 2005. 
Second, for each variable the performance of deposit institutions2 as a whole is analysed, 
differentiating between their main component parts: commercial banks and savings banks. For 
simplicity, reference is made to the performance of commercial banks, on one hand, and of savings 
banks, on the other, assuming that performance in each of these two groups of institutions was not 
uniform (the report indicates that savings banks were the main recipients of public aid, but, logically, 
not all savings banks were). Also, it should be noted that from 2010 the reform of the savings banks 
sector initiated pursuant to RDL 11/2010 of 9 July 2010 ended with the transformation of most of 
1 The financial variables refer to business in Spain, except in the case of profitability and solvency, where consolidated data 
are used. Consolidated data include the data of subsidiaries abroad, unless it is expressly stated that they relate to business 
in Spain. 
2 Comprising commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives. 
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the institutions in this sector into commercial banks. However, for information purposes, the 
comparison between commercial banks and savings banks is maintained in several sections, the latter 
group comprising the “former savings banks sector”, i.e. institutions whose legal status was once that 
of savings banks, regardless of whether they were subsequently transformed into banking institutions. 
The third section of each chapter refers to the international and Spanish regulatory framework.3 
One of the main elements of response to the international financial crisis was the profound financial 
regulation reform coordinated internationally through the Financial Stability Board and the Basel 
Committee, and which entailed specific developments in Europe and Spain alike. The Banco de 
España contributed to the preparation and approval of this framework through its participation in 
international and European fora, and through its advisory functions on national legislation and the 
regulatory implementation thereof, mainly through the Banco de España’s circulars. 
The fourth section of each chapter (the fifth in Chapters 2 and 3) addresses supervisory actions 
undertaken by the Banco de España in the exercise of its powers. These actions relate to the 
macroeconomic and financial environment of each period and are determined by the regulatory 
framework in force from time to time. 
Finally, the report includes two annexes. Annex 1 summarises the cooperation of the Banco de 
España and the FROB with the judicial authorities in connection with the banking crisis, including 
submissions to the judicial authorities of operations potentially involving criminal activity. Annex 2 
includes a list of the main documents published by the Banco de España in connection with the crisis, 
namely the Annual Report, Financial Stability Report, Report on Banking Supervision in Spain, Economic 
Bulletin, briefing notes and press releases. The report is mainly based on these publications, and on 
documents issued by international bodies such as the European Central Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Commission. 
3 As there were significant regulatory developments during the period 2008-2013, Chapters 2 and 3 include two distinct 
sections on this issue: one on the international and European framework and one on the Spanish framework.

1 THE YEARS OF ECONOMIC EXPANSION: 
ANALYSIS OF THE PERIOD 2000-2007
1.1 MACROECONOMICENVIRONMENT
By the end of 2007 the Spanish economy had recorded fourteen years of uninterrupted economic 
growth. During that period, Spain achieved its aim to be among the first countries to join Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), in 1999, meeting the criteria required in respect of price stability, 
interest rates, exchange rates and sustainability of public finances. Euro area membership entailed not 
only a step up in the Spanish economy’s participation in the global economic boom, but also this 
environment had a particularly expansionary impact in Spain. For that reason, as a prelude to analysis 
of the years of economic expansion in Spain, it is appropriate to first consider the international 
environment and, especially, the prolonged period of growth and stability of the global economy that 
came to be known as the Great Moderation.
A. International economy
Between 2000 and 2007 global GDP rose by 42%, with annual growth rates (see Chart 1.1) of 
at least 2.5% in all cases. World economic growth was affected, in 2001, by the dot-com crisis and 
the terrorist attacks in the United States. However, the main advanced economies responded with 
expansionary monetary policies that provided, at least in part, for a continuation of the financial 
upturn, with continued growth in lending and in certain asset prices including, in a good many 
advanced economies, those of real estate assets. 
This response by the main monetary authorities was possible thanks to the absence of significant 
inflationary pressures, despite the notable and prolonged economic growth recorded.1 Indeed, in the 
period indicated, the average rate of inflation in the advanced countries overall barely reached 2.1%, 
with a high of 2.4% in 2006. Increasing globalisation and, especially, the incorporation of emerging 
economies into world trade contributed to this benign inflation scenario by limiting the scope for 
1 In this respect it is important to note that, at that time, most central banks were mandated to maintain consumer price stability, but 
this mandate did not extend to prices of real or financial assets. For a discussion of whether or not monetary policy should also take 
account of developments in asset prices see, for example, the paper authored by Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler (2001), “Should 
Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?”, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 91, num. 2, pp. 253–257.
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price increases of goods and services in the advanced economies. Moreover, the high savings levels 
recorded in some of the main emerging economies gave rise to a general decline in both nominal and 
real interest rates, to historically low levels, and prompted high capital flows into advanced countries. 
As a result, significant imbalances built up in the current account balances of some of the leading 
economies, which became commonly known as “global imbalances”. 
In tandem with this increase in economic globalisation came an intense process of financial 
integration. The sharp rise in financial flows between regions and countries was accompanied, in turn, by 
a high degree of financial innovation, characterised by rapid growth in the use of new instruments, such 
as certain structured products and credit derivatives. Some of these products gradually became more 
complex, and purportedly more efficient when it came to avoiding excessive risk concentration. The speed 
with which some of these financial assets evolved was faster, in some cases, than the pace of adjustment of 
the regulatory framework. At the same time, it became increasingly hard to identify the agents assuming 
the ultimate risk of these financial instruments and products, making their monitoring difficult. 
With the benefit of hindsight, there can be no doubt that the real level of risk assumed at that time 
in the global financial markets was much higher than was estimated or could be expected, and that some 
of the newest and most complex products proved to be less reliable than estimated, especially in some 
jurisdictions, all of which contributed to the outbreak of the crisis and its subsequent worsening. In 
addition, the lack of early detection and monitoring tools for systemic risk and the low level of development 
at that time of global macroprudential policies hindered the early detection of these excesses.
Likewise, in retrospect, the international environment described was conducive to pursuit by the 
main central banks of monetary policies that were probably too lax, thus contributing to the build-up of 
the imbalances mentioned. Fiscal policies too were affected by the long period of economic boom and 
asset price inflation. Although some countries achieved a favourable financial situation, with a budget 
surplus and a significant reduction in debt, it later became clear that part of those improvements were a 
result of temporary increases in public revenue frequently connected to real estate market growth. 
Subsequently, when this revenue suddenly disappeared, fiscal positions deteriorated significantly, 
narrowing the room for manoeuvre available to authorities to counter the effects of the crisis.
B. Spanish economy
In this international setting, real GDP growth in Spain was 34.5% in cumulative terms in the 
period 2000 to 2007, with an annual average rate of 3.8% (see Chart 1.2). As a result, economic 
growth in terms of GDP per capita rose significantly, converging by 9.8 pp2 in respect of the euro 
2 In nominal terms. 
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area average, to reach 94.8% in 2007. This positive macroeconomic performance was especially 
evident in the employment rate, which rose by 12.2 pp in the period, against the backdrop of a 
significant increase (of almost 12 pp) in the female participation rate, on the one hand, and strong 
demographic expansion, with population growth of almost five million in the period (1.3% in 
annual average terms), some 90% of which was owing to net inflows of immigrants, on the other. 
This long period of expansion also had a number of undesirable effects, which translated into a 
build-up of significant macroeconomic and financial imbalances. Euro area membership entailed the 
loss of the mechanism whereby exchange rates could be adjusted relative to those of the other euro 
area countries, and the adoption of a common monetary policy that was appropriate for the euro area 
as a whole. Joining an economic area that enjoyed greater macroeconomic stability meant that interest 
rates fell considerably in Spain, an effect that was heightened by the expansionary monetary policy 
prevailing in the period. 
In consequence, after Spain joined the euro area, interest rates were low compared with those 
that would have been advisable in view of the cyclical position of the Spanish economy. The resultant 
strong expansionary impulse encouraged higher spending by different agents and was accompanied 
by growth in the debt of households and non-financial corporations, which in terms of GDP rose by 
97 pp (from 94% to 191% of GDP) in the period 2000-2007.
The growth in financing to the private sector was concentrated especially in the real estate sector, 
which posted annual average growth rates of 20% in loans for house purchases and 29% in loans to 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE, European Commission and Banco de España.
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construction and real estate service firms in that period.3 After a minor slowdown in 2002 and the first 
half of 2003, linked to the effects of the dot-com crisis, financing raised by the private sector picked up 
again in the second half of 2003, reaching peak annual growth rates of 25% (in December 2005) in 
loans to households for house purchases and 44% (in December 2007) in loans to construction and real 
estate firms. The notable growth in the real estate sector and the strong flow of financing into the sector 
fuelled each other, eventually giving rise to excesses in the rate of house-building and in house prices. 
The surge in demand for housing observed in the period was encouraged by, high future income 
prospects, easier access to mortgage credit (courtesy of low interest rates and longer maturity periods, 
among other factors) and the notable population increase. The consequent upward momentum in 
prices also helped to fuel demand momentum, prompting greater expectations of higher real estate 
prices which fomented growth in the supply of credit, underpinned by the developments in real estate 
prices and assets.
Housing supply responded, somewhat belatedly but intensely, to this higher demand, which 
was also encouraged by the accommodative credit conditions for the real estate and construction 
sectors, the availability of development land, boosted by several regulatory changes introduced from 
the end of the 1990s, and the plentiful supply of labour, fuelled by the large migration flows. In the 
strong demand setting described, all these factors prompted a very marked increase in investment in 
housing. Indeed, as a percentage of GDP, housing investment almost doubled in the period 2000-
2007, reaching a peak of 12% (more than 5 pp above the figure for the euro area). Investment in 
non-residential building (civil and public works) increased by 1.4 pp, while the number of social 
security registered workers in the construction sector rose by more than one million and, in 2007, 
housing starts totalled more than 600,000. 
That said, despite the significant increase in supply, house prices (measured by the statistics on 
appraised value of the Ministry of Public Works) soared, rising by 100% in real terms and by 150% 
in nominal terms in the period. This house price momentum heightened in the years leading up to 
the crisis and came to form a pattern consistent with a speculative bubble, such that, for a protracted 
period, house prices were higher than the level consistent with the fundamental housing market 
determinants.4
3 See Section 1.2 for an analysis of credit growth in the reference period. 
4 A speculative bubble may be defined as a disproportionate increase in the price of an asset, such that it exceeds the value 
that would be consistent with its fundamental determinants for a protracted period. In the case of housing, the “fundamental 
value” would be its value as a durable good that provides accommodation for its inhabitants. The presence of a speculative 
element in house prices would reflect expectations by some house buyers of obtaining a return on their property, by 
subsequently selling it at a sufficiently high price, above that they would obtain by keeping it for their own use or placing 
it on the rental market.
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Ultimately, the combination of real estate sector imbalances and very high indebtedness in the 
economy became the main transmission mechanism of the subsequent crisis. The significant feedback 
loop that developed between real estate prices and the indebtedness of certain segments of the household 
and non-financial corporation sectors increased their vulnerability (and that of the financial system 
itself ) to potential adjustments in real estate prices and tightening of financial conditions. 
Against this background of excessively accommodative financial and monetary conditions for 
the Spanish economy, the inflation rate was systematically higher in Spain than in the euro area 
overall (see Chart 1.2). The build-up of positive inflation differentials with respect to the euro area 
from the very start of its existence (around 1 pp per annum on average up to 2008) fuelled a significant 
loss of price competitiveness relative to the rest of the euro area, as both profit margins and unit 
labour costs grew at a faster pace than the euro area average. Spain’s low labour productivity growth 
(and especially its low total factor productivity growth)5 relative to the rest of the euro area, together 
with its high wage growth rates, gave rise, in the period 1996-2008 (see Chart 1.3), to an increase in 
unit labour costs relative to the euro area as a whole verging on 25%. 
The strong demand pressure and the loss of external competitiveness of the Spanish economy 
also had very significant consequences. Although Spain’s world export market shares remained 
quite steady, the weight of imports in final demand rose by 2 pp in the period, resulting in a 
current and capital account deficit of 9% of GDP in 2007, one of the highest among the developed 
countries.
Recurring balance of payments deficits in the period gave rise to a negative net international 
investment position (IIP) for the Spanish economy of 80% of GDP in 2007, whitch was also very 
high by international standards (see Chart 1.3). Most of these capital inflows into Spain were 
obtained directly or indirectly by credit institutions, through sales to international investors of 
securities (especially asset-backed securities and covered bonds) issued by those institutions (or, in 
the case of asset-backed securities, by special-purpose vehicles), backed largely by their loan 
portfolios. These funds, which financed the expansion of credit to households and non-financial 
corporations in Spain, entailed a growing reliance on the willingness of external investors to 
maintain a flow of funds to meet not only the maturities but also the new needs deriving from the 
persistent current account deficit.
In short, during this period of economic expansion, highly significant imbalances built up, in 
terms of resident private-sector debt, reliance on external financing, the weight of the real estate 
5 Total factor productivity (TFP) is defined as the part of final output that cannot be related to the levels of employment and 
capital utilised in its production, and that seeks therefore to reflect intangibles, including, in particular, technological 
progress, innovation, research and development, the economic and institutional environment and competitiveness.
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sector in the economy, over-valuation of the price of real estate assets and loss of competitiveness. 
Economic agents tended to underestimate the importance of these imbalances, in a setting in which 
Spain’s recent inclusion in an economic area that enjoyed greater macroeconomic stability made it 
difficult to distinguish between the long and short-term effects of that inclusion. This limited 
appreciation of the level of risk extended to the valuations of many financial assets, and discrimination 
as to the credit quality of the different financial products and agents proved to be clearly insufficient. 
This build-up of macroeconomic and financial imbalances also occurred in other countries of 
the euro area, particularly in those that started out from lower levels of income per capita. With the 
advent of monetary union, these countries saw a significant fall in their real interest rates and an 
improvement in their growth expectations, and they received financing essentially from other member 
countries with current account surpluses and more moderate economic growth rates. Problems 
CHART 1.3 BUILD-UP OF IMBALANCES IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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emerged of private-sector over-indebtedness, banking system vulnerability, excessive reliance on 
external saving, competitiveness losses and, in some cases, fiscal sustainability, with varying degrees of 
intensity, in these countries, although in general their scope and their possible consequences were not 
correctly diagnosed. The financial markets underestimated the risks deriving from these developments, 
so that, for example, the differences in risk premia applied to different sovereign debt issuers virtually 
disappeared.
In their analysis of the Spanish economy, the Banco de España and other international 
organisations such as the IMF and the OECD identified these problems and issued warnings about 
the growing vulnerability of households’ finances associated with their increasing debt, a significant 
over-valuation of housing, the build-up of competitiveness losses, the level of concentration in credit 
institutions’ portfolios and the excessive reliance on borrowing.6 These imbalances in the Spanish 
economy were identified as risks for continuation along the central economic growth path, but a 
progressive deceleration in activity was projected, compatible with a gradual correction of these 
imbalances which, in the event, did not occur. As will be seen in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report, there 
was no anticipation of a severe economic downturn such as that which ensued from 2008, nor, 
clearly, of the factors that triggered that downturn, namely the international financial crisis, in the 
first instance, and the euro area sovereign debt crisis, in the second.
Regarding economic policy recommendations, given that the prevailing financial and monetary 
conditions were excessively accommodative for the Spanish economy, the use in that period of other 
domestic economic policy levers, which could have helped to counter the generation of these 
imbalances, was clearly insufficient. In particular, as indicated above, the limited implementation at 
the international level of systems permitting early detection of systemic financial risk and of 
macroprudential policy tools – which started to be developed as a consequence of the crisis – acted as 
a constraint on the adoption of a more forward-looking and more efficient approach to prevention of 
the crisis, both in Spain and globally. 
In the case of Spain, the constraints on adopting such an approach were most evident in 
relation to the excessive credit growth in the years preceding the crisis and the high exposure of credit 
institutions to real estate sector risks. It should be noted, however, that the Banco de España developed 
a raft of specific regulatory instruments to counter the build-up of these risks in the Spanish financial 
system, including the “dynamic provisions”, analysed below in detail in Section 1.2. Subsequently, 
however, as the international financial crisis unfolded and international capital markets severely 
tightened, the Spanish regulatory instruments implemented during the expansionary phase proved 
6 See, inter alia, the Banco de España’s Annual Report and Financial Stability Report for this period, the IMF’s reports on 
Article IV Consultations and the OECD’s Economic Studies.
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to be clearly insufficient and, as will be analysed in the next chapter, only from 2008 did work 
begin on the development of a new regulatory and supervisory framework coordinated at the 
international level. 
Moreover, the supply-side reforms affecting the labour, product and factor markets and the 
economy’s productivity also proved insufficient to achieve the aim of maintaining and enhancing the 
competitive capacity of the economy, as required by membership of a monetary union. 
Lastly, insofar as budget policy is concerned, although during the first years of euro area 
membership Spain’s general government agencies reduced their financing needs substantially, to the 
extent that fiscal surpluses were recorded in 2006 and 2007, taking government debt to 36% of GDP 
in 2007, it is clear that the fiscal policy stance during that expansionary phase was not sufficiently 
countercyclical. In particular, as was demonstrated when the real estate bubble came to an end, the 
improved fiscal position was underpinned in part by cyclical effects and by extraordinary revenue 
closely linked to the real estate boom, whereas a large portion of the higher public spending 
commitment had a significant structural component. 
1.2 SITUATIONOFTHEFINANCIALSECTOR
As described in the previous section, the first few years after 2001 were marked by rapid growth 
in the volume of credit and by an increasing proportion of real estate lending. This section offers a 
more detailed description of the strong expansion of the financial sector and, in particular, of the 
savings banks, which by December 2007 accounted for 49% of total credit in the system, outpacing 
the growth of the commercial banks (even though neither all of the savings banks nor all of the 
commercial banks behaved in the same fashion). For this purpose, there follows a review of the main 
indicators of the deposit institution sector, such as developments in lending and non-performing 
loans, sources of financing, profitability and, lastly, solvency. As will be seen, throughout the reference 
period the main variables remained consistent with the prevailing economic expansion, although 
towards the end of the period they started to reflect a turnaround.
A. Credit to the resident private sector
As shown in Charts 1.4 and 1.5, in the years 2001 to 2007 credit growth outpaced that of 
nominal GDP, and with an increasingly larger gap. Credit rose by 221% in the period, while nominal 
GDP rose by 67% and real GDP by 28%. The average annual rate of change in credit throughout the 
period considered was 18.1%, with the highest growth rates being recorded in 2005 (28%) and 2006 
(26%), well above the average year-on-year rate of change in nominal GDP in the period which was 7.6% 
(see Chart 1.4).
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The figures by volume also illustrate the strong expansion in credit extended by deposit 
institutions in the period. While credit totalled €527 billion at the end of 2000, that is, 81% of 
nominal GDP, by the end of 2004 it was 1.7 times higher, and by the end of 2007 it was another 
1.9 times higher. In total, by the end of 2007, credit volume was 3.2 times higher, amounting to 
€1,692 billion or 157% of nominal GDP (see Chart 1.5). 
The savings banks were the main protagonists of this credit expansion, in keeping with the 
geographical expansion undertaken by many of their number during the previous decade. Thus, 
between 2000 and 2007, lending by savings banks rose by 266%, compared with rather more 
moderate growth in lending by commercial banks (182%). In cumulative annual average terms, 
lending by savings banks rose by 20.3% and lending by commercial banks by 15.9%. The rate of 
growth peaked in both cases in 2005 and 2006: lending by commercial banks rose by 28% in 2005 
and by 24% in 2006, while lending by savings banks rose by 28% in each of those years.
Given this disparate performance, by the end of 2007 savings banks accounted for 49% of 
total credit volume and commercial banks for 46%, when in the year 2000 commercial banks had 
accounted for more than 50% of the total (see Chart 1.6). The cooperative sector maintained a 
stable share close to 5%.
Analysis of lending by institutional sector, that is, to households or non-financial corporations, 
shows no major differences. In keeping with the general credit growth pattern, recourse to lending 
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increased similarly in both sectors, with growth rates over 220% between 2000 and 2007 and annual 
average rates over 18%. However, significant differences are observed according to loan purpose, with 
a higher proportion linked to the real estate sector. 
— In the case of lending to Spanish households, between 2000 and 2007 a substantial increase 
is observed in loans for house purchases, which record cumulative average annual growth of 
19.7% between 2000 and 2007 – 252% in the period – compared with 14.6% for loans for 
other purposes, essentially consumer loans. Accordingly, in 2007, 80% of total lending to 
households was for house purchases, compared with 75% in 2000. Of this increase in 
lending to households, commercial banks accounted for 37% and savings banks for 57%. 
— As regards lending to non-financial corporations, there was a significant increase in credit 
extended to firms in the construction and real estate sectors, which recorded a cumulative 
average annual rate of change of almost 30%, compared with 12% in the case of credit 
extended to firms in other sectors. In cumulative terms, lending to the real estate sector rose 
by 513%, compared with lending to all other sectors, which rose by just 120%. Thus, as a 
proportion of total lending to the resident private sector, lending to construction and real 
estate firms went from 14% at the end of 2000 to 26% in December 2007 (see Chart 1.7). 
Both commercial and savings banks progressively increased their lending to construction 
and real estate sector firms, although savings banks to a greater extent than commercial 
banks: while lending by the latter rose at average annual rates of 27.7%, lending by savings 
banks rose at rates verging on 31% year-on-year. 
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In short, during the reference period, the rate of growth of credit extended by commercial 
banks and, particularly, by savings banks accelerated. Moreover, this lending was concentrated on 
construction and real estate activities, in the case of lending to non-financial corporations, and on 
house purchases in the case of lending to households. Thus, whereas at the end of 2000 construction-
related activities and the real estate sector accounted for 47% of total credit to the resident private 
sector, seven years later this figure had risen to 62.5%.7
B. Non-performing loans
An analysis of credit developments is incomplete without an analysis of non-performing loans, 
non-performing loan ratios and coverage levels.
Despite the notable credit growth, the first years of the period under study were characterised 
by a low volume of non-performing loans (NPLs), declining NPL ratios and high NPL coverage 
ratios (around 50%, or over 200% coverage by countercyclical provisions is included),8 although the 
rate of coverage declined somewhat at the end of the period. The changes observed in each of these 
variables is described below.
7 This figure, as shown in Chart 1.7, is the sum of loans for “construction and real estate activity” plus “housing” loans.  
8 See Section 1.4 of this chapter for an analysis of countercyclical provisions. 
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— In terms of volume, NPLs posted positive year-on-year growth rates, but these were 
lower than the annual average rate of growth of total lending. NPL growth did not begin 
to accelerate until 2005 (see Chart 1.8). 
— As NPLs were growing, but at a slower pace than total lending, NPL ratios remained low 
and relatively steady. Indeed, as Chart 1.9 shows, these ratios, which measure the amount 
of non-performing loans relative to total loans, remained below 1% throughout the 
period analysed. 
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 NPL ratios remained at low levels in all components of credit to the private sector. In the 
case of loans for house purchases, the ratio was even below 0.5%, being slightly higher, 
at close to 2%, in the case of loans for other purposes (see Chart 1.9). For their part, 
non-financial corporations had NPL ratios below 1% for lending to the construction 
and real estate sectors, and slightly higher ratios for lending for other activities. 
— Regarding coverage ratios, deposit institutions’ credit risk appeared to be adequately 
covered. Between 2000 and 2004, NPL coverage ratios were high, around 50%-60%, 
save in the case of loans to households for house purchases which stood at 30%-40%, as 
shown in Chart 1.10. 
These NPL and coverage ratios remained at similar levels both for commercial and savings banks. 
At the end of the period analysed, in 2007, a turnaround started to be observed in both the NPL and 
coverage ratios, and developments at commercial and savings banks started to diverge. The volume of 
NPLs rose sharply, more so for savings banks (with year-on-year rates of change verging on 70%) than for 
commercial banks (below 50%) and at a much higher pace than total lending (growth rates below 20%). 
This prompted widespread increases in NPL ratios (save in the case of lending to non-financial 
corporations for other activities), although they continued to be relatively low: at the end of 2007 the 
NPL ratio for lending to the resident private sector was 0.8%. The coverage ratio dropped to 37%, 
compared with more than 50% in 2003 and 2004. As will be seen in the next chapter, the NPL 
situation worsened in 2008, both in absolute and relative terms.
C. Government debt holdings of deposit institutions
For purposes of comparison with the developments described in the following chapters, it should be 
noted that during the first years of the period analysed the volume of Spanish government debt held by 
deposit institutions was relatively steady and was proportionately much lower than that held subsequently. 
Between 2000 and 2005 these holdings fluctuated, for the system overall, around the level of €100 billion, 
with a peak of €114 billion in 2003. The volume of holdings of Spanish government debt was stable both 
for savings banks (around €45 billion) and commercial banks (around €55 billion). 
From 2006 and up to the end of the expansionary period, Spain’s commercial banks gradually 
reduced the volume of government debt on their balance sheets, to €34 billion in December 2007, 
while the volume at savings banks remained unchanged (see Chart 1.11). 
This relative stability in Spanish government debt holdings in a period of strong balance sheet 
growth for Spanish deposit institutions (total assets of business in Spain increased by 160% between 
December 2000 and December 2007) meant that Spanish government debt securities gradually came 
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to make up a smaller portion of institutions’ balance sheets. Thus, whereas in December 2000 government 
debt holdings accounted for 8.8% of total assets, by December 2007 this figure had shrunk to barely 
2.8% (see Chart 1.12). This pattern was observed both at commercial and savings banks, although with 
differences in the starting and finishing levels. In the case of commercial banks, Spanish government debt 
holdings fell from 7.9% of assets in December 2000 to 2.2% in December 2007 (a decrease of 5.7 pp); 
in the case of savings banks, they fell from 10.2% to 3.8% (a decrease of 6.4 pp) over the same period.
D. Sources of credit institutions’ financing: deposits and securitisations
Having analysed the strong growth in lending by credit institutions, it is now time to examine the 
funds obtained by those institutions to finance this growing activity. The main sources of financing are 
deposits, especially customer deposits, and securities market issues such as covered bonds and securitisations. 
As Chart 1.13 shows, in the growth years that preceded the crisis there was a very significant 
increase in deposits in the financial system overall. Thus, deposits rose by €920 billion between 2000 
and 2007, which is an aggregate growth rate of 109% (a cumulative average annual rate of 11%). The 
increase in customer deposits accounted for the bulk of this growth (almost €584 billion). In the case of 
commercial banks, such high rates of growth were also observed in interbank deposits. For their part, 
savings banks financed their lending business during those early years mainly with customer deposits. 
Nevertheless, despite the considerable increase in deposit volume, it was outpaced by credit 
growth, so institutions were forced to seek alternative sources of financing to fund the strong credit 
expansion. This may be illustrated by the change observed in the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio, which 
measures the relationship between loans to the private sector and private-sector deposits. At 31 
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December 2000 deposit institutions had an LTD ratio of 93% (102% at commercial banks and 85% 
at savings banks); by 31 December 2007 the ratio had risen to 155% (159% at commercial banks and 
154% at savings banks).
In turn, in the years preceding the crisis there was very strong growth in issuance of asset-
backed securities, with year-on-year rates of growth in excess of 40%, mainly in the form of mortgage 
securitisations (which in the case of savings banks accounted for more than 80% of total securitisations, 
compared with around 50% for commercial banks). In this respect, there was a notable increase in 
marketable debt securities and, especially, in issues of covered bonds both by commercial and savings 
banks. At the end of 2007, covered bonds amounted to more than €275 billion (compared with 
€12 billion at the start of the period; see Chart 1.14). Between 2000 and 2007 savings banks posted 
a cumulative average annual rate of change in the issuance of covered bonds of 60%, compared with 
50% for commercial banks. 
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E. Profitability of the sector
Overall, Spanish deposit institutions’ financial statements showed healthy results in the years 
preceding the crisis, assisted by rapid credit growth and low levels of NPLs. 
Institutions became more efficient, courtesy of the substantial growth in assets managed, which 
meant that the ratio of operating expenses to average total assets tended to decline. Moreover, although 
in the period 2000 to 2007 net interest income decreased in relative terms owing to the fall in interest 
rates, in absolute terms it rose as a result of the higher volume of transactions. Also in that period, 
institutions’ fee and commission income tended to decline, as competition to attract new customers 
(borrowers and depositors) heightened. Lastly, as a consequence of the low levels of NPLs, loan loss 
provisioning expenses were very low relative to credit volumes (see Chart 1.15).
In this setting, on consolidated data, return on equity (ROE) held steady between 2000 and 2007, 
remaining over 12% at all times and verging on 20% even at the end of 2007. Likewise on consolidated 
data, return on assets (ROA) also remained high, standing above 0.7% in all cases and reaching a peak of 
1.05% in December 2007 (see Chart 1.16). Thus, institutions’ profits rose at a faster pace than their capital 
or assets.
Considering activity pursued in Spain only, income statements showed a similar performance, with ROE 
remaining over 13% on average in the period 2000 to 2007, as the ratio of operating expenses to average total 
assets also declined. There was little difference between commercial and savings banks, which posted similar ROE 
and ROA levels. As to the ratio of operating expenses to average total assets, savings banks recorded somewhat 
higher levels, although they also obtained efficiency gains at a faster pace than commercial banks in the period.
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F. Solvency indicators
In order to analyse the solvency of Spain’s deposit institutions, three main components are 
studied: volume of capital, risk-weighted assets, and solvency or capital ratios, defined as the ratio 
between volume of capital (numerator) and risk-weighted assets (denominator).9 
It is important to note that during the period of reference of this report, significant changes 
were made to solvency regulations,10 modifying certain aspects of the definitions of solvency ratios. 
In particular, the regulatory changes introduced in recent years changed the concepts included in or 
excluded from the numerator (different types of capital and deductions from capital), and also the 
method used to calculate the denominator (risk-weighted assets). 
For the capital analysis, and to ensure that the data used are uniform throughout the period 
covered by this report, two different capital variables will be analysed.11 First, total capital, which is a 
broad capital measure covering institutions’ total own funds; and second, Tier 1 capital, which is a 
slightly narrower capital measure, limiting the elements eligible as capital to higher quality components, 
that is, those with greater loss-absorbing capacity (see Box 1.1). 
9 Consolidated data are used for the solvency analysis.
10 These regulatory changes, deriving primarily from the international capital accords known as Basel II and Basel III, are 
described in more detail in Section 2.3 of this report.
11 To standardise the concepts included in each capital definition over the period 2000-2015, the necessary adjustments have 
been made to the data series.
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box 1.1 ToTAL CAPITAL AND TIER 1 CAPITAL
Different capital measures may be used to analyse 
deposit institutions’ solvency, according to the 
concepts included in or excluded from the capital 
definition. These definitions vary according to the 
solvency regulations in force from time to time. Thus, 
during the fifteen years analysed in this report (2000-
2014) the solvency regulations underwent significant 
changes, chiefly the introduction of Basel II solvency 
standards in 20081 and Basel III solvency standards 
in 2014,2 described in detail in Section 2.3 of this 
report. Basel III, for instance, whose essential aim3 
was not only to raise capital requirements for 
institutions but especially to enhance capital quality 
(that is, the capacity to absorb losses), introduced 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1). This new capital 
definition, which corresponds to the highest quality 
capital and immediately became the market 
benchmark for assessing institutions’ solvency, is only 
available from June 2014, so its analysis for the entire 
period is not possible. This report analyses two 
solvency variables: total capital and Tier 1 capital. 
Total capital comprises Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. 
Tier 1 capital is more limited and includes the 
relevant capital deductions. 
Tier 1 capital elements have the most loss-
absorbing capacity and, therefore, the highest quality. 
The essential elements of Tier 1 capital are share 
capital, including similar elements such as savings 
banks’ equity units (cuotas participativas), and reserves, 
while preference shares (participaciones preferentes), 
hybrid instruments that grant their holders voting 
rights that are more limited than those of ordinary 
shares, are only eligible if they meet certain conditions 
and up to a certain limit. The main deductions are for 
goodwill and other intangibles.
The chief element of Tier 2 capital, which is part 
of total capital but not of Tier 1 capital, is subordinated 
debt. Other key elements are general loan loss 
provisions and asset revaluation reserves.
1 Banco de España Circular 3/2008 of 22 May 2008 to credit 
institutions on determination and control of minimum own 
funds is the main standard adapting Spanish legislation to 
the Basel II criteria, transposing EU Directives 2006/48/EC 
and 2006/49/EC.
2 Basel III was transposed into Spanish legislation through 
Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 (directly 
applicable in the Member States) and Law 10/2014 on the 
regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions 
which transposes Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 
into Spanish law.
3 Other, equally significant, aims of Basel III were to 
standardise capital definitions at an international level 
and strengthen transparency.
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The changes in capital, risk-weighted assets and solvency ratios over the period 2000 to 2007 
are analysed below:
— Capital. As Chart 1.17 shows, institutions’ volume of capital increased significantly 
during the expansionary years. In absolute terms, between 2000 and 2007 the total 
capital of the Spanish financial system rose by €135 billion, up 155% on the level at the 
start of 2000. Over the same period, higher quality Tier 1 capital rose by slightly less 
(€85 billion, an increase of 118% between 2000 and 2007). Thus, during those years, 
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total capital grew at a cumulative average annual rate of 14.3% and Tier 1 capital at 
11.8%. The average annual rate of growth of Tier 1 capital was 5.4% in the period 
2000-2003 and 16.7% in the period 2004-2007.
 Both commercial and savings banks recorded an increase in the volume of capital on their 
balance sheets, with savings banks recording the higher rate of growth. Thus, commercial 
banks’ total capital rose by 113% between December 2000 and 2007, representing a 
cumulative average annual rate of growth of 11.4%, while the figures for savings banks were 
215% and 17.8%, respectively. The pattern is the same for Tier 1 capital, although with lower 
rates of growth: Tier 1 capital rose by 91% (a cumulative average annual rate of 9.7%) for 
commercial banks and by 154% (an annual rate of 14.3%) for savings banks in the period.
— Risk-weighted assets (RWAs). These assets, which constitute the denominator of the 
solvency ratio, also posted strong growth in the period (see Chart 1.17), with a cumulative 
average annual rate of change of 14.2%. 
 In 2007, RWAs in the sector amounted to almost €2.1 trillion, growing by more than 
€1.25 trillion in absolute terms from the €828 billion recorded in December 2000, an 
increase of 153%. The rate of growth was higher for savings banks than for commercial 
banks. Thus, commercial banks’ RWAs rose by 116% between December 2000 and 
December 2007, a cumulative average annual rate of change of 11.6%, while savings 
banks’ RWAs rose by 216%, a cumulative average annual rate of change of 17.9%.
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 Therefore, during the years preceding the crisis, both the volume of capital – be it total or 
Tier 1 capital – and RWAs rose sharply, although with some differences. The volume of total 
capital and RWAs recorded similar rates of growth, while Tier 1 capital grew at a slower pace. 
— Solvency ratios. In consequence, solvency ratios differ according to whether they are based 
on total capital or Tier 1 capital (see Chart 1.18). While the total capital ratio remained 
virtually unchanged, standing at 10.5% in 2000 and at 10.6% in 2007, the Tier 1 capital 
ratio declined by 122 bp in the period, from 8.8% in 2000 to 7.5% at the end of 2007. 
This drop was more pronounced in the case of savings banks, where the ratio fell by almost 
200 bp on average,12 to 8.1% at the end of 2007, compared with a fall of 90 bp for 
commercial banks, to 7% in December 2007.
To sum up, while between 2001 and 2007 the main indicators for the Spanish deposit institution 
sector reflected a healthy position for institutions, with low levels of NPLs, high coverage ratios and 
solvency ratios that, as will be seen, were higher than the minimum levels required at the time, the 
period of expansion in lending activity saw the existence of the imbalances described (increasing 
concentration of risk in the real estate sector, high borrowing to meet growing activity, etc.). 
G. Singularities of the savings banks’ business
Some of the difficulties faced by savings banks were associated with the singularities of their 
legal status, explained in greater detail in the next section.
Savings banks were subject to structural restrictions preventing them from obtaining high-
quality capital other than by capitalising profit. Unlike commercial banks, they were unable to issue 
shares and raise capital on the financial markets, since equity units (cuotas participativas) were the 
only similar instrument available to them and, as these do not include voting rights, over time they 
proved to be unattractive to investors. 
While savings banks continued to pursue their business model based on proximity to their 
home region, marketing non-complex banking products to their customer base and pursuing moderate 
growth strategies, the capital obtained by capitalising profits proved to be sufficient. In that setting, 
the restrictions associated with their particular structure did not significantly hamper their normal 
development. However, as savings banks gradually expanded their business, these structural difficulties 
became more relevant.
12 As in the other sections, the differences between the commercial and savings bank sectors, which are presented for purposes 
of illustration, are based on average data for each sector. Neither all of the savings banks nor all of the commercial banks 
performed in the same fashion. 
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As savings banks expanded their activity beyond their traditional or original geographical areas, 
both their branch networks and their overheads expanded significantly, in keeping with their 
traditional business model based on retail banking and customer proximity. In some cases, this 
expansion entailed relaxing credit standards and disregarding sector concentration risks. Indeed, as 
seen above, over the course of the protracted economic growth phase some savings banks built up 
imbalances deriving from their high exposure to the real estate development and construction sector.
The traditional sources of financing were not sufficient to fund this strong business growth, as 
a consequence of the higher credit demand, so savings banks began to make more recurrent use of 
wholesale financing, mainly through covered bonds or asset securitisations.
Specifically, following the start of monetary union and the creation of the single currency, savings 
banks financed a significant part of their growth via recourse to the euro markets, issuing securities 
subscribed mainly by “non-resident investors”, and their retail deposit base lost ground compared with 
international financing. In retrospect, the relative proportion of securitised liabilities was high for the 
prevailing level of risk aversion on the financial markets. It should be noted, however, that this greater 
recourse to wholesale markets was undertaken quite prudently, with most maturities concentrated in 
the medium and long term. The diminishing level of profitability also became apparent, essentially 
owing to oversized structures, the increase in non-earning assets and the higher cost of debt. 
All these factors shaped an unfavourable setting for the savings banks, making a transformation 
of their structure advisable. This transformation, as described in the next section, began with corporate 
moves aiming to raise their efficiency levels, boosting their competitive position and their market 
credibility by increasing their average size and harnessing synergies. However, as will be seen in more 
depth below, these moves proved to be tardy and insufficient.
1.3 REGULATORYFRAMEWORKANDSUPERVISORYPOWERS
Before describing the measures taken by the supervisor during the period analysed, an overview 
of the regulatory framework governing banking activity at the time is appropriate. 
The regulatory framework governing the activity of deposit institutions seeks to safeguard the 
stability of the financial system and preserve the essential economic role played by the banking sector, 
namely intermediation between savings and credit, by raising funds, chiefly deposits, and granting 
credit and loans to firms, households and general government. Clearly, this activity is not devoid of 
risks or uncertainties, such as those deriving from the economic cycle, financial innovation, inefficient 
management or growing globalisation and financial interdependence, all of which may affect the 
stability of the system. 
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The regulations governing the Spanish banking sector, without forgetting the accounting regulations, 
are chiefly based on international banking agreements, deriving from the Basel Capital Accords, and the 
adaptation of European Union law to those accords through the relevant Directives and Regulations. 
The following analysis covers the main elements of the regulatory framework: regulations on 
solvency requirements; accounting regulations; the sanctions regime and supervisory powers; and, 
lastly, the specific legal status of savings banks.
A Solvency regulations
Solvency regulation is one of the key elements of regulation of credit institutions. For most of 
the economic growth years, the regulatory solvency framework was based on the first Capital Accord 
– Basel I – that was published in 1988 and was the guiding principle for the Community Directives 
that were transposed into Spanish law. 
As indicated in Box 1.2, one of the main elements of Basel I was the introduction of a minimum 
capital requirement or solvency ratio of 8% that aimed to measure the relationship between an 
institution’s regulatory capital and the risks assumed in its activity, although as subsequently became 
evident the sensitivity of the solvency ratio to the risk assumed was quite low. 
box 1.2 INTERNATIoNAL CAPITAL STANDARDS: bASEL I
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) is the leading international authority for the 
harmonisation of international financial regulation, 
made up of representatives of the supervisory bodies and 
central banks of the G20 countries. Its objective is to set 
uniform international standards in banking regulation 
and supervision. These international standards are “soft 
law” and are an essential component of the standards 
set in the various jurisdictions relating to the regulation 
of the financial system in the last two decades.
During most of the economic growth years, 
the regulatory solvency framework was based on 
the first Capital Accord, Basel I, which was published 
in 1988. The cornerstones of Basel I were the 
introduction of a definition of the components  of 
regulatory capital and the setting of a minimum 
capital requirement or solvency ratio of 8%. This 
ratio aimed to measure the relationship between the 
volume of an institution’s regulatory capital and the 
risks assumed in its activity. However, the ratio’s 
sensitivity to risk was low, as it did not sufficiently 
distinguish such an important factor for measuring 
capital needs as the credit quality of different 
lending operations and, therefore, their different 
probability of default.
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The European solvency regulations were transposed into Spanish law through Law 13/1985 of 25 
May 1985 and its subsequent amendments, including in particular those introduced by Law 13/1992 of 
1 June 1992 and its implementing regulations (Royal Decree 1343/1992 of 6 November 1992, Ministerial 
Order of 30 December 1992 and Circular 5/1993 of 26 March 1993) and Law 19/2003 of 4 July 2003. 
Basel I standards were thus included in Spanish legislation from the end of 1992.
In particular, banking regulation in force at that time in Spain aimed to ensure that credit 
institutions’ capital met minimum quality requirements. To that end, a distinction was drawn between 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, the latter with lower loss-absorbing capacity and, therefore, lower quality. 
In no circumstances could Tier 2 capital exceed Tier 1 capital. In addition, certain elements of Tier 2 
capital could not exceed 50% of Tier 1 capital.  
Tier 1 capital included, inter alia, share capital, initial capital, savings banks’ equity units (cuotas 
participativas), preference shares (participaciones preferentes)13 – provided that certain conditions were met – 
and reserves. As a further precaution, and in order to ensure optimum capital quality, preference shares 
could not account for more than 30% of an institution’s Tier 1 capital.14 At that time, bearing in mind 
these limits, of the solvency ratio of 8% required, Tier 1 capital had to account for at least 2.8%;15 as will 
be seen in subsequent chapters of this report, this requisite was to increase substantially in following years. 
Moreover, the minimum solvency ratio of 8% was essentially intended to cover the credit risk 
assumed by credit institutions.16 Each institution’s ratio was obtained by dividing its total capital by 
its risk-weighted assets, the bulk of the latter corresponding to credit risk. Risk-weighted assets were 
calculated using an approach that provided for little discrimination of credit risk, based on a very 
simple “standardised” method that classified assets into five pre-determined categories, weighted 
according to factors established in the legislation that defined the risk associated with those factors.17 
The regulations also established other measures, such as: i) limits on risk concentration by 
borrower (individual borrowers or risk groups),18 although there were no specific limits on sectoral 
13 The voting rights conferred by these shares are not comparable to those conferred by ordinary shares as they allow no say 
in institutions’ decision-making.
14 This condition was included in Law 13/2003 and subsequently in Rule Eleven of Circular 3/2008.
15 If Tier 2 capital cannot exceed 100% of Tier 1 capital, the latter must account for at least 50% of total capital. If preference 
shares may account for up to 30% of Tier 1 capital, then high-quality capital instruments would account for at least 35% 
of total capital (70% of 50%). The total solvency ratio required is 8%; 35% of that figure is 2.8%.    
16 Although this was not the only risk covered, as foreign exchange risk, trading book risk and commodity price risk were 
also included.
17 The weighting factors by type of asset were 0%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 100%. 
18 Exposures to a single customer or group of related customers could not exceed 25% of capital (20% in the case of the 
institution’s own group). Moreover, large exposures (understood as those that accounted for at least 10% of an institution’s 
capital) could not exceed 800% of capital. 
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box 1.3 bASEL II CAPITAL ACCoRD
In 2004, in order to overcome the weaknesses 
highlighted in respect of Basel I, the Basel Committee 
proposed Basel II. The main aim of this new Accord 
was to enhance and increase the risk sensitivity of 
banking regulations, making the calculation of risk-
weighted assets much more sophisticated, and to 
strengthen supervision. The regulatory framework was 
based on three pillars: 
i) Pillar 1, relating to minimum capital requirements, 
which revised the Basel I model. In addition 
to introducing operational risk requirements 
(adding operational risk-weighted assets), the 
main new feature was that it allowed institutions 
to use internal risk measurement models to 
calculate weighted assets, based on their 
own risk estimates. These models had to be 
validated by the supervisory authorities. The 
changes sought to recognise the advances made 
in portfolio management and internal loan 
classification techniques that, in principle, 
should provide incentives for banks to improve 
their risk measurement and their management 
capacity.
ii) Pillar 2, on supervisory review of the capital needs 
estimated by institutions following analysis of their 
risk profile. Pillar 2, which complemented Pillar 1, 
sought to ensure that institutions had additional 
safety buffers to cover other risks not envisaged in 
Pillar 1. Indeed, Pillar 2 was one of the key new 
features of Basel II. The aim was for institutions to 
improve their risk management and to have a capital 
policy closely linked to management. For that 
purpose institutions were required to conduct an 
annual internal capital adequacy assessment, which 
was subsequently reviewed by the supervisory 
authorities. Pillar 2 gave supervisors a bigger role: 
they were to act when they considered that an 
institution was operating with capital levels that were 
not consistent with its risk profile and they could 
impose on an institution a capital requirement above 
the minimum requirement established in Pillar 1.
iii) Pillar 3, which introduced market discipline, 
required institutions to have formal market 
reporting policies, including quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the activities pursued and 
the risks those activities entailed.
concentration; ii) the need for appropriate accounting procedures, risk management systems and 
internal control arrangements according to the size of the institution and the complexity of its 
business, and for policies clearly defined by its governing bodies; and (iii) the need for an appropriate, 
transparent organisational structure with well-defined reporting lines.19
In 2004 the Basel Committee published Basel II (see Box 1.3), a revised version of the 1988 
Capital Accord, which aimed, inter alia, to enhance and increase risk sensitivity in banking regulations 
and strengthen supervision.
19 In 1996, market risk requirements were introduced into Basel I (“Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate 
market risks”, BIS, January 1996).
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These international Accords were not transposed into European regulations until 2006, through 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. Transposition of the European regulations into the Spanish 
legal framework began in 2007 with Law 36/2007 of 16 November 2007, amending the above-
mentioned Law 13/1985, and Royal Decree 216/2008 of 15 February 2008. The transposition 
process was completed in 2008, coinciding with the outbreak of the crisis in Spain, with the publication 
of Banco de España Circular 3/2008 of 22 May 2008 on determination and control of minimum 
own funds, described in detail in the next chapter.20 
B Accounting regulations
In light of their importance, mention should also be made of the accounting regulations. Since 
1989 the Banco de España has powers to set the accounting standards to which credit institutions are 
subject. In 1991 the Banco de España published Circular 4/1991, which was implemented following 
the principle of prudence when it came to setting the requirements for the recording of credit risk 
provisions by institutions on their balance sheets.21 
In mid-2000, with a view to reducing the cyclical nature of credit risk provisioning, as it was 
observed that these provisions declined considerably in cyclical upturns and rose sharply in downturns, 
the Banco de España changed the method of calculation of general provisions, incorporating a 
countercyclical element, to be described in more detail in the next section. 
In 2004, the accounting framework of Spain’s credit institutions had to be adapted to 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), which had been incorporated into European law by 
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002.22 
The Banco de España implemented this adaptation through Circular 4/2004, both for consolidated 
and individual financial statements. Thus, thereafter, the accounting rules applied by Spanish credit 
institutions had to be consistent with IAS. 
However, these new international accounting standards were based on different principles to 
those that had underpinned the previous Spanish accounting model, which complicated their 
incorporation into Spanish regulations rather. Under the new accounting regulations, management 
had broader powers to set accounting policy, compared with the more rigid and deterministic Spanish 
20 In response to the international financial crisis, the Basel II standards were complemented, as discussed below, by Basel III 
(see Chapter 4 of this report). 
21 The Circular divided credit risk provisions between specific provisions (to be set aside according to a specific calendar in 
the case of past-due exposures) and general provisions.
22 The Regulation obliged all institutions publicly traded on an EU regulated market to use IAS to prepare and submit their 
consolidated financial statements.
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accounting model. The new framework gave institutions more discretion as to how to reflect a true and 
fair view of their financial situation, at the same time as it made the supervisory function more complex.
Spanish accounting practice adapted to the new international framework, although efforts were 
made to conserve the prudential criteria that characterised Spanish regulations. Thus, the Banco de 
España’s traditional approach was maintained, preserving certain stricter elements of Spanish 
accounting practice, such as aspects relating to the recognition and coverage of non-performing assets. 
Two elements in particular should be highlighted: the countercyclical provisions, which were 
maintained, albeit with certain adjustments; and the strict restrictions on institutions holding special 
vehicles off balance sheet. As described in the next section, both these elements helped to limit or 
reduce risk during the financial crisis.    
C. Sanctions regime and supervisory powers
The regulatory framework also envisaged the sanctions regime and the supervisory arrangements 
in the event of breach of the rules. In this respect, Law 26/1988 of 29 July 1988 on the discipline and 
intervention of credit institutions, in force in that period, is notable.
The supervisory functions carried out by the Banco de España essentially consisted of regular on-
site inspections of institutions and continuous off-site monitoring based on analysis of the confidential 
information furnished by them (with the exception of the two big banking groups, Santander and BBVA, 
which were subject to continuous on-site monitoring, with teams of inspectors based at the banks’ 
headquarters). According to the conclusions drawn from the supervisory exercises and the nature of the 
events detected, under Law 26/1988 the Banco de España had the following powers:
— To make recommendations to institutions and requirements of them, alerting them to 
the weaknesses detected and requiring that the appropriate corrective measures be taken.
— In the case of institutions with a capital shortfall, to assess and, where appropriate, 
approve a plan to be submitted by the institution for resuming compliance with the 
required levels. Limits would also be set on the distribution of profit. 
— In addition, in the event of breach of the applicable rules, to file disciplinary proceedings 
and impose and/or propose sanctions according to the circumstances of each case.23 
23 Law 26/1988 attributed to the Banco de España the power to impose sanctions for serious and minor infringements, and 
to propose severe sanctions to the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance. The power to withdraw authorisation lay 
with the Council of Ministers, at the proposal of the Banco de España.
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— In exceptionally serious situations,24 to take control of the institution concerned and 
replace its directors. 
In addition to these supervisory aspects, it should be noted that Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
were in place, regulated by Royal Decree 2606/1996 of 20 December 1996. These schemes, funded 
by the credit institutions themselves, were established in order to withstand possible banking crises, 
with a dual role: (i) to cover customers’ deposits in the event of an institution being unable to 
reimburse its liabilities;25 and (ii) to help restructure debilitated credit institutions. 
D. legal status and governance of savings banks
In retrospect, the singularities of the legal status of savings banks were determined, first by their 
complex and rigid governance structure, which was less flexible than that of listed companies and less 
conducive to implementing best international practice in terms of corporate governance and to 
ensuring that the members of their governing bodies had the necessary professional experience. And 
second, by the structural restrictions on raising high-quality capital by means other than by capitalising 
profits, which meant, as indicated earlier, that the equity units were the only instrument available. 
However, as these units did not confer voting rights, they proved unattractive to investors, which 
limited their development and, therefore, the possibility of their contributing to enhance management 
of savings banks and market discipline.  
The savings banks’ legal status has been the focus of prolific doctrinal debate in which political 
interests have played no small part. The savings banks undoubtedly had a welfare role, but equally 
they operated in a highly competitive financial market that required them to seek efficiency and 
competitiveness. So it seems there may possibly have been a conflict between their welfare role and 
the search for profit.
The Spanish Constitutional Court judgment 49/1988 of 22 March 1988, in response to 
various appeals filed alleging that Law 31/1985 on regulation of the basic rules on governing 
bodies of savings banks was unconstitutional, failed to clarify their legal status. Although the 
judgment seems to affirm their welfare role, their purpose being not to distribute profit but to 
devote their excess income to welfare activities, the Constitutional Court also indicates as follows: 
“Without denying that the legal status of savings banks is similar to that of foundations, or that they 
may be categorically classed as foundations for the purpose of placing them in a legal construct recognised 
by Spanish law, the truth is that they are, in any event, foundations of a very special kind, dominated 
24 Giving a reasoned explanation to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. 
25 In this respect, Royal Decree 1642/2008 of 10 October 2008 raised the coverage limit from €20,000 to €100,000 (which 
is still the limit today). 
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by their role as credit institutions”. This judgment underlined their atypical nature, as not-for-profit 
institutions, in contrast with the traditional concept of a firm, although since the entry into force 
of Royal Decree 2290/1977 of 22 August 1977 they operate on an equal footing with companies 
(commercial banks). 
These aspects justified the presence of public authorities on savings banks’ governing bodies, a 
presence that was recognised in the specific legislation of the regional governments, which viewed 
savings banks as an important instrument in their political and economic actions. These political 
interests ultimately sought to exert control over savings banks, in view of their welfare role. 
Against this backdrop, Law 31/1985 established savings banks’ governing bodies: the general 
assembly (senior decision-making body), the board of directors and the control committee. It also 
indicated the collective interests that would be represented on the general assembly26 through 
representatives of local government, depositors, founders, employees and institutions that represent 
the collective interest in their sphere of operation, all with a complex system of election of those 
representatives. 
Law 44/2002 of 2 November 2002 on financial system reform measures established that public 
representatives could not hold more than 50% of the votes at the general assembly, so as to prevent 
savings banks from being considered public institutions under EU law. Nevertheless, savings banks 
cannot be said to have been managed or run separately from the public authorities in each region. 
With the benefit of hindsight, this corporate governance structure was not conducive to adoption of 
the measures needed to address the crisis.
1.4 MEASURESTAKENBYTHEBANCODEESPAÑA
As described in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 above, during the economic growth years risks built up for 
the activity of credit institutions, creating imbalances that had a particularly harsh impact on savings 
banks. Although financial institutions’ main indicators reflected a healthy position both in terms of 
risk coverage and solvency, the concentration of risk in the real estate and construction sectors and 
the growing reliance on wholesale markets flagged the need for caution.  
In this setting, the Banco de España, within the scope of its powers, gradually adapted to the 
international legislation, establishing measures to halt latent risk, or to help cover it should it 
26 The above-mentioned judgment considered the proportional distribution of the various groups that make up the general 
assembly non-essential, meaning that the regions could establish a different distribution. 
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materialise, such as the countercyclical provisions or the strict restrictions on the creation of special 
investment vehicles off balance sheet, as described below.
The Pillar 2 guidelines (see Box 1.3) introduced by Basel II, which allowed the supervisor to 
impose a capital requirement above the minimum requirement established under Pillar 1, according to 
the annual internal capital adequacy assessment, were incorporated into the Banco de España’s procedures 
(as indicated in Section 1.3, the European legislation incorporating Basel II was not fully transposed 
into Spanish regulations until 2008). Reviewing the risk profile of institutions was nothing new for the 
Banco de España. The new feature was establishing the link between the risk profile of an institution 
(which includes both quantitative and qualitative elements) and the adequacy of its solvency level. The 
crisis, which began to be felt in Spain in 2008, complicated the implementation of the new approach as 
this tool, which allows the supervisor to impose levels of capital above the minimum requirement or to 
limit certain activities, is a supervisory tool for crisis prevention rather than crisis management.
Aware of the difficulties involved in achieving effective and quality implementation of the 
advanced approaches permitted under the new Basel II framework, in 2004 the Banco de España 
resolved to design a “roadmap” over three years, identifying the institutions that could use 
advanced approaches from January 2008 and the process to be followed.27 During that period 
it spent much time and effort validating institutions’ internal models that determine the capital 
requirements needed to cover Pillar 1 risks. The validation processes were continuous and 
repetitive, consisting of on-site supervisory measures at institutions and work performed at the 
Banco de España itself. 
Regarding the Banco de España’s supervisory powers, during the years preceding the financial 
crisis the legislative framework was essentially microprudential in approach, concentrated on ensuring 
that individual financial institutions were solvent and sound. There were no regulatory elements in 
place at the time that could ensure a correct link between macroprudential and microprudential 
supervision,28 as various international organisations subsequently highlighted in response to the 
international financial crisis of 2007. The low level of implementation at an international level of 
systems for early detection of systemic financial risk and of macroprudential policy tools – which 
began to be developed as a consequence of the crisis – limited the possibility of earlier measures being 
taken to ward off the crisis on both a national and a global scale.
27 In order to convey to the sector the supervisor’s expectations, criteria and demands as to the validation of approaches, in 
2006 the Banco de España published a document entitled “Implementation and Validation of Basel II Advanced Approaches 
in Spain”, http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/COM/supervision/politica/Documento_Supervision_Web_ingles_completo.pdf.
28 See the report of the Internal Committee of the Banco de España, published in October 2012, entitled “Analysis of the 
supervisory procedures of the Banco de España and recommendations for their reform”, http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/
Secciones/SalaPrensa/ComunicadosBCE/DecisionesPoliticaMonetaria/13/Arc/Fic/Informe_de_la_Comision_Interna_en.pdf.
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A. Introduction of countercyclical provisions 
As mentioned earlier, in mid-2000 the Banco de España introduced new countercyclical 
provisioning requirements, known as “dynamic” provisions internationally and as “statistical” 
provisions in Spain.29 
How these countercyclical provisions worked was relatively straightforward. Institutions had to 
cover at all times the expected loss through the cycle on the loan portfolio. This entailed additional 
provisioning (against the income statement) during upturns, when NPLs and, more generally, non-
performing assets were very low, and release of those provisions, credited to the income statement, 
when the economic cycle contracted and NPLs started to emerge. 
The following main objectives motivated the Banco de España to introduce the countercyclical 
provisions: 
First, the desire to counter a development that had been observed for some years in Spain. The 
existing credit risk provisions behaved very procyclically, that is, they were very low for long periods, 
when the economic boom kept NPLs at very low levels, and they rose sharply when the economic 
cycle changed direction, with the consequent impact on NPLs and institutions’ income statements. 
Indeed, the provisions built up by Spanish banks in 1999 were the lowest and also the most procyclical 
of all the OECD countries. Provisions in Spain were so highly sensitive to the economic cycle because 
specific provisions were only set aside when loans became non-performing, meaning that they 
increased in parallel with, but not ahead of, the growth in NPL portfolios. 
Second, there was also a concern for the possible future development of the credit cycle. In 
1998 and 1999 credit was already escalating, growing at double-digit real rates, largely as a consequence 
of the fall in real interest rates. This concern was fuelled by the still recent experience of the previous 
credit cycle, when credit expanded very significantly, linked in part to the real estate sector, credit 
standards eased and NPLs rose substantially with the onset of the recession. 
The countercyclical provisions were an innovation in the Spanish and international accounting 
and regulatory world. In general, they were not well received by international or other jurisdictions’ 
accounting regulators, as they surpassed the concept of incurred losses. Spanish credit institutions 
were also opposed to them, as they feared their book profit would decline (see Box 1.4). 
29 For a detailed analysis of these provisions, see J. Saurina and C. Trucharte (2017), The Countercyclical Provisions of the 
Banco de España, 2000-2016 (Ed. Banco de España).
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box 1.4 MAIN ELEMENTS oF CoUNTERCYCLICAL PRoVISIoNS
Until countercyclical elements were included, 
Spanish provisions covered specific and general losses 
(very close to the idea of incurred losses). Specific 
provisions covered materialised incurred losses (when a 
default event had occurred) while general provisions 
covered an estimate of incurred losses not yet 
materialised in the form of a default event, according to 
a breakdown of the portfolio by risk level at each point 
in time (thus excluding past-due exposures).
Incurred losses not yet materialised represent loan 
portfolio impairment arising from loss events that have 
occurred, that have not yet given rise to default on a 
loan but that, with a non-zero probability, will result in 
lower future cash flows from those loans than were 
initially envisaged. For example, the fact that a firm 
records significant losses in a year is clearly an indication 
as to its future ability to repay its debts; that is, the loss 
event recognised will affect repayment of its debt, even 
though at the date of recognition of the losses there has 
been no default. 
The inclusion of the countercyclical element in 
the concept and calculation of the provisions clearly 
introduced coverage of expected loss. Expected loss is 
a statistical concept: it is the average (mathematical 
expectation) of losses due to default that are expected 
(based on experience) to appear (materialise) over a set 
future period. 
The countercyclical provisions incorporated 
various elements. The volume of provisions required 
was determined not only by the volume of the loan 
portfolios at a set date, but also by how they evolved 
in the period analysed. If lending had grown, the 
calculation would result in higher general provisions 
(new provisioning requirements), subject to the 
ceiling on the stock of those provisions. The theoretical 
new general provisioning requirement was reduced by 
the amount of specific provisions (coverage of 
exposures reported as non-performing) set aside in the 
period. The parameters used for these calculations 
had been drawn from the experience of the crisis of 
the 1990s.
At times of economic expansion and lending growth, 
when new specific provisioning requirements were very 
low owing to the low level of defaulting borrowers, the 
calculation method gave rise to higher countercyclical 
provisions.
At times of crisis, with low lending growth and rising 
default on loans, general provisions were released, 
offsetting the higher specific provisioning required.1
The incorporation into the Spanish legislative framework of IAS, by application of the European 
Union Regulation, was a significant change, especially for a country such as Spain where the banking 
supervisor had standard-setting powers for the supervised banks, subject to prior approval by the 
Spanish Accounting and Audit Institute (ICAC). 
As described in the previous section, IAS put the emphasis on financial reporting being useful for 
investors, whereas under the former Spanish accounting regulations (the previous Accounting Circular) 
1 For a more detailed description see Box III.1, “The new 
general provision as a macroprudential instrument”, Financial 
Stability Report, May 2005, Banco de España, pp. 73-74.
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the emphasis was on protecting funds entrusted to institutions and, especially, retail customer deposits. 
Accordingly, European regulations amended the principle of prudent valuation that had hitherto been 
the guiding principle of accounting regulations for banks in Spain. 
Nevertheless, the Banco de España decided not to abandon the countercyclical provisions, 
keeping them in force, as to do otherwise may have added further momentum to the cyclical upturn, 
but the provisioning regulations had to be adapted to comply with IAS. The new system maintained 
the general provisioning component, but it was transformed so as to allow for countercyclical behaviour.
Spanish banks built up countercyclical provisions up to the end of 2007, when the stock peaked 
at around €26 billion. This occurred before NPLs began to increase and when credit to the private 
sector, although decelerating, was still growing at a very substantial year-on-year rate. Until then 
countercyclical provisioning had always been positive, with the provisions set aside charged to the 
income statement, and the stock of provisions had increased continuously, with the sole exception of 
a slight dip in early 2005 when IAS came into force, given the adjustments that had to be made, as 
explained above. These provisions amounted to between 15% and 20% of banks’ net operating income, 
representing a reduction on the same scale in book profit. The loan loss provisions set aside strengthened 
institutions’ solvency. Had such provisions not been made, institutions’ book profit would have been 
higher in an amount equal to the provisions. Bearing in mind that book profit is a determinant in the 
decision to pay dividends, had the provisions not been set aside, institutions would have paid out 
higher dividends and, therefore, retained earnings levels would have been lower.
As described in the next chapter, after mid-2008 the flow of countercyclical provisions began to turn 
negative, owing to the substantial increase in NPLs and, in consequence, in specific provisioning requirements. 
This negative flow of countercyclical provisions began to act as a significant drain on the stock built up since 
mid-2000 when these provisions were first introduced, countering to some extent the increase in specific 
provisions and, therefore, moderating their impact on institutions’ profit levels and capital.
It is important to note that the countercyclical provisions were calibrated on the basis of the credit 
cycle that preceded Spain’s entry into the euro area, which included the 1993 recession that was considerably 
less acute than the double-dip recession that commenced in 2008. They were not calibrated for upward or 
downward shocks of the magnitude of the crisis that was to unfold, which meant that, in many cases, the 
stock of provisions built up was not sufficient to offset the provisioning requirements that arose from 2008.
That said, and as indicated above, the countercyclical provisions built up in the Spanish banking 
system overall amounted to almost €26 billion.30 Accordingly, countercyclical provisions helped some 
30 These provisions were eligible as Tier 2 capital in the part not exceeding 1.25% of the weighted risks used as a basis for 
the calculation of coverage.
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banks to reinforce their robustness and, in the case of the bailed-out banks, the €7 billion that had 
been built up in countercyclical provisions reduced the subsequent injections of funds needed. Taking 
into account the extremely adverse conditions that Spanish institutions faced during the crisis, the 
conclusion drawn is that the countercyclical provisions, designed and established by the Banco de 
España alone among the BCBS member supervisors, at a time when there were no countercyclical 
instruments in place at an international level, played a positive, albeit limited, role in helping the 
Spanish banking sector better withstand the initial effects of the crisis.
B. treatment of special investment vehicles
Unlike other jurisdictions with major international banking systems, Spain adopted a very 
strict interpretation of the criteria that allowed credit institutions not to include special investment 
vehicles (SIVs)31 in their scope of consolidation.32 The application of these stricter criteria prevented 
such vehicles from being excluded from the consolidable group. In consequence, these vehicles were 
taken into account for the purposes of calculating the necessary own funds and capital requirements. 
The creation of such special purpose vehicles off balance sheet contributed, in other countries, 
to the development of operations involving the transformation and securitisation of subprime loans, 
which were at the source of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and of the international propagation of 
the crisis. Low-quality mortgage loans were bundled up and transformed into bonds, which were in 
turn unbundled and repackaged, so that it became very difficult to assess the risk of the end 
instruments, despite the excellent credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies. These bonds 
were acquired by numerous US and European banks. Long-term investments were funded by issuing 
very short-term securities targeted at money market funds. This is the originate-to-distribute model. 
The collapse in house prices in the United States and the consequent increase in subprime delinquencies 
marked the start of the international financial crisis. 
C. other supervisory measures
Without prejudice to the lack of regulatory provision for macroprudential tools mentioned 
earlier, in the period leading up to the crisis, and in light of the latent risks observed in Spanish 
31 IAS, including the interpretations, listed the factors that had to be taken into account in order to consider whether or not 
a credit institution exerted control over special purpose vehicles (which include SIVs). The Banco de España, through 
Circular 4/2004, promoted strict implementation of the IAS framework in this respect, establishing that if analysis of the 
determining factors produced no clear and irrefutable conclusion as to the loss of control over a special purpose vehicle, 
the latter must be included in the consolidated statements. Supervisory measures designed to ensure that the consolidation 
criteria relating to these vehicles were being correctly applied complemented these regulations.
32 The scope of consolidation sets out the companies to be included (consolidated) for presentation of overall information 
on the economic and financial situation of an institution or group for the purposes of setting the capital requirements.
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lending activity, the Banco de España conveyed to institutions, in the framework of its inspection 
activity, a series of recommendations and reflections on the main risks observed, notably: 
— In respect of real estate financing, it pointed out: i) the importance of observing the 
80%33 loan-to-value limit in retail mortgages; (ii) the uncertainty created by lengthening 
maturities in floating rate loans; and (iii) its concern regarding the volume of real estate 
developer financing, especially where borrowers had not contributed funds proportional 
to the scale of the project and the loan repayment expectations rested on a hypothetical 
price increase.34
— Regarding financing of the high mortgage loan growth rates (see Table 1.1), it noted that 
the need for greater recourse to the markets demanded appropriate risk management, 
establishing a diversification policy and setting maximum limits on wholesale market 
funding and concentration of maturities. It also insisted on the need to improve liquidity 
contingency plans.35
— Lastly, as to governance of savings banks, it indicated that the correct functioning of the 
different governing bodies and delegated committees was essential and that the control 
function must be fulfilled. 
One may question whether more vigorous steps could have been taken, promoting the legal 
amendments needed to limit risk concentration by sector, leverage levels or maximum loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratios.36 However, as indicated above, the international regulations of the time did not provide 
for the use of such macroprudential tools. Moreover, institutions’ solvency and provisioning levels, 
together with market developments and economic forecasts, supported the view that, in general, the 
instruments available and the existing legal provisions would allow institutions to withstand gradual 
balance sheet correction.
33 The capital regulations (Circular 5/1993 of 26 March 1993) established a higher weighting, for the purposes of calculation 
of risk-weighted assets, for retail mortgage loans with an LTV over 80%.
34 In respect of the growing concentration of risk in the real estate sector, it should be noted that the capital regulations of 
the day provided for the imposition of limits on risks assumed by credit institutions with individual borrowers or economic 
groups, but there were no limits on sectoral concentration. Such limits were subsequently deemed an element to be taken 
into consideration in Pillar 2 (Basel III) for the purpose of setting additional capital requirements.
35 The existing regulations provided for no limit on leverage. Today, Regulation 575/2013 (the CRR) sets out how the 
leverage ratio should be calculated and the information to be furnished, although there is still no defined limit (the BIS 
considers the minimum should be 3%) and, logically, no date for compliance with such a limit. However, as in the case of 
concentration and the LTV ratio, high leverage risk may be assessed when setting additional capital requirements under 
Pillar 2 (Basel III).
36 This could have been done, even though there was no legal authorisation to introduce such a limit.
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Indeed, Spanish institutions’ solvency and provisioning levels meant that, in general, they were able 
to withstand the first onslaught of the crisis better than their peers in other countries, although clearly in 
some cases these levels were patently insufficient to withstand the double-dip recession that finally ensued.
Total
CRPS
(%)
Total loans to 
RE&C
(%)
Total
mortgage
loans (%)
Total CRPS
Total loans to 
RE&C
Total
mortgage
loans
Total
CPRS
(%)
Total loans to 
RE&C
(%)
Total
mortgage
loans (%)
2000 Q1 16.7 27.5 17.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 3.5 6.4 3.8
2000 Q2 15.0 26.2 18.7 105.4 108.2 105.5 5.4 8.2 5.5
2000 Q3 16.0 30.5 19.9 108.4 114.3 110.8 2.9 5.7 5.1
2000 Q4 17.5 27.4 22.6 113.5 119.8 118.2 4.7 4.8 6.6
2001 Q1 14.3 23.0 22.5 114.3 123.0 122.5 0.7 2.6 3.7
2001 Q2 13.8 20.8 22.7 119.9 130.7 129.4 4.9 6.2 5.7
2001 Q3 12.6 15.1 19.9 122.0 131.6 132.9 1.8 0.7 2.7
2001 Q4 11.3 15.8 16.6 126.3 138.7 137.8 3.5 5.4 3.7
2002 Q1 13.4 16.9 17.1 129.7 143.8 143.5 2.7 3.6 4.1
2002 Q2 12.5 17.5 16.9 134.9 153.6 151.3 4.1 6.8 5.4
2002 Q3 13.5 23.6 18.4 138.5 162.7 157.4 2.6 5.9 4.0
2002 Q4 13.0 28.0 14.1 142.8 177.6 157.2 3.1 9.2 -0.1
2003 Q1 13.5 29.0 13.8 147.2 185.5 163.2 3.1 4.5 3.9
2003 Q2 14.6 29.7 13.4 154.7 199.2 171.5 5.1 7.4 5.1
2003 Q3 14.3 30.1 12.4 158.3 211.7 176.8 2.3 6.3 3.1
2003 Q4 15.0 28.9 16.7 164.2 228.9 183.4 3.8 8.2 3.7
2004 Q1 16.0 32.1 17.4 170.7 245.0 191.6 4.0 7.0 4.5
2004 Q2 16.6 34.3 16.6 180.4 267.5 199.9 5.7 9.2 4.4
2004 Q3 17.3 34.6 17.9 185.6 285.0 208.6 2.9 6.5 4.3
2004 Q4 18.2 33.3 20.7 194.1 305.1 221.4 4.6 7.1 6.1
2005 Q1 19.1 34.4 21.6 203.4 329.2 233.0 4.8 7.9 5.3
2005 Q2 23.6 35.3 31.2 222.9 361.8 262.3 9.6 9.9 12.6
2005 Q3 25.4 35.0 33.4 232.7 384.7 278.2 4.4 6.3 6.0
2005 Q4 27.4 38.3 34.1 247.3 421.9 296.9 6.3 9.7 6.7
2006 Q1 28.3 40.4 34.8 260.9 462.3 314.1 5.5 9.6 5.8
2006 Q2 25.0 39.7 26.7 278.6 505.7 332.4 6.8 9.4 5.8
2006 Q3 26.0 43.6 24.5 293.1 552.4 346.5 5.2 9.2 4.2
2006 Q4 25.9 43.9 22.8 311.5 607.1 364.7 6.3 9.9 5.3
2007 Q1 24.3 39.9 20.7 324.4 646.6 379.3 4.2 6.5 4.0
2007 Q2 23.1 35.7 18.8 343.1 686.0 395.0 5.8 6.1 4.1
2007 Q3 20.9 29.1 17.0 354.3 713.1 405.4 3.3 4.0 2.6
2007 Q4 17.1 21.0 13.6 364.7 734.9 414.3 2.9 3.1 2.2
2008 Q1 14.6 16.0 11.2 371.8 750.2 421.9 1.9 2.1 1.8
2008 Q2 11.0 10.1 8.4 380.7 755.3 428.3 2.4 0.7 1.5
2008 Q3 8.3 6.5 6.7 383.6 759.2 432.7 0.8 0.5 1.0
2008 Q4 6.0 3.6 5.0 386.7 761.1 435.1 0.8 0.2 0.5
Y-o-y rate of change Cumulative change (FY-2000 = 100) Q-o-q rate of change
atad ylretrauQatad ylretrauQatad ylretrauQ
SOURCE: Banco de España.
TABLE 1.1 YEAR-ON-YEAR, CUMULATIVE AND QUARTER-ON-QUARTER RATES OF CHANGE OF CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT 
PRIVATE SECTOR (CRPS), WITH BREAKDOWN OF LENDING TO THE REAL ESTATE AND CONSTRUCTION SECTORS 
(RE&C) AND MORTGAGE LOANS FOR HOUSE PURCHASES
2 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE CRISIS (2008-2011)
2.1 MACROECONOMICENVIRONMENT
A. World economy 
The financial crisis and the world economy (2008-2009)
The first signs of the global financial crisis began to emerge in mid-2007, starting in a relatively 
minor segment of the US mortgage market, that of high-risk or sub-prime mortgages.1 Nevertheless, 
the impact spread rapidly around the world, in a context in which the preceding long period of 
global economic growth had been accompanied by widespread underestimation of risks, such that 
prices both of real and financial assets were extremely high, as was private-sector financial and non-
financial debt.
In the United States, where there had been a particularly long and intense real estate boom, the 
slowdown in the sector began in early 2006. Nevertheless, it was not until 2007 that defaults on sub-
prime mortgages began to rise sharply. The turnaround in the real estate sector, coupled with 
expectations that the expansionary phase of the economic cycle was running out of steam, triggered 
an upward revision of investors’ risk perceptions and a drop in financial asset prices that was initially 
limited, but gradually gained momentum, reaching an ever greater range and number of products 
and markets. 
The outcome was a sudden paralysis of some of the main financing markets, including the 
interbank markets, as was reflected by the spikes in risk premia in these markets (see Chart 2.1). This 
led to a significant tightening of financial conditions for the private sector, first in the United States 
and then in other –mainly advanced– economies, including the euro area and Spain.
In the case of financial institutions, the closure of wholesale funding markets triggered a process 
of disorderly deleveraging, with liquidation of assets that, in turn, led to new losses and the effect 
spreading to other institutions not initially exposed. Hedge funds that had based their high returns 
1 The sub-prime mortgage segment accounted for 13% of total US mortgage lending at the time. The mortgage loans in 
question were extended to borrowers with low credit ratings. During the upward cycle they were often granted with conditions 
that increased the risk (initial interest rates below market rates and amounts that were high relative to borrowers’ incomes).
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on leveraged investments also had to make significant divestments. The situation deteriorated over the 
course of 2008 as the tension on international financial markets heightened and an ever larger number 
of institutions were affected, with a number having to be bailed out (among others, Bear Stearns, 
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac in the United States and Northern Rock in the United Kingdom). 
The collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008, followed by the 
nationalisation by the US Government of American International Group (AIG), the world’s largest 
insurer, prompted a quantum leap in investors’ fears. It brought the US financial system to the verge 
of collapse, triggering a sudden rise in risk premia on world markets, a sharp fall in stock market 
prices and a strong upsurge in volatility. Thus, for example, in the days following the fall of Lehman 
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Brothers, US interbank market premia for three-month operations rose fourfold, from less than 1 pp 
to over 3.5 pp, the S&P 500 stock market index dropped by 28% and its volatility tripled. 
The rapid deterioration in financial markets was exacerbated by the fact that, during the 
expansionary phase, sub-prime mortgages had been securitised, along with other assets, in 
operations that frequently used complex structures and inappropriate valuation methods. These 
products were sold to different kinds of investors around the world, including leading capital 
market operators, such as investment banks and some major insurance companies, which ended 
up taking on a large share of the risk associated with sub-prime mortgage securitisations. The 
scarcity of information about the distribution of some of the most troubled assets also made it 
difficult to identify the ultimate holders of these risks and to determine their scope. This led to a 
widespread and severe loss of investor confidence in the creditworthiness of financial market 
counterparties. 
In a context of high integration and complex interconnections between financial institutions, 
instability spread rapidly to all assets, markets and economies, leading to the most serious global 
financial crisis of the last 80 years. The tightening of financial conditions and reduced availability 
of credit caused many companies to drastically cut their workforce. This, in conjunction with the 
negative wealth effect deriving from falling real and financial asset prices, and rising uncertainty 
and mistrust, led to sharp cutbacks in economic agents’ spending and to recession in many 
advanced countries that would subsequently spread to certain emerging economies. In this 
context, in 2009 there was a sharp contraction in international trade flows, which shrank by 
10.5%, and a drop in global GDP of 0.1% (3.4% in the advanced countries), the biggest 
contraction since the Second World War (see Chart 2.2).
CHART 2.2 GDP GROWTH AND POLICY INTEREST RATES
SOURCES: IMF and Banco de España.
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From 2007 on, the major international monetary authorities responded to these tensions by 
increasing liquidity supply and in some instances acting in concert. For example, following the initial 
turbulence in August 2007, a currency swap facility was set up between the main central banks in 
order to make it easier for financial institutions to obtain foreign currency. From 2008, the measures 
destined to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis extended along three main fronts: additional 
monetary policy measures, support for the financial sectors affected and fiscal policy. 
— First, on the monetary front, from September 2008 the central banks in the leading advanced 
and emerging economies made sharp cuts in interest rates and embarked on unprecedented 
concerted actions. In parallel, measures were introduced to make the framework for 
providing liquidity to financial institutions more flexible, increasing the number of 
institutions with access to central bank funding, broadening the range of assets eligible as 
collateral for monetary policy operations and extending the maturity of the liquidity provided 
to the market. Some central banks also began to use non-standard tools. 
 In the case of the euro area, the ECB, which just three months earlier, in July 2008, had 
again raised the main refinancing rate in the face of concerns about inflationary pressures 
driven by rising energy prices, reversed its policy in October with a 50 bp cut to the 
reference rate, bringing it down to 3.75%. This was followed by further cuts that left it at 
1% in May 2009. The Eurosystem continued to meet all funding demands through open 
market operations, extended the validity of the broadened list of eligible collateral, 
introduced new operations with 12-month maturities and set up a covered bond purchase 
programme, a category which includes Spanish mortgage covered bonds (cédulas hipotecarias). 
— Second, Governments adopted various measures supporting the banking industry to 
facilitate its funding and recapitalisation. These measures included expanding deposit 
guarantee schemes, offering State guarantees for bank debt issues and providing public 
funding in the form of loans and purchases of high quality assets. In many countries the 
deterioration in banks’ solvency was addressed by injecting public capital (to the extent 
that some institutions were even nationalised) and, in some cases, by buying impaired 
assets or introducing asset protection schemes for financial institutions. In this context, a 
number of systemically important institutions were bailed out, particularly in the United 
States and Europe. All told, up to 2010 this entailed the disbursement of $1.5 trillion in 
the main advanced economies (see Section 3.3.C). Additionally, with the backing of the 
G20, work also began on reforming the global financial system.
— Third, Governments adopted discretionary economic stimulus policies that included tax 
cuts or measures to increase public spending, together with assistance for the groups and 
sectors hardest hit by the crisis. Given the usual lag between the design and implementation 
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of discretionary fiscal measures, their main impact began to be felt from 2009 onwards. 
Specifically, it was estimated that, on average for the G20 countries, they involved the 
mobilisation of resources amounting to around 2% of GDP in each year of the period 
from 2009 to 2010. In Europe’s case, the European Economic Recovery Plan channelled 
fiscal stimulus of around 1.5% of EU GDP over this same period. These programmes 
were dominated by measures on the expenditure side, specifically transfers and public 
investment.
As a result of these measures, global GDP began a gradual recovery in 2009, with a return to 
positive growth rates in the second half of the year. In 2010, the recovery was stronger, with growth 
of 5.4% in real terms. Financial markets also stabilised, volatility and risk aversion dropped significantly 
from the peaks they reached at the end of 2008, asset prices recovered and some segments of the 
capital markets gradually began to reopen. 
However, the recovery was not evenly distributed across geographical areas: it was more robust 
in the emerging economies (with real GDP growth of around 7% in 2010), particularly in Asia, and 
weaker in the advanced economies. Among the latter, the recovery in the United States (2.5%) and 
Japan (4.2%) was more robust than in the euro area (2.0%) or the United Kingdom (1.9%). Within 
the euro area there were also significant differences between countries, with strong GDP growth in 
Germany (3.9%) and Finland (3%), a degree of stagnation in Spain (0%) and Ireland (0.4%), and a 
significant contraction in Greece (-5.5%). This marked dispersion in the rate of progress within the 
single-currency area was largely due to the outbreak of the euro area crisis. 
The euro area crisis (2010-2011)
In Europe the process of normalisation was upset in the early months of 2010 by the emergence 
of the first episodes of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. The origins of the crisis, which was triggered 
by the loss of confidence in Greece’s public finances figures in late 2009, lie in the fact that serious 
macroeconomic and financial imbalances had built up in certain Member States during the economic 
expansion. These concerned public finances, private sector and real estate sector indebtedness, exposure 
of the financial system to both sectors and loss of competitiveness. Moreover, the euro area’s existing 
institutional framework proved to be insufficiently developed and lacking the necessary flexibility to 
address these problems in advance. It was able neither to prevent problems arising nor to establish clear 
and transparent rules of conduct in the face of possible crises. This situation exacerbated the subsequent 
tensions and allowed their effects to spread to certain member countries whose fundamentals had not 
significantly diverged from patterns of stability.
The tensions initially arose as a result of the Greek fiscal crisis, which first spread to the sovereign 
debt of countries perceived to be more vulnerable, fiscally or financially, or to have a worse economic 
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growth outlook. The interaction between these three risks (sovereign, banking and macroeconomic 
risk) was intense and produced significant increases in risk premia in the countries affected, which 
included Spain (see Chart 2.3). These problems also spread to stock markets and currency markets, 
and ultimately to banks’ wholesale funding, causing serious liquidity problems for some institutions 
and affecting the stability of the euro area financial system as a whole. 
After several months of discussing possible aid to the Greek authorities from the European 
institutions, in May 2010, the IMF and the euro area countries finally approved a financial support 
package, conditional upon Greece’s adoption of an austerity programme, which involved budgetary 
consolidation in particular. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was also created, with a 
mandate to provide financial assistance in similar cases up until 2013. These decisions, together with 
the publication in July of the results of the stress tests performed in coordination with the European 
banking industry, helped ease market tensions temporarily. 
Nevertheless, the deterioration of the situation of Irish banks and the implications for the 
country’s fiscal situation led to a further bout of market tensions in the summer and autumn of 2010. 
This forced the Irish authorities to apply for a €68 billion programme of conditional financial support 
(equivalent to 40% of GDP). And financial market tension in the euro area intensified in 2011, 
leading to a financial assistance programme also being set up for Portugal in May 2011, again in 
coordination with the IMF, with the disbursement of €78  billion (42% of Portugal’s GDP). In 
Greece’s case, there was a review of the programme approved in 2010, which subsequently, in March 
2012, would lead to a second aid package as a result of the lack of confidence in the Greek economy’s 
ability to return to the markets for funding, given the worse than originally forecast deterioration 
of its macroeconomic situation (the first two programmes for Greece represented a disbursement of 
€226.5 billion, more than 100% of Greek GDP).
The loss of investor confidence also spread to other euro area countries, as a result of a number 
of factors, including political difficulties holding back the adoption of the agreed support mechanisms, 
a worsening macroeconomic and fiscal situation in many cases, or doubts about the inclusion of 
private-sector debt restructuring within negotiations to review the programme of financial assistance 
to Greece. The deterioration in confidence began to push up sovereign risk premia significantly again 
in the summer of 2011, to levels much higher than in 2010, and this time with an impact on countries 
such as Belgium and France, which had previously been less affected. Ten-year sovereign debt spreads 
over Germany peaked in November 2011, momentarily reaching 189 bp in France, 560 bp in Italy, 
485 bp in Spain and 360 bp in Belgium (see Chart 2.3).2
2 To avoid excessive volatility, the chart shows monthly averages, which peaked, in November 2011, in France (148 bp), Italy 
(488 bp), Spain (422 bp) and Belgium (294 bp).
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Given that the banks held substantial portfolios of sovereign debt, the deterioration in sovereign 
debt issued by the most vulnerable euro area countries exacerbated the funding difficulties faced by 
euro area banks, with the ensuing risks for financial stability and economic development in the worst 
affected countries, as could also be seen in the tensions in currency markets, stock markets and 
interbank markets. It is worth noting that, in the context of this new episode of financial strain, the 
supervisory authorities for the Belgian, French, Italian and Spanish stock markets, in coordination 
with the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), agreed to introduce temporary 
restrictions on short selling of shares in financial institutions, so as to ensure financial stability and 
the orderly functioning of the capital markets. 
Economic policy responses
In this environment, the economic policy stance in 2010 and 2011 varied widely around the world. 
In the United States, monetary policy adopted new non-conventional stimulus measures based on expanding 
the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve Board. This involved a new phased programme of $600 billion of 
securities purchases (quantitative Easing II), bringing the total bought since 2008 to $2.35 trillion, 
equivalent to 15% of US GDP, while in the fiscal policy area, new budgetary stimulus plans were adopted. 
In the euro area, monetary policy moderated its expansionary stance somewhat in the first half 
of 2011, while fiscal policy had already turned contractionary in 2010 as a result of the difficult sovereign 
debt market conditions, and there was also a major overhaul of the European institutional architecture: 
— Monetary policy. The ECB maintained its accommodative monetary policy stance 
throughout 2010. In May 2010 the Securities Market Programme was launched, through 
which government bonds were purchased, primarily in order to keep the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism operating smoothly (see Chart 2.4).
 Relative easing of tensions in the first few months of 2011, coupled with the prospects 
of economic recovery in the euro area and an upturn in inflation rates to levels close to 
3%, in a context of rising energy and food prices, led the ECB to raise its main benchmark 
interest rate by 25 bp in April and July. 
 However, in view of the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis in the summer of that year, 
monetary policy in the euro area changed direction again and further expansionary 
measures were adopted. These included cuts by the ECB in policy interest rates in 
November and December (25 bp in each case, returning the rate on main refinancing 
operations to 1%), new long-term loan auctions (three years) to credit institutions in 
December 2011 and February 2012, a reduction in the reserve requirement and broadening 
of the range of assets eligible as collateral for monetary policy operations. 
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— Fiscal policy. In response to tensions in sovereign debt markets, fiscal policy in the euro area 
took on a contractionary stance. This was not limited to those countries that had had to 
resort to financial support, but also extended to the rest of the euro area economies. At the 
G20 summit held in Toronto in mid-2010, the advanced economies undertook to reduce 
their public deficits significantly by 2013. In Spain, fiscal consolidation plans were brought 
forward to 2010 and in the other euro area economies plans were implemented as of 2011, 
such that the deficit for the euro area as a whole, once the effects of the economic cycle had 
been discounted, was reduced from 4.3% of GDP in 2010 to 2.1% in 2012.
— European institutional architecture (see Box 2.1). In 2010, the euro area embarked on a 
reform of its institutional architecture. The sovereign debt crisis had highlighted the 
shortcomings of the monetary union’s institutional framework on several fronts. First, 
monitoring had failed, in that mechanisms had not been put in place to identify and prevent 
the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances (which included persistent losses of 
competitiveness, an oversized financial sector and excessive build-up of exposure to the real 
estate market, high levels of private debt and fiscal imbalances). In this regard, as of 2011, 
the governance and supervision framework was strengthened significantly through various 
legislative initiatives (the Six Pack and Two Pack and the European Fiscal Compact). These 
essentially entailed a strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact and national fiscal 
frameworks, the creation of a new framework for the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances, placing the emphasis on countries’ current account imbalances, 
indebtedness and competitiveness, and the launch of the European Systemic Risk Board, 
entrusted with macroprudential supervision. 
CHART 2.4 EUROSYSTEM MONETARY POLICY
SOURCE: ECB.
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box 2.1 kEY DEVELoPMENTS IN ThE REFoRM oF EURoPEAN ECoNoMIC goVERNANCE
1   Strengthening of fiscal and macroeconomic supervision (Six-Pack, Two-Pack and Fiscal Compact)
Strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact: limits were introduced on expenditure growth in the Pact's
preventive arm, a debt reduction rule in the corrective arm and sanctions that are broader and applicable
during earlier phases of the procedure.
Creation of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure. A series of indicators (the alert mechanism) are used to 
determine which countries have (or are at risk of having) excessive imbalances and recommendations are issued 
following an "in-depth review". Sanctions may be imposed if these recommendations are not followed.
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and  Monetary Union (TSCG) requires
Member States (except the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom) to commit themselves to a balanced
budget over the course of the cycle and to introduce an automatic correction mechanism for possible deviations.
European Commission Regulation giving the European Commission the authority to issue an opinion on the
national budgets of the euro area countries before they are adopted by national parliaments, and requiring
Member States to set up independent national councils.
European Commission Regulation that introduces the enhanced supervision procedure for countries that have 
requested financial assistance.
2    Establishment of crisis management mechanisms
BANKING UNION: Entry into force of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) giving the ECB responsibility for bank supervision. Creation of the Single Resolution Fund.
Implementation of various capital market union initiatives.
ECONOMIC UNION: Creation of national productivity boards and improvement of the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure to facilitate convergence.
FISCAL UNION: Creation of the European Fiscal Board.
Progress
Improvements to macroeconomic supervision and crisis management mechanisms (2010-2013)
1   Economic union, to bolster structural convergence and social cohesion.
2   Financial union, seeking to build full banking union and implement capital market union.
3   Fiscal union, aiming to improve the coordination of public finances and establish fiscal capacity across the euro area.
4   Political union to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the European institutions.
The Five Presidents' Report (preceded by the Four Presidents' Report in 2012) proposed four pillars on which a more genuine economic and 
monetary union should be built:
Six-Pack
(December 2011)
Fiscal Compact 
(January 2013)
Two-Pack 
(May 2013)
European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) / European 
Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM)
European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM)
Progress towards a more solid economic and monetary union (Four Presidents' Report, December 2012, and Five Presidents'
Report, July 2015) 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
The Member States of the euro area created the EFSF in June 2010 to provide financial assistance to euro area 
countries requiring it (Ireland and Portugal in 2011 and Greece in 2012). This facility was a transitional arrangement 
with a financial capacity of up to €440 billion, through debt issues backed by State guarantees. The EFSM was
also created, which is available for all EU countries and is authorised to obtain market funding of up to €60 billion
secured by the EU budget.
In October 2012, euro area Member States signed the ESM Treaty, under which the ESM took over the 
functions of the EFSF. This is a permanent crisis management institution with its own legal personality, 
subscribed capital of €700 billion and effective lending capacity of €500 billion. Spain received assistance 
from the ESM in December 2012, Cyprus in May 2013 and Greece in August 2015.
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 Second, the euro area lacked crisis management and resolution mechanisms. The first 
Greek programme had to be financed with a bilateral loan scheme between the Member 
States. Immediately afterwards, also in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) was created, as a temporary measure. Subsequently, a new permanent body, the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), was set up in 2013. 
 Third, the euro area lacked a system of banking integration. In this respect, a reform of the 
regulatory and supervisory framework was begun, the two main elements of which being the 
development of a new prudential regulatory framework and the configuration of a new European 
supervisory architecture: the European System of Financial Supervision (see Section 2.3). 
B. Performance of the Spanish economy
2008-2009: The first stage of the crisis
In mid-2007, when the first signs of turmoil on the international financial markets began to 
emerge, the Spanish economy had already entered a phase of deceleration as its expansionary cycle 
matured. The strong rate of growth initially began to moderate in a context of progressive tightening 
of financial conditions in the wake of the successive interest rate hikes by the ECB (from 2% at the 
end of 2005 to 4% in June 2007) and exhaustion of the upward cycle in the real estate market, 
which began to show signs of a gradual slowdown in demand and prices, although the supply of 
housing under construction was still very high. Slower growth in household wealth and rising 
interest rates helped moderate the expansion of household consumption and, in particular, 
residential investment. However, the sustained buoyancy of other demand components and the 
improvement in the net contribution from the external sector allowed GDP to grow by 3.8% in 
the year (see Table 2.1).3
In this context, the forecasts prepared in the early months of 2008 by the main public and 
private institutions, including the Banco de España, suggested a gradual slowing of Spain’s economic 
growth, in parallel with the deceleration forecast for the euro area and the global economy.4 However, 
these projections were not met and the Spanish economy slipped into recession in the second half of 
2008. This was due to several factors: tightening global financial conditions, despite the change in the 
ECB’s monetary policy stance in the autumn of that year; the decline in private-sector wealth, as a 
3 Unless expressly stated otherwise, all the figures in this document refer to the most recent National Accounts estimates 
available at the time of writing and may therefore differ in some cases from those available during the crisis.
4 See, for example, the European Central Bank June 2008 forecast, the European Commission’s 2008 Spring Economic 
Forecasts, the IMF’s April 2008 World Economic Outlook, OECD June 2008 Economic Outlook, Consensus 
Economics Forecasts and the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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result of the real estate market correction and falling financial asset prices; heightened uncertainty; 
and the decline in exports in the wake of the sharp contraction in global trade. 
Between mid-2008 and end-2009 real GDP contracted by 4.6% (see Chart 2.5). The adjustment 
fell heaviest on domestic demand, which dropped by 7%, with an accumulated decline of 4.5% in 
private consumption, 27% in investment in capital goods and 21% in construction investment. 
Despite the drop in sales abroad, the strong contraction in imports enabled the external sector to 
make a positive contribution up until the second quarter of 2009, partially alleviating the sharp 
contraction in GDP.
The recession was significantly worse than in the mid-1970s, when GDP barely dropped, and 
the early 1990s, when GDP contracted by just 2 pp. Nevertheless, in comparative international 
terms, the contraction was similar to that in the main European countries. Specifically, during this 
economic downturn the Spanish economy’s GDP contracted by 4.6%, as mentioned, and that of 
Observed
GDP (e) year t-1 year t year t-1 year t year t-1 year t year t-1 year t
2000 5.3 3.5 3.7 3.3 4.3 – – 3.5 3.8
2001 4.0 3.4 2.9 2.9 2.9 – – 3.4 3.2
2002 2.9 3.2 2.3 2.9 2.1 – – 3.3 2.1
2003 3.2 3.2 2.2 3.3 2.1 – – 3.1 2.0
2004 3.2 3.1 2.8 3.1 2.9 – – 3.0 2.8
2005 3.7 3.3 2.8 2.5 3.0 – – 3.3 2.7
2006 4.2 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.3 – – 2.7 3.1
2007 3.8 3.2 3.6 3.0 3.6 – 3.7 2.8 3.7
2008 1.1 3.4 1.8 2.7 1.6 3.1 2.4 3.4 2.2
2009 -3.6 1.7 -3.0 1.1 -4.2 2.1 -3.0 1.8 -3.2
2010 0.0 -0.7 -0.4 -0.9 -0.2 -1.0 -0.4 -1.0 -0.4
2011 -1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
2012 -2.9 1.6 -1.8 1.6 -1.6 1.5 -1.5 1.5 -1.8
2013 -1.7 0.1 -1.6 -0.8 -1.7 0.2 -1.5 -0.3 -1.5
2014 1.4 0.7 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.1
2015 3.2 1.0 2.5 1.5 2.9 1.7 2.8 2.1 2.8
2016 3.2 2.0 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6
IMF (Spring
Forecasts) (a)
Banco de España (Economic
projections report) (c)
European Commission
(Spring Forecasts) (d)
OECD (Spring
Forecasts) (b)
TABLE 2.1 CHANGES IN FORECAST GDP GROWTH FOR SPAIN
SOURCES: European Commission, IMF, INE and Banco de España.
a IMF forecast in April of reference year and preceding year.
b OECD forecast in May or June of reference year and preceding year.
c Banco de España forecast in Economic projections report of reference year and preceding year.
d European Commission forecast in spring of reference year and preceding year.
e Latest growth rate published by the INE.
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
CHART 2.5 GDP, EMPLOYMENT AND PRICES IN SPAIN. FIRST STAGE OF THE CRISIS
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the euro area by 5.8%. GDP in Germany, France and Italy contracted by 7.1%, 4% and 7.9%, 
respectively. However, a distinctive feature of the adjustment in Spain was the severity of job destruction. 
Between 2008 and 2009 more than 1.5 million jobs were lost (8%) and the unemployment rate rose 
by 8 pp to 18.7%.
The fiscal policy response to this contractionary scenario was expansionary. In 2008 and 2009 
not only did the automatic stabilisers come into play, but various discretionary measures were taken 
on both the expenditure and income sides, while there was a significant loss of tax revenue due to 
lower income from the real estate sector. The result was an extremely rapid deterioration in the 
general government financial position. Thus, a surplus of 2% of GDP in 2007 turned into a deficit 
of 11% in 2009 (see Chart 2.6). 
The abrupt contraction in domestic spending paved the way for the start of the process of 
correcting some of the imbalances that had built up during the expansionary phase, including the 
current account deficit, competitiveness, the oversized real estate sector, and excess indebtedness (an 
issue which is discussed in Section 2.2). 
The Spanish economy’s external deficit decreased, reducing Spain’s financing needs (equivalent 
to the combined current and capital account balance) from 9.2% of GDP in 2007 to 3.9% in 2009. 
The initial improvement in this balance was mainly due to the correction of the trade deficit resulting 
from the slump in imports, which contracted by 5.6% and 18.3% in 2008 and 2009, respectively, 
combined with a sharp, but smaller, drop in exports (0.8% and 11% in each of these two years). In 
terms of the financial position of the various institutional sectors, the adjustment in the initial phases 
CHART 2.6 FISCAL POLICY IN SPAIN. FIRST STAGE OF THE CRISIS
SOURCES: IGAE and Banco de España.
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of the crisis reflected the private sector’s improved financing capacity, resulting from lower investment 
and higher savings, which was only partially offset by general government’s increased net borrowing 
(see Chart 2.7). However, the persistence of the external deficit and the asset and liability valuation 
effects exacerbated the deterioration in the Spanish economy’s net international investment position, 
which reached 94% of GDP at end-2009. 
That same year, Spain’s CPI dropped by 0.3% relative to the previous year, a substantial price 
moderation that also exceeded that of the euro area, such that the inflation differential with the euro 
area turned negative for the first time since the launch of the single currency.
In the real estate market, by end-2009 house prices had fallen 10% from their peak in the third 
quarter of 2007 (see Chart 2.8) and the volume of sales had more than halved.5 The intensity of the 
adjustment in these years was also much greater than that registered in previous episodes in Spain, 
although it was in line with the scale of the preceding expansion and influenced by the impact of the 
sudden tightening of borrowing conditions in a sector highly dependent on external finance. 
Thus investment in new housing fell significantly, with a contraction of 35% between 2007 and 
2010, and the construction sector shed almost a million jobs, with the consequent spillover effects for 
the rest of the economy. Nevertheless, the adjustment on the supply side was relatively gradual, as in 
5 The value of urban land dropped by 25% over this same period.
CHART 2.7 SPAIN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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2008 and 2009 construction work continued on housing begun before the onset of the crisis 
(approximately one million homes over the two-year period; on average, building and development 
work takes slightly more than two years to complete). This contributed to the build-up of a substantial 
stock of unsold housing, which weighed down on prices and held back new housing starts in 
subsequent years.
2010: The failed recovery
In early 2010, when an upturn began in the global economy, the Spanish economy was in a 
position where the contraction in GDP was progressively smaller, and adjustment of the main 
imbalances that had built up during the expansionary phase was under way. Nevertheless, up to that 
point, the absorption of these imbalances had been very limited. The external deficit was shrinking 
and competitiveness improving, but the process was far from complete. Levels of private-sector debt 
and dependence on external finance remained very high and the concerns about the extent of the 
impact of real estate asset impairment impinged on the perceived soundness of the financial sector. 
On top of this were the imbalances generated by the crisis, in the form of extremely high unemployment 
rates and the deterioration of the general government financial position. 
Against this backdrop, the economic growth forecasts available pointed to a gradual recovery 
not exempt from risks. However, financial distress in European markets in the wake first of the Greek 
crisis and then of the Irish crisis, significantly affected the Spanish economy. Thus, the yield spread 
between Spanish and German ten-year sovereign debt rose to over 200 bp at end-2010 and credit 
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institutions had difficulty accessing wholesale financial markets, which significantly increased their 
recourse to the Eurosystem in the middle of the year. All of this eroded the confidence of businesses 
and households and put a brake on the reactivation of private spending.
Economic policy reacted with a sharp change of course. In particular, fiscal policy went from 
being openly expansionary to contractionary, in line with the stance taken in the rest of the EU, with 
the consequent negative effect on household income and government consumption and investment. 
Specifically, in January 2010, the Spanish Government approved the 2010-2013 Fiscal Consolidation 
Plan, with a view to redressing the deterioration in public finances in the early years of the crisis. This 
plan envisaged cutting the deficit by 1.6 pp of GDP in 2010 and by a further 2.3 pp per year between 
2011 and 2013. This was basically structural and mainly based on public spending cuts, but it also 
involved tax increases, such as the VAT increase in July 2010 or the partial elimination of tax relief on 
housing investment announced for January 2011. Subsequently, two packages of measures were adopted 
in March and May 2010 that gave shape to a significant portion of the adjustment in this consolidation 
plan and brought it forward to 2010 and 2011, in a context in which the effects of the tensions in the 
euro sovereign debt markets were beginning to make themselves felt in Spain. 
In parallel with the change in the budgetary policy stance, various reforms were announced or 
adopted in 2010, particularly concerning the pension system and the labour market.6 In the financial 
sector, regulatory reform of savings banks was implemented, transparency measures were taken and 
the capital requirements for credit institutions were increased (see Section 2.4).
The decline in the Spanish economy slowed over 2010 as a whole, mainly thanks to the positive 
contribution made by net external demand, in a context of a recovery in international trade flows in 
which Spain’s exports grew by 9%, thus outpacing import growth (7%). Both investment in capital 
goods and consumption returned to positive rates, whereas investment in housing and other 
construction continued to contract. In the housing market, the volume of sales picked up for the first 
time since the onset of the crisis, although prices fell a further 2%. For its part, the slowdown in 
lending to households and non-financial corporations moderated to 0.4% year-on-year in December 
2010, compared with a drop of 2% in December 2009. Finally, general government ended the year 
with a deficit of 9.4% of GDP, an adjustment to the structural deficit of 2.1 pp of GDP (bringing it 
down to 7.1% of GDP), and a public debt ratio of 60%. 
6 In August 2011, the Government passed Law 27/2011 on reform of the public pension system, modifying some of the main 
parameters, such as the retirement age, extending the calculation period for the regulatory base and incorporating a sustainability 
factor due to come into force in 2027. As regards the labour market, on 17 September 2010 Law 35/2010 was passed, modifying 
hiring mechanisms but not changing the existing forms of contract, followed in 2011 by Royal Decree-Law 3/2011 of 18 
February 2011 which modified some of the active employment policy instruments, and by Royal Decree-Law 7/2011 of 10 
June 2011 which introduced mechanisms to stimulate internal flexibility within firms.
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2011: The double-dip recession 
According to the data published by the INE over the course of 2011, the year began with a 
continuation of the incipient recovery that had started to emerge in 2010, showing modest but 
positive rates of GDP growth in the first two quarters. In this context, the forecasts made in the 
spring of that year by the IMF, the European Commission, the OECD and the Banco de España still 
pointed to GDP growth for the year of 0.8% in Spain (see Table 2.1).
However, renewed tensions in the euro area financial markets, which intensified in the second 
half of the year, raised the aggregate uncertainty in the euro area overall, with a negative impact on 
euro area growth. In Spain, the tensions mainly affected general government and credit institutions, 
and led to a substantial rise in borrowing costs. Credit institutions, which had already suffered 
difficulties in 2010, although to a lesser extent, started to pass on their higher costs to customers at 
the start of 2011, reducing the supply and raising the cost of loans to Spanish households and 
businesses (see Chart 2.9). 
This fresh bout of financial market tension in the euro area (see Chart 2.3), which became 
particularly intense as from July, led to a sharp tightening of financing conditions for all resident 
agents and heightened overall uncertainty, which had a further contractionary effect on the 
Spanish economy, confounding the forecasts of recovery made by the leading national and 
international institutions, including the Banco de España, in the first half of the year, as mentioned 
earlier. 
Lastly, the National Statistics Institute (INE) would later report a 1% contraction in GDP 
over 2011 as a whole. In this regard, it is worth noting that 2011 saw the biggest forecasting error 
in recent years (defined as the difference between the final GDP estimate and the macroeconomic 
forecasts made in the spring of the same year) by the IMF, the European Commission, the OECD 
and the Banco de España, bigger even than that recorded in 2008 (see Chart 2.10 and Table 2.1). 
As regards employment, the downward trend accelerated and employment contracted by 
3.7%, resulting in an unemployment rate of 23% at end-2011. The adjustment in the real estate 
sector intensified, with the volume of house sales down 30% and prices down 11% compared 
with the previous year, at the same time as sluggish economic activity and the need to deleverage 
limited the scope for growth in the balance of outstanding credit to the private sector, which 
dropped by 3%. Bad loans and arrears continued to rise, particularly among the savings banks 
(see Section 2.2), and the outlook for financial institutions’ earnings also worsened. In this 
context, in February the Government approved an increase in the capital requirements for credit 
institutions (see Section 2.5). Also, in this setting, in relation to the budget, there was a deviation 
from the general government  deficit target for the year of more than 3 pp of GDP (9.6% compared 
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with an initially projected 6%), situating public debt at the start of 2012 at 69% of GDP, more 
than 30 pp higher than in 2007.
2.2 FINANCIALSECTOR
Given the absence of significant exposures to structured products originated in the United 
States, the first signs of global financial stress in 2007 had a relatively minor impact on Spanish credit 
institutions. However, the high level of exposure to the real estate market and substantial borrowing 
needs placed the sector as a whole in a position of particular vulnerability to a deterioration in 
economic activity in Spain and borrowing conditions on international capital markets. 
In particular, the gridlock in wholesale funding markets increasingly affected Spanish 
intermediaries as a result of their high level of dependence on foreign savings. These institutions 
therefore had to react by replacing long-term securities with short-term instruments and recourse to 
the Eurosystem. 
The period from 2007 to 2011 was therefore characterised by a rapid slowdown in lending up to 
mid-2009, followed by a drop that subsequently accentuated, going from annual growth of over 17% 
in 2007 to a drop of 3.8% in 2011. In turn, there was a sharp rise in bad loans, particularly loans to 
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the real estate and construction sector, in a context of worsening financial conditions for real estate 
businesses, whose situation progressively deteriorated, given the impossibility of freeing themselves 
from their financial burdens by liquidating their real estate assets. 
The result was rapid growth in the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio, which started out very 
low, at 0.8% in 2007, rising to 8% by the end of 2011, with generally higher ratios among the 
savings banks (9.3%) than the commercial banks (6.8%). The distance between the commercial 
banks and savings banks also increased during the period in terms of their coverage ratios and 
ability to generate profits.
A. Credit to the resident private sector
Credit granted to Spanish households and non-financial corporations slowed rapidly from 
2008, when credit grew by 6%, compared with rates that had been over 17% since 2004 (see Chart 
2.11). In year-on-year terms, credit began to drop in the third quarter of 2009, and 2010 was the first 
calendar year in which it declined. Overall, in the period from December 2007 to December 2011, 
outstanding lending by deposit-taking institutions to the resident private sector in Spain dropped by 
0.2% (around €3.7 billion). However, in the period from December 2008 to December 2011, the 
drop was 5.9% (€105.7 billion). 
This sharp contraction in lending from 2008 onwards was driven by both demand- and supply-
side factors. Falling domestic spending, the loss of confidence among economic agents and the 
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reassessment of their financial position reined in applications for new borrowing by households and 
businesses substantially. At the same time, the upward revision of perceived risks, against a background 
of a profound global crisis and falling asset prices, and the deterioration in lending conditions all 
contributed to tightening the supply of new credit. 
It is worth noting that the drop in credit between 2007 and 2011 was due to the savings banks, 
as lending by the commercial banks continued to grow, albeit very moderately (cumulative growth of 
0.5% over the period). The savings banks, which had grown much faster in the preceding years, 
slowed the rate at which they granted credit in this period, such that there was a cumulative drop of 
1.4% in their lending.
By institutional sector, the downward correction in the outstanding balance of loans to 
households started earlier in the case of lending for consumption and other purposes (with shorter 
average maturities) than in that of lending for house purchases (with longer maturities). Lending to 
households grew by €2.4  billion overall (0.3%) between December 2007 and December 2011 
(Chart 2.12). Credit intended for housing purchases continued to grow during the period, with 
a cumulative rise of 5.3% over the four-year period (€32 billion), while credit for other purposes 
dropped significantly in terms of both the absolute amount (€30  billion) and as a percentage 
(a cumulative drop of almost 20%). The behaviour of the commercial banks and savings banks was 
similar in terms of credit to households during the period.
There was also a significant decrease in lending to non-financial corporations in the period. 
Overall, lending to non-financial corporations dropped by 6.2% between 2007 and 2011 (almost 
€54  billion). This drop was due to the behaviour of credit to businesses in the real estate and 
construction sector, which fell by more than €57 billion (–12.9% in cumulative terms). Indeed, other 
business lending increased by €3.4 billion in the period (0.8% in cumulative terms). There were 
differences, however, in how commercial banks and savings banks behaved in terms of granting credit 
to businesses. Specifically, the commercial banks cut their lending to real estate and construction 
businesses more than did savings banks (–15% compared with –11%) and they also reduced their 
lending to other businesses, while savings banks increased their lending to businesses other than those 
in the real estate and construction sectors during this period.
B. Non-performing loans
Broadly speaking, the period 2007-2011 was characterised by a sharp increase in non-performing 
loans (NPLs), particularly in lending to the real estate and construction sector, which led to rising non-
performing loan ratios. The distance between commercial banks’ and savings banks’ NPL ratios and 
coverage ratios also widened, as was to be expected given the savings banks’ greater exposure to real 
estate sector lending.
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The biggest increase in the volume of NPLs, in both absolute and relative terms, took place in 
2008 (see Table 2.2), with year-on-year growth of over 300%. NPLs were concentrated particularly 
in lending to the real estate and construction sector, which rose to over 45% of the total volume of 
NPLs, compared with less than 20% in previous years. Non-performing loans remained on an upward 
path and began to rise faster again in 2011, particularly in the case of the savings banks, with an 
annual growth rate of over 44%. 
This increase led to an upturn in the NPL ratio for households and non-financial corporations, 
particularly in the case of lending to the real estate and construction sector. The NPL ratio in this 
sector stood at over 20% in December 2011, while in other non-financial sectors and lending to 
households other than for house purchases, it stood at around 6.5% (the NPL ratio on housing loans 
was below 3%; see Chart 2.13). In general, the savings banks also had higher NPL ratios than the 
commercial banks, except in the case of loans to households for purposes other than house purchases. 
For their part, coverage ratios decreased slightly relative to 2007, with a minimum of less than 
30% in 2008. In December 2011 they stood at 36.3%, with commercial banks’ and savings banks’ 
ratios being similar (see Chart 2.14).
Percentage year-on-year changeNon-performing loans to private sector
Years
Total deposit-taking
institutions
Commercial
banks
Savings
banks
Savings
banks (%)
Total
deposit-taking
institutions (%)
82.274.261.50002
71.288.758.533.276.264.51002
18.2196.6163.4136.211.342.62002
02.193.3-46.0-66.210.302.63002
57.734.3-83.178.209.292.64002
08.2360.2227.6218.345.379.75002
04.6141.3112.4134.410.401.96002
80.7609.6410.6514.798.502.417002
25.66374.59214.62365.4392.3245.068002
29.8275.1795.5455.4459.9341.889002
17.8192.3182.6198.2562.5494.2010102
06.4402.7145.2384.6750.3548.5311102
TABLE 2.2 NON-PERFORMING LOANS TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR IN SPAIN
€bn and percentage
SOURCE: Banco de España
NOTE: Total institutions data include commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives.
Commercial
banks (%)
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C. Government debt 
The financial crisis marked a turning point in how institutions behaved regarding their 
government debt holdings, which started to grow as a substitute for lending to the private sector. 
Between December 2007 and December 2011, the volume of government debt held by banks grew 
by 145%, rising from €79  billion at end-2007 to €194  billion at end-2011 (see Chart 2.15). 
Particularly noteworthy was the annual growth of 54% financial institutions as a whole saw in 2009. 
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The growth in holdings of Spanish government debt was particularly significant in the case of the 
commercial banks, with a cumulative increase in sovereign exposures of 175% between 2007 and 2011 
and annual growth exceeding 95% in 2009. Growth of holdings by the savings banks was somewhat 
more moderate, but also very significant, with cumulative growth of 113% over the same period. 
This striking increase in deposit-taking institutions’ government debt holdings is largely explained 
by the successive cuts in policy interest rates (the rates at which central banks lend to financial 
institutions) in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first half of 2009, which were cut from 4.70% to 1%. 
The reduction in financial institutions’ borrowing costs, coupled with the deterioration in lending to 
the private sector, made investments in sovereign debt a safer and, at the same time, profitable option.7
Moreover, the size of institutions’ balance sheets in these early years of the economic crisis grew 
slightly, cumulative growth coming to 12% over the period. As a result, the share of Spanish 
government debt in financial institutions’ balance sheets rose from a minimum of 2.8% in December 
2007 to 6.2% in December 2011. As can be seen in Chart 2.16, growth was similar in the case of 
both commercial banks and savings banks. In the case of the commercial banks, the weight of Spanish 
government debt on the balance sheet rose from 2.2% in December 2007 to 5.5% four years later. 
The relative importance of Spanish government debt in the case of savings banks, for their part, rose 
from 3.8% to 7.2%, with a particularly significant annual increase in 2011 (1.4 pp).
7 For example, yields on ten-year Spanish bonds stood at around 4% a year in the period, which was much higher than the 
cost of borrowing from the ECB.
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D. Deposits and securitisation transactions
Between December 2007 and December 2011, financial market tensions and difficulties 
accessing wholesale funding were partly alleviated by the provision of additional liquidity by the 
ECB, particularly in 2011 when there was strong growth in central bank deposits through longer-
term refinancing operations (with rates of year-on-year change of over 100%). Consequently, across 
the financial system as a whole, deposits continued to rise in 2008, but began to decline gradually in 
2009, such that total deposits decreased by €69 billion between December 2008 and December 2011 
(see Chart 2.17).
In this period, deposit-taking institutions’ private-sector loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio fell slightly 
from the peak reached in December 2007 (155%). At 31 December 2011, this ratio was 143% 
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(140% for the commercial banks and 149% for the savings banks, the commercial banks having 
undergone a bigger adjustment).8 
Similarly, an increase over the period in the volume of securitised assets was observed, both 
among commercial banks and savings banks, although it was more pronounced in the case of the 
savings banks (see Chart 2.18). 
E. Profitability
The contraction in credit and the rapid increase in the NPL rate had a significant impact on 
trends in the consolidated profit and loss account.9 Return on equity (ROE) gradually dropped from 
levels close to 20% in 2007 to less than 3% in 2011. Similarly, return on assets (ROA) dropped to 
0.17% in December 2011 (see Chart 2.19). 
Among the main items on the income statement, net interest income relative to average total 
assets was on a downward trend, albeit a moderate one. In parallel, fee and commission income halted 
its descent, somewhat stabilising institutions’ operating income. Following this context of lacklustre 
growth, or even contraction, of managed assets, the share of operating costs on these assets also 
stopped decreasing, stabilising at levels close to 1.4%.
8 The ratios of the commercial banks and savings banks at 31 December 2007 were 159% and 154%, respectively.
9 It is worth noting that, based on consolidated data, profitability is affected by the results of the business of large banks with 
operations outside Spain. 
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CHART 2.19  RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE) AND RETURN 
ON ASSETS (ROA)
Percentages. Consolidated data
CHART 2.20  MAIN INCOME STATEMENT ITEMS RELATIVE
TO AVERAGE TOTAL ASSETS (ATA)
Consolidated data
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As a percentage of average total assetsMain income statement items
Years Net interest
income
Fees &
commissions
Operating
expenses
Provisioning
Net interest
income
(%)
Fees &
commissions
(%)
Operating
expenses
(%)
Provisioning
(%)
2000 28,522 
2001 36,528
2002 35,919
2003 34,435
2004 36,350
2005 38,381
2006 44,103
2007 52,857
2008 57,432
2009 70,475
2010 65,795
2011 63,357
Consolidated data
€m and percentages
12,685 28,465 2.43 1.084,870 2.42 0.41
13,865 31,801 9,540 2.72 1.03 2.36 0.71
13,355 30,351 7,244 2.61 0.97 2.21 0.53
13,317 29,052 6,236 2.41 0.93 2.03 0.44
14,527 29,981 7,093 2.30 0.92 1.90 0.45
17,678 34,962 6,291 1.59 0.73 1.45 0.26
20,023 37,668 8,724 1.77 0.80 1.51 0.35
22,038 41,305 14,061 1.81 0.76 1.42 0.48
21,904 43,660 21,822 1.82 0.70 1.39 0.69
21,844 46,667 33,813 2.05 0.64 1.36 0.98
22,781 48,882 26,349 1.85 0.64 1.37 0.74
23,591 50,560 29,378 1.76 0.66 1.41 0.82
TABLE 2.3 MAIN INCOME STATEMENT ITEMS RELATIVE TO AVERAGE TOTAL ASSETS (ATA)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Nevertheless, the item with the biggest impact on net income on the income statement was 
undoubtedly the growth of provisions over the period, which rose due to the increase in non-
performing assets (see Chart 2.20 and Table 2.3). Whereas in December 2005 provisions came to just 
0.26% of average total assets (ATA), in December 2009 they reached 0.98%, averaging 0.81% over 
the period. Overall, impairment losses on the consolidated income statement came to €111 billion in 
the four-year period from 2008 to 2011. 
Considering only business in Spain, the drop in profitability was even sharper, with losses already 
being registered in 2011 due to the performance of the savings banks, which suffered a bigger impact from 
provisions on their profit and loss account (€36 billion over the four-year period as a whole). The profitability 
of the financial sector was largely sustained during the period by the large Spanish banks’ foreign business. 
F. Solvency
As of end-2007, changes took place in institutions’ solvency basically with a view to strengthening 
their highest quality capital or common equity Tier 1 (CET-1) position. Based on consolidated data 
(including foreign business), the solvency of both the commercial banks and savings banks improved, 
although there were two different types of adjustment: whereas the commercial banks increased their 
capital, at the savings banks the adjustment took place through a reduction in risk-weighted assets.
Across the financial system as a whole, over the four-year period from December 2007 to 
December 2011, Tier 1 capital increased by more than €41 billion, equal to 26% cumulative growth 
over the period.10 Over the same period, growth in total capital was somewhat lower, at €14 billion 
(6%). During this four-year period, financial institutions focused on bolstering their core capital, in 
an attempt to demonstrate the strength of their solvency position to the market. Thus, in line with 
the reduction in credit, the system’s risk-weighted assets (RWAs) dropped by €150 billion, or more 
than 7%, between December 2007 and December 201111 (see Chart 2.21). 
The increase in capital and decrease in risk-weighted assets boosted the capital ratios, in 
particular the Tier 1 capital ratio, as this was the type of capital that had been strengthened most (see 
Chart 2.22). In particular, the total capital ratio increased by 154 bp, rising from 10.6% in December 
2007 to 12.2% at end-2011, while the Tier 1 capital ratio rose by 271 bp (from 7.5% at end-2007 to 
10.2% in December 2011).
10 The reason for the bigger increase in Tier 1 capital than in total own funds was the reduction in Tier 2 funds, largely as a 
result of the decrease in general provisions and subordinated debt. 
11 The capital ratios are calculated by dividing the amounts of eligible own funds by risk-weighted assets, such that an 
improvement in these ratios may derive from either an increase in eligible own funds or a decrease in risk-weighted assets 
or a combination of both. 
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As mentioned, the commercial banks and savings banks adjusted differently. Between 2007 and 
2011 the commercial banks’ total capital grew by €28.5 billion (26.8%) with their Tier 1 capital 
increasing most (€41.3 billion, or 53%). For their part, the savings banks’ total capital contracted by 
14%, and their Tier 1 capital by 2%. The situation was inverted in the case of risk-weighted assets 
(RWAs). The commercial banks’ RWAs grew by €49 billion, or 4.4%, between December 2007 and 
December 2011, while the savings banks’ RWAs grew more strongly, by almost €194  billion, or 
21.6%. Savings banks cut their exposures (mostly credit exposures), which had grown more rapidly 
during the pre-crisis expansion, further and faster. 
Thus, in the case of the commercial banks, the stronger capital growth, in particular Tier 1 
capital, relative to RWAs, translated into higher capital ratios. The total capital ratio rose by 2 pp 
between 2007 and 2011, reaching 11.6% in December 2011, while the increase in the Tier 1 capital 
ratio was larger, rising by over 3 pp to reach 10.2% at the end of the period. The significant drop in 
the savings banks’ RWAs also translated into rising capital ratios. Specifically, the increase in the total 
capital ratio was 1 pp, taking it to 12.9% at end-2011, while the increase in the Tier 1 capital ratio 
was 2 pp, such that it came to 10.1% in December 2011.
G. the crisis highlighted the credit portfolio’s risks
The depth and length of the recession, which was unprecedented in peacetime in Spain, ultimately 
highlighted the weaknesses of a credit portfolio that had grown very substantially at numerous financial 
institutions, many of which were savings banks, during the years of the real estate boom.
CHART 2.21  TOTAL CAPITAL, TIER 1 CAPITAL AND
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS
All deposit-taking institutions. Consolidated data
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CHART 2.22  TOTAL CAPITAL RATIO AND TIER 1
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In line with how the economy progressed, with first a slowdown (2008) and then a very deep 
recession (2009), lending to the private sector continued to slow and then to contract, while the NPL 
rate began to rise at an ever-faster rate as the economy deteriorated. The 2009 recession was unusually 
intense, making it Spain’s severest since the Civil War. This seriously damaged businesses’ and 
households’ net worth, and created the conditions for the rise in non-performing loans that year.
The slower pace of GDP contraction in 2010 helped moderate the rate at which NPL ratios 
were rising, but the new recession in 2011, which proved persistent and worsened over the following 
two years, ultimately impaired deposit-taking institutions’ credit portfolios, in particular, those linked 
to the real estate development and construction sector, which suffered a sharp rise in NPLs and a 
credit squeeze, in line with the significant drop in prices and slump in activity in the Spanish real 
estate sector. 
The continuously rising NPL rate and consequent specific provision requirements had an 
impact on financial institutions’ profit and loss accounts. This impact was more marked in the case 
of those financial institutions with most exposure to the real estate development and construction 
sector, which reduced their ability to generate profits and therefore the possibility of retaining earnings 
as reserves with which to build up capital. Private-sector debt reduction, together with refuge taken 
in government debt in the face of rising NPLs and deteriorating quality of demand for credit, led to 
a reduction in RWAs that boosted the solvency ratio, despite the fact that the capital (the numerator 
in these ratios) was growing more slowly, in particular, in the case of the savings banks, which were 
dependent on profits to increase their own funds, as they could not issue equity to bolster them.
2.3 INTERNATIONALREGULATORYFRAMEWORK
The international authorities reacted to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 by 
adopting a series of initiatives, including a reform of financial supervision and regulation. The first 
step was to hold the first summit of G20 leaders at the head of state and government level in 
Washington in November 2008. The leaders at the meeting agreed on the need to adopt urgent 
exceptional measures to stabilise financial markets and undertook to reform the international financial 
system. The reform was given its general outline at this first summit, with more details being added 
following the second summit held in London in April 2009. This can be summarised as being on 
three main fronts: (a) changes to prudential banking regulations (microprudential and macroprudential 
regulations, including various measures on the treatment of systemically important financial 
institutions); (b) other regulatory reforms; and (c) bail-out measures for financial systems. 
Implementation of the reforms began in 2008, based on a new institutional framework for 
international coordination of financial regulation and supervision. Within this framework the G20 
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played a key enabling role as a forum for guidance, operating through the leaders’ summit and 
periodic meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors. The was followed in 2009 by 
the creation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB),12 as the main forum of international cooperation 
in the financial arena, with the participation of finance ministers, national supervisors, international 
organisations (IMF, OECD, World Bank and BIS) and international standard-setting bodies 
(SSBs), including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which is responsible for issuing international accounting 
standards.13 
In Europe, a review of the institutional supervisory framework was entrusted to a high-level 
expert group chaired by Jacques de Larosière, whose report14 (published in early 2009) led to the 
creation of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). The ESFS comprises three new 
European supervisory authorities entrusted with microprudential tasks for the banking, securities and 
insurance sectors (the EBA, ESMA and EIOPA, respectively) which replaced, with the rank of 
“authority”, the former European committees in these areas,15 and the creation of a new institution 
for macroprudential oversight, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The ESFS came into 
operation in January 2011.16
A. Changes in prudential regulation
The international community was particularly active in the field of coordination of prudential 
regulation, where it acted on three main pillars: redefinition and strengthening of the microprudential 
framework (A1); and implementation of two new regulatory frameworks, one macroprudential (A2)  and 
12 The Financial Stability Board (FSB), which has higher rank and more member countries than its predecessor, the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF). Spain became a member of the new FSB. 
13 The member countries of the FSB assume various commitments, including implementing and publishing the degree of 
adherence to the agreed international financial standards (FSB Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International 
Standards (January 2010) and undergoing the IMF-WB Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) every five years 
and FSB peer reviews.
14 Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (25 February 2009). Jacques de Larosière de 
Champfeu was managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and governor of the Banque de France, 
chairman of the Strategic Committee of the French Treasury, advisor to BNP Paribas and president of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. The aforementioned report, known as the “Larosière Report” was published in 
2009, at the behest of the European Commission.
15 The European Banking Authority (EBA), which replaced the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS); the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which replaced the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS); and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA), which replaced the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR).
16 In December 2010, the regulations for the entry into force of the ESRB, EIOPA, EBA and ESMA were published and the 
institutions began to be established in January 2011. 
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another specific enhanced framework (A3) for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).17 
As will be discussed below, in all these fields, and within the international framework, the EU has 
developed its own regulatory and supervisory initiatives and instruments, adapting them to the 
situation of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
A.1 Microprudential framework: Basel III 
At the behest of the G20, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) developed the 
reforms to strengthen international standards on banking regulation. The first steps were taken in 
2009 with a series of measures that were part of the set of reforms known as Basel II.5, including higher 
capital requirements for exposures in the trading book and for securitisation and resecuritisation 
transactions. 
However, the bulk of the reforms were developed later, between 2010 and 2011, giving rise to 
a new regulatory framework known as Basel III, which introduced substantial changes to the 
preceding accord (Basel II) to improve its transparency and consistency. Basel III strengthened the 
regulation of the banks at individual level (microprudential regulation) so that they can withstand 
periods of stress better; it also introduced measures aimed at preventing and mitigating the risks that 
may build up in the banking sector as a whole (macroprudential regulation).
On the microprudential level, Basel III established stricter liquidity and capital quality 
requirements, setting the minimum Tier 1 capital requirement at 6%, with a minimum of 4.5% for 
the highest-quality capital (CET-1).18 It also established a further series of requirements, such as an 
additional capital conservation buffer of 2.5%, a parallel leverage ratio independent from the RWA-
based capital requirements, and minimum liquidity standards (both short and medium/long term). 
These measures are being phased in over the period from 2013 to 2018 (see Box 2.2). 
A.2 Macroprudential framework19
One of the main lessons of the global financial crisis was the inadequacy of a regulatory 
framework based solely on monitoring individual institutions, as it failed to allow for proper control 
17 G-SIFI: Global-SIFI.
18  The Basel II framework did not establish an explicit minimum CET-1 capital requirement, but it was understood that at 
least 2% of RWAs should be made up of CET-1 capital (CET-1 did not exist as such in Basel II, but a similar concept, 
that of core capital, did).
19 The aim of macroprudential policy is to help safeguard the stability of the financial system as a whole. In particular, it aims 
to develop and apply instruments that make it possible to temper and address the systemic risks that develop over the 
course of the credit cycle (time dimension). It also aims to address the impact on systemic risk arising out of financial 
institutions’ size, complexity and interconnectedness (cross-cutting structural dimension).
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of the risks building up across the financial system as a whole.20 Thus, following the London summit 
in April 2009, the G20 promoted a reconfiguration of the regulatory systems to facilitate the 
identification and consideration of macroprudential risks. On the international level, the FSB, IMF 
and BIS prepared progress reports on the frameworks and tools, identifying best practices in 
macroprudential policy.21 These reports highlighted that macroprudential frameworks need to be 
tailored to each country’s conditions, as there is no standard configuration that matches all national 
situations. Nevertheless, they did identify a series of common challenges in terms of systemic risk, 
evaluation of new tools in various situations, the establishment of institutional frameworks, and 
governance to implement macroprudential policy. 
In the regulatory realm, as Box 2.2 shows, Basel III also established specific macroprudential 
regulations, in particular, the introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer and an additional buffer 
for financial institutions classed as being of systemic importance. 
In the EU, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) came into operation in 2011 with the 
participation of national and European authorities, including the ECB, which hosted its secretariat.22 
This developed into the reference European forum for discussion of issues of macroprudential 
oversight, performing an important analytical role, and discussing risks and possible sources of 
vulnerability in the financial system. The ESRB also coordinates national macroprudential measures 
implemented in the EU, mainly in the framework of the solvency regulations applicable to credit 
institutions, which transpose global standards agreed by the BCBS into national legislation.
Although the ESRB does not have binding powers over EU Member States, it can decide to issue 
formal acts such as warnings of systemic risks and recommendations for voluntary compliance by the 
authorities in each country. Since its creation, the ESRB has prepared some ten recommendations,23 
covering topics as diverse as the establishment of national macroprudential authorities, granting loans 
in foreign currencies and setting countercyclical buffer rates. It has also issued warnings about risks in 
the residential property sector in eight European countries24 (not including Spain).
20 In 2008, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) began to point in this direction with a report on the elements contributing 
to increased procyclicality (Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience). 
This was followed in 2009 with a series of recommendations to reduce procyclicality, including mechanisms allowing 
resources to be built up at times of economic prosperity so they could be released during situations of economic and 
financial stress (Recommendations for Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System, April 2009).
21 Macroprudential policy tools and frameworks. Update to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors – FSB, IMF and 
BIS (March 2011). Macroprudential policy tools and frameworks. Progress report to G20 – FSB, IMF and BIS (October 2011). 
22 National authorities (central banks, bank, securities and insurance supervisory authorities) and Community bodies (ECB, 
the European Commission, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA and the Economic and Financial Committee) all participate in the 
ESRB. The ESRB also has an advisory committee of academics.
23 https://www.esrb.europa.eu/mppa/recommendations/html/index.en.html
24 https://www.esrb.europa.eu/mppa/warnings/html/index.en.html
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box 2.2 MAIN ELEMENTS oF bASEL III 
Microprudential reform: 
— Improvement in the definition and quality of 
ordinary capital and asset risks. The new 
definition of capital is stricter, in that some hybrid 
instruments have ceased to be recognised as part 
of the highest-quality capital, common equity 
Tier 1 (CET-1) capital, for example. It also 
tightens the definition of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. 
— Increased minimum capital requirement. Thus, 
for CET-1 capital, the minimum requirement is 
set at 4.5% of RWAs. The requirement rises to 
6% (minimum Tier 1 capital ratio) when 
additional Tier 1 capital is added, and to 8% 
(total capital ratio) when Tier 2 capital is added.
— Establishment of an additional capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5% for CET-1 above the 
minimum capital requirements for absorption of 
losses in times of stress and to ensure banks 
remain able to lend to the real economy. 
— Improvement in how risks are reflected by 
changing the treatment of market risk, off-balance-
sheet operations, securitisation transactions, and 
requirements for the calculation of counterparty 
credit risk exposures. A framework of large 
exposure limits was also developed in order to 
curb the excessive concentration of risk, by 
capping banks’ overall exposure with each 
individual counterparty at a maximum of 25% of 
their Tier 1 capital. If the institution is a global 
systemically important bank (G-SIB), its exposure 
to any other G-SIB may not exceed 15% of its 
Tier 1 capital. 
— Introduction of a minimum leverage ratio of 3%, 
calculated as the ratio between banks’ Tier 1 
capital and their total assets, including off-balance 
sheet transactions, independently of the risks of 
these exposures (unlike the capital requirements, 
which are set relative to RWAs).
— Introduction of two minimum liquidity 
standards: (i) the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), 
whereby banks hold sufficient liquid assets to 
meet short-term liquidity needs in the event of 
episodes of market stress; and (ii) the net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR), which requires that 
banks hold a minimum level of stable funding 
sources relative to the degree of liquidity of 
their assets.
Reforms on the macroprudential level
— A countercyclical capital buffer was established in 
order to prevent and mitigate systemic risks of a 
cyclical nature that may be caused by excessive 
credit growth at the aggregate level.
— For institutions classed as being systemically 
important (see Section A.3), an additional capital 
buffer was established to address the externalities 
associated with their size, complexity and 
interconnectedness. 
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A.3 Systemically important institutions
The G20 also promoted the development of a differentiated regulatory framework for 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs),25 which in the case of systemically important 
banks, are identified as global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). These are banks that would 
represent a serious risk for the financial system as a whole if their viability were in danger, because of 
the complexity, scale and importance of their systemic connections. This means they raise a problem 
of moral hazard, being referred to as “too big to fail”. 
Work in this area was led by the FSB26 with the publication of a series of reports that resulted 
in the introduction of legislative and institutional changes. In 2010, it published the regulatory 
framework of reference to strengthen the requirements applicable to SIFIs,27 comprising three 
types of additional measures for these financial institutions, over and above the standards laid 
down for other institutions: additional requirements to increase their loss-absorbing capacity, 
standards and requirements for the resolution of institutions of this type, and recommendations 
for more thorough and effective supervision. This framework has been in the process of being 
phased in since 2010 (see Box 2.3), focusing in particular on the banking segment. The FSB, in 
conjunction with the BCBS, has published a list of G-SIBs since 2011. This list comprises 
approximately thirty institutions.28 
Prudential regulation in euroPe
All these international standards and agreements on prudential regulation have been incorporated 
into the European legal system, mainly through Regulation 2013/575/EU (CRR) and Directive 
2013/36/EU (CRD IV) on capital requirements (usually referred to jointly as CRR/CRD IV; see Box 3.1) 
and through Directive 2014/59/EU on bank recovery and resolution (BRRD; see Table 3.2). For their 
part, CEBS and then EBA have been developing this standard through their advisory role to the 
European Commission and the development of the associated legal instruments, such as technical 
standards and EBA guidelines.29
25 SIFIs include banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions.
26 In 2009, the FSB published a set of high level principles to strengthen cross-border cooperation (FSB Principles for Cross-
border Cooperation on Crisis Management, April 2009).
27 Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions- FSB (November 2010).
28 The number of Spanish banks on the list of G-SIBs has been one or two, depending on the year.
29 The guidelines prepared include: Technical advice on liquidity risk management (2008), Guidelines on Liquidity Buffers 
and Survival Periods (2009), Guidelines on the revised large exposures regime (2009), Guidelines on Hybrid Capital 
Instruments (2009), Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (2010), Guidelines on the management of 
concentration risk under the supervisory review process (2010), Guidelines on Internal Governance (GL 44) (2011).
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One of the priority lines of action on the 
international scale in 2010, and particularly in 2011, 
was the development of a framework for the treatment 
of systemically important financial institutions, 
particularly in the banking sector (G-SIBs). The objective 
was to develop a framework proportionate to these 
institutions’ greater potential risk of destabilisation. The 
main initiatives during the period are outlined below:1 
November 2010: the FSB published its 
recommendations2 for more thorough and effective 
supervision of SIFIs, based on stronger supervision 
mandates, more resources and powers and 
higher supervisory expectations in relation to risk 
management, governance and internal controls. 
November 2011: 
— The FSB published the framework document 
for SIFIs,3 which envisaged the development of: 
(i) essential attributes of resolution frameworks; 
(ii) evaluation methodologies; and (iii) measures 
to strengthen the intensity and effectiveness of 
the supervision of SIFIs.
— The BCBS published a framework4 for the 
evaluation of global systemically important 
banks (G-SIBs), establishing the capital 
surcharge system they need to comply with in 
order to ensure they have greater loss-
absorbing capacity. This requirement must be 
met with highest-quality capital (CET-1) and 
may vary between 1% and 2.5% of RWAs, 
depending on the institution’s degree of 
systemic importance (to avoid institutions 
increasing their systemicity, a surcharge of up 
to 3.5% may be applied, if necessary). At the 
same time, the FSB published an initial list of 
G-SIBs,5 prepared by the BCBS using its own 
methodology. The list is updated annually.
— The FSB published a new international standard 
to promote the adoption of effective resolution 
frameworks (Key Attributes).6 The standard 
establishes specific requirements for G-SIFIs 
and their competent authorities, such as: (a) the 
preparation of recovery and resolution plans; (b) 
performing evaluations of their resolution 
capacity; and (c) the need to establish agreements 
to prepare and enhance cooperation between 
resolution authorities in different jurisdictions 
at times of crisis. It also establishes the key 
principle that, in the event of collapse of a 
financial institution, shareholders and creditors 
should assume a large share of the costs of its 
recapitalisation (a process referred to as bail-in). 
box 2.3  REgULAToRY FRAMEwoRk FoR SYSTEMICALLY IMPoRTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIoNS  
(2010-2011)
1  See Report on Banking Supervision in Spain, Banco de 
España, 2011.
2  Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision 
Recommendations for Enhanced Supervision – FSB 
(November 2010).
3  Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions - FSB (November 2011).
4  Global systemically important banks: Assessment 
methodology and the additional loss absorbency 
requirement – BCBS (November 2011).
5  Included in the document Policy Measures to Address 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions - FSB 
(November 2011).
6  Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for 
Financial Institutions – FSB (November 2011). Document 
updated in October 2014 to incorporate sectoral annexes 
to promote its implementation in non-bank financial 
institutions (such as insurance companies or market 
infrastructures).
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Two further CEBS initiatives are also worth noting: the development of stress tests and the 
banking sector recapitalisation exercise. The CEBS ran several stress tests30 on the European banking 
system as a whole as part of the general strategy to strengthen and rebuild financial institutions’ 
balance sheets. The first of these took place in 2009 at the behest of the ECOFIN Council, looking 
at a sample of 22 cross-border banks from which aggregate data were obtained. In subsequent years 
(2010 and 2011) the sample was expanded and the individual results obtained for each bank were 
published in order to bolster market discipline on financial institutions.
Lastly, the resurgence of the sovereign debt crisis in the autumn of 2011 led the EBA to run a 
banking system recapitalisation exercise, which began in late 2011. The EBA conducted an in-depth 
analysis of 71 European banks in order to detect their possible capital shortfalls. In the light of its 
findings, the EBA issued Recommendation EBA/REC/2011/1 (08/12/2011), urging banks to reach 
a 9% Core Tier 1 ratio by June 2012, and requiring banks with a shortfall to submit capital plans 
enabling them to comply with the recommendation.
B. other elements of the regulatory framework 
Together with the pillars of prudential regulation (micro- and macroprudential and SIFIs), the 
G20 also promoted a series of additional regulatory reforms aiming to curb an excessive accumulation 
of risks in the financial system, developed, on the international level, by the FSB in coordination with 
the Basel Committee and other international standard-setting bodies (SSBs), and in Europe by the 
CEBS and, at the end of the period, by the EBA. This comprised a broad range of measures, including 
in particular: (i) measures to harmonise accounting standards; (ii) remuneration policies; and (iii) 
regulation of shadow banking. 
(i) Strengthening and harmonisation of international accounting standards. The 
international financial crisis highlighted the weaknesses of the “incurred-loss” model 
used by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in their standards for the recognition and 
estimation of loan loss provisions. This model was criticised for doing “too little, too 
late” given the lateness and inadequacy of the provisions it recognised.
 As a result of the foregoing, the G20,31 prudential supervisors and the markets asked 
international accounting regulators to replace the “incurred-loss” model with an 
30 Section 2.5(C) below summarises the scope of these tests in Spain. 
31 Improving Financial Regulation - FSB (September 2009).
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“expected loss” model. In response, in 2014 the IASB published IFRS 9 and the US 
accounting regulatory body, the FASB, published its equivalent standard in 2016. The 
international standards will be obligatory in 2018, while the US standards will be 
applicable as of 2020 or 2021, depending on the characteristics of the financial 
institution.
 In the incurred loss model applicable during the financial crisis, and, as mentioned, still 
in effect, provisions are recognised when there is objective evidence of impairment (such 
as arrears on the loan or the borrower being made redundant). The requirement for a 
trigger event for the recognition of provisions led many financial institutions to fail to 
cover the risk of default on their performing exposures adequately. The new expected 
loss model will require recognition of provisions for all credit risk exposures, including 
those which have not yet suffered an event of default. 
(ii) Best practices on remuneration and corporate governance. The analysis of the 
causes of the financial crisis suggests that it was exacerbated by excessive remuneration 
policies, which had driven a disproportionate risk appetite. In this connection, the 
FSB published a set of standards on compensation,32 while in Europe the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD III) laid down standards to control and correct this 
phenomenon and the CEBS drew up guidelines.33 The aim was to promote more 
prudent risk management and make compensation policies subject to effective 
governance and supervision mechanisms, through measures such as: 1) effective 
independent oversight of compensation policies and practices by the board of directors; 
2) the relationship between variable compensation, the institution’s profits and the 
need to maintain a sound solvency position; 3) imposing limits on guaranteed 
bonuses;34 4) the composition and qualification of management bodies; 5) enhancing 
transparency; and 6) strengthening supervision in this area, including the imposition 
of penalties where necessary.
(iii) Strengthening the regulation and monitoring of non-banking sectors. The build-
up of risks outside the banking industry35 had serious consequences when the crisis 
32 Principles for Sound Compensation Practices – Implementation Standards – FSB (September 2009).
33 Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (2010), Guidelines on Internal Governance (GL 44) (2011).
34 A bonus is a variable salary complement linked to productivity, i.e. the payment is normally conditional upon meeting 
certain targets that are set in advance. 
35 For example, the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in the summer of 2007, the recapitalisation of AIG (an insurance 
group) and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
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broke, leading the G20 to back measures to avoid the risk of banking activities 
migrating to unregulated, or less regulated, financial system players or mechanisms 
(shadow banking). 
 The January 2010 Joint Forum report36 noted that the increased requirements on banks 
in response to the crisis could result in typical banking risks being driven out of the 
banking sector,37 and to avoid this it established a series of recommendations. In 2011 
the FSB began a project to monitor the risks that were building up outside the banking 
sector, and since then it has led work in this area.38 As a result of the FSB’s 
recommendations, regulatory measures were developed to address the risks associated 
with securitisation transactions39 or interconnections between banks and other 
institutions (for example, through improvements in the rules on the consolidation of 
off-balance sheet entities and enhancements to prudential regulations).
(iv) Other regulatory measures. The G20 backed other measures aimed at: a) reflecting the 
risk assumed in the form of OTC off-balance sheet derivatives transactions, including 
the obligation that they be traded on electronic platforms or exchanges, cleared through 
central counterparties (CCPs) and reported to central registers (trade repositories); 
b) reducing the dependency of banks, institutional investors and other market 
participants40 on risk ratings issued by credit rating agencies (CRAs); c) strengthening 
and relaunching securitisation operations41 (for example, by reviewing their prudential 
treatment, transparency and consolidation in the banking area) to bolster the provision 
of credit to the real economy; and d) improving the dissemination of public information 
and strengthening market discipline42 towards the end of 2012. 
36 Joint forum with representatives of the BCBS (banking), IOSCO (securities) and IAIS (insurance). Review of the 
Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation – Key Issues and Recommendations - Joint Forum (January 
2010).
37 Credit intermediation with transformation of liquidity, maturities and leveraging, but without being subject to the 
banking prudential framework or having access to central bank liquidity or a deposit guarantee system.
38 See, for example, the following FSB publications: Recommendations to Strengthen Oversight and Regulation of Shadow 
Banking (October 2011); Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report (November 2012) and Policy Framework for 
Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities (August 2013).
39 Unregulated Financial Markets and Products (September 2009) – IOSCO, Disclosure Principles for Public Offerings and 
Listings of Asset-Backed Securities (April 2010) – IOSCO.
40 Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings - FSB (October 2010). The road map for these principles envisaged 
eliminating CRAs’ ratings from standards, legislation and regulation and encouraging financial institutions to bolster their 
own internal credit assessment processes to replace ratings from agencies.
41 Improving Financial Regulation – FSB (September 2009).
42 See medium-term actions on strengthening transparency and accountability (G20 Action Plan – Washington, 2008).
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C. Financial system bail-out policies43
Governments of developed countries have deployed numerous measures to support the 
financial system since the onset of the financial crisis. These public interventions were not uniform, 
as they were shaped by the specific features of national financial systems –particularly financial 
institutions’ business models and their ability to absorb shocks– and also by the severity and duration 
of the economic crisis and the amount of fiscal leeway available in each country.44 
Public support measures in the EU were subject to the conditionality criteria envisaged in EU 
law on State aid. Hence, countries that applied for financial support through the European Stability 
Mechanism were subject to enhanced conditionality with country-specific requirements. Given the 
severity of the crisis, the European Commission introduced a specific temporary framework in 
competition legislation to authorise financial support for the financial system. This was set out 
in the “Banking Communication” dated 13 October 2008, which enabled a concerted action plan 
to be deployed to bail out Europe’s financial systems.45 As time passed, the Commission revised this 
temporary framework, although it did not withdraw it altogether, and the conditions for the granting 
of State aid to the financial sector gradually became stricter. Finally, in 2013, following the experience 
of recapitalisation of the Spanish banking system, the Commission adopted the Communication 
currently in effect, which replaced the 2008 Banking Communication.46 
Between October 2008 and October 2012, over 350 decisions were adopted in the EU regarding 
around 50 general schemes supporting the financial system and interventions affecting more than 90 
financial institutions. The action plans envisaged a wide variety of measures, and in some cases the tools 
used to provide support were centralised through specific entities (either already existing or created 
specifically for this purpose), such as the SoFF (Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung) in Germany, the 
43 For more information on these policies, see “The cost of interventions in the financial sector since 2008 in the EU 
countries”, Analytical Articles, Banco de España (6 April 2017).
44 It should be noted that the causality between banking and fiscal problems can operate in both directions (in the case of 
Ireland, the banking crisis threatened to overwhelm the public finances, whereas in that of Greece, the country’s fiscal 
problems weighed down the banking sector), and they feed back into one another (as in the case of the loop between 
sovereign and banking risk in the European sovereign debt crisis). 
45 A further three Communications with more specific criteria were issued over the course of 2009: the Communication on 
recapitalisation in January 2009; the Communication on impaired assets in March 2009; and the Communication on 
restructuring in August 2009.
46 In 2013 the European Commission raised the minimum requirements regarding bail-ins (whereby shareholders and 
creditors assume losses) and made authorisation of financial support conditional upon the existence of a restructuring 
plan, with the dual objective of speeding up the resolution process and better calibrating the minimum level of aid 
necessary. These changes were partly a response to the serious deterioration in public finances, and also to the need to 
incorporate considerations that would be applicable under the new common legislation on resolution (through the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive, BRRD) to safeguard taxpayers’ interests.
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SFEF (Société de Financement de l’Economie Française) in France, the HFSF (Hellenic Financial Stability 
Fund) in Greece or the FROB (Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria) in Spain. 
The measures adopted by the various countries were of three main types: 
(i) Liability guarantees and other liquidity measures. At the start of the systemic phase of the 
global crisis, in October 2008, measures were taken, such as guarantees for new bank debt 
issues (the most widely used measure) and various public systems were set up to provide the 
banks with liquidity, whether directly or indirectly through centralised State agencies (such as 
SoFFin in Germany and SFEF in France). In Spain, the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial 
Assets (FAFA) was set up to purchase high quality assets from banks. 
(ii) Recapitalisations. A second line of support addressed the banks’ difficulties attracting 
private investors to finance the capital needs arising as a result of the impairment of the 
asset portfolio (initially structured products and, as the economic crisis progressed, credit 
portfolios) and the increased capital requirements established by the authorities in an 
attempt to restore confidence in the sector. This State aid in the form of capital injections 
took place both under the general schemes applicable to the banking sector as a whole 
and in response to specific operations at banks facing varying degrees of difficulty, which 
in some cases resulted in the partial or total nationalisation of some of them. 
(iii)  Asset write-down measures. In some cases, however, the capital injections were insufficient to 
resolve the situation of vulnerability, particularly at the height of the crisis of confidence (as in 
2008, and later in the countries affected by the sovereign debt crisis) or at certain high-risk 
institutions. In these cases it was necessary to reduce the uncertainty over the value of the 
impaired assets and facilitate the restructuring of institutions through aid to build up their 
balance sheets. These measures included a range of mechanisms to segregate and insure portfolios 
of impaired assets, such as the Asset Protection Scheme in the United Kingdom in 2009 and 
the Spanish asset protection schemes, including systems to segregate and transfer these assets to 
vehicles, entities or institutions specifically for their management and liquidation. Within this 
latter category general schemes were designed for the sector, with the creation of ad-hoc 
structures to acquire impaired assets from various financial institutions, such as the National 
Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in Ireland (set up in late 2009), Sareb in Spain (created in 
2012) or the Bank Assets Management Company (BAMC) in Slovenia (created in 2013). 
 Management and liquidation entities were also set up for specific banks, as in the case 
of WestLB (Erste Abwicklungsanstalt, in late 2009) or Hypo Real Estate (FMS 
Wertmanagement, in 2010) in Germany, which, despite being specific, involved the 
transfer of large portfolios of assets with a book value of 3% and 8% of German GDP, 
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respectively. In the United Kingdom the Government created a public holding company 
in 2010 called UK Asset Resolution (UKAR) for the orderly dismantling of the mortgage 
portfolio of Northern Rock Asset Management (from the division of Northern Rock) 
and Bradford & Bingley (B&B), both of which had been nationalised in 2008.
Table 2.4 sets out the value of the aid granted to the financial sector in the countries of the EU 
between 2008 and 2015, according to the European Commission’s register of State aid. It distinguishes 
between recapitalisations, impaired asset write-downs, liability guarantees and other liquidity 
SOURCE: European Commission, DG Competition.
a Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Finland are not included as there was no (or negligible) public aid. The GDP 
figure is for 2015.
b Cumulative total gross capital injections, including resolution processes, not considering possible repayments.
c Total aid for asset write-downs quantified as implicit public aid (calculated as the difference between the transfer value of the segregated assets and their market 
value). Measured in gross terms without considering possible reversal of measures.
d Guarantees on liabilities and other liquidity measures incorporate the maximum value reached in a given year between 2008 and 2015, considering the value on 
31 December in each year. In the column headed "other measures" the amount for Spain includes FAFA asset purchases (this system has since expired).
€bn % of GDP €bn % of GDP €bn % of GDP €bn % of GDP
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Ireland
Spain
Greece
France
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Slovenia
Sweden
United Kingdom
Memorandum item:
    EU
Recapitalisations
Total 2008-2015 (b)
Impaired assets
Total 2008-2015 (c)
Liability guarantees
Maximum 2008-2015 (d)
Other measures
Maximum 2008-2015 (d)
TABLE 2.4 AID GRANTED TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN THE EU (a)
Period 2008-2015
20.8 5.1 21.8 5.3 46.8 11.4 0.0 0.0
10.8 4.0 0.3 0.1 145.0 53.4 2.0 0.7
64.2 2.1 80.0 2.6 135.0 4.5 4.7 0.2
62.8 24.5 2.6 1.0 284.3 111.1 0.9 0.4
61.9 5.8 32.9 3.1 72.0 6.7 19.3 1.8
46.6 26.5 0.0 0.0 62.3 35.5 6.9 3.9
25.0 1.1 1.2 0.1 92.7 4.3 0.0 0.0
11.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 85.7 5.2 0.0 0.0
3.5 19.7 0.0 0.0 2.8 16.0 0.0 0.0
0.5 2.2 0.4 1.7 0.5 2.2 1.0 4.0
0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.6 5.1 0.0 0.0 3.8 7.3 0.1 0.3
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.2
23.0 3.4 5.0 0.7 40.9 6.0 30.4 4.5
11.8 3.5 0.5 0.1 19.3 5.7 0.0 0.0
15.3 8.5 3.1 1.7 16.6 9.2 3.8 2.1
3.6 9.3 0.3 0.7 2.2 5.6 0.0 0.0
0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 19.9 4.5 0.0 0.0
100.1 3.9 40.4 1.6 158.2 6.1 33.3 1.3
466 3.2 189 1.3 1,188 8.1 105 0.7
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measures. The figures refer to the effective gross amount of aid and do not take into account possible 
total or partial repayment or recovery.47
Relative to GDP, the countries with greatest recourse to capital aid between 2008 and 2015 were 
Greece, Ireland and Cyprus (with a value of around 20%-25% of GDP), Portugal and Slovenia (with 
a value of close to 9%), followed by Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg (between 5%-6%) and Denmark, 
the United Kingdom, Austria and the Netherlands (with 3%-4%). For their part, recapitalisations in 
Germany, France and Italy represented 2.1%, 1.1% and 0.7% of GDP, respectively. These figures are 
gross and do not include capital reimbursement operations undertaken by some banks48 or recoveries 
47 For an analysis of the financial support to the Spanish banking sector, see Section 5.2 and Table 5.5.
48 This was the case of the Dutch banks ING and Aegon, Germany’s Commerzbank and the French banks. The latter were 
obliged to take part in the capital scheme, subsequently repaying €16 billion.
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deriving from resolution processes. The largest impaired asset write-downs were made in Belgium 
(5.3% of GDP), Spain (3.1% of GDP) and Germany (2.6%).49
Chart 2.23 plots the figures at the end of 201650 (and the maximum levels reached since 2008) 
for: 1) the increase in government debt deriving from measures to support the financial sector 
(liabilities chart); 2) values of assets (not always at market prices) held by general government as a 
result of these measures (and which may generate future income),51 and 3) the net balance of liabilities 
and assets. The fourth panel of the chart shows the value of contingent liabilities, reflecting the 
potential additional costs in the case of collateral being foreclosed.
According to Eurostat the fiscal cost, approximated by public-sector indebtedness (net of assets), 
stood at 1.9% of GDP across the euro area as a whole at the end of 2016, with a wide range of 
variation between countries. Thus, Greece and Ireland are the countries which have taken on the 
most public debt (around 20% of GDP), followed by Slovenia and Portugal (7%-8% of GDP). This 
figure came to 3.8% of GDP in Spain’s case. However, the final cost of aid to the financial sector will 
not be fully quantified until the restructuring processes currently under way are completed and the 
public sector has freed itself from its remaining exposure to the banking sector.
2.4 REGULATORYMEASURESINSPAIN
During the period 2008-2011, the Spanish authorities fostered several initiatives under which, 
on the one hand, international reforms were adapted to the country’s financial system and, on the 
other, specific reforms were developed to tackle the crisis in Spain. During this period four major 
types of measures can be identified, adopted in chronological order (see Box 2.4 for the main 
regulatory changes of the period), as follows: 
a) 2008: Measures aimed at strengthening the liquidity of financial institutions and the 
confidence of depositors and investors. 
b) 2009: Financial sector restructuring and consolidation measures (FROB I). 
c) 2010: Strengthening of the soundness of institutions and reform of the savings banks sector. 
d) 2011: Strengthening of the solvency of credit institutions (FROB II).
49 It is worth noting that in the case of transfers of problem assets, the implicit aid component is calculated as being the 
difference between the value at which the assets are transferred (which must be similar to a real value) and their market 
value (possibly below their real value, in a context of illiquid markets).
50 This report includes data updated for 2016 (the printed Spanish version of the report includes data for 2015).
51 The volume of assets was particularly large in countries where balance sheet restructuring had taken place through entities 
belonging to the public sector, such as in Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom.
— 10 October 2008: Royal Decree-Law 6/2008 
creating the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial 
Assets (FAFA).
— 10 October 2008: Royal Decree 1642/2008 
reforming the deposit guarantee schemes.
— 13 October 2008: Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 on 
urgent economic-financial measures. 
— 26 June 2009: Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 
establishing the Fund for the Orderly 
Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB). 
— 29 June 2010: Banco de España Circular 3/2010 
amending Circular 4/2004 of 22 December 2004 
on public and confidential financial reporting 
rules and formats.  
— 9 July 2010: Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 on the 
reform of the savings banks sector.
— 18 February 2011: Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 on 
the strengthening of the solvency of credit 
institutions.
— 3 June 2011: Royal Decree 771/2011 amending 
Royal Decree 216/2008 of 15 February 2008 on 
the own funds of financial institutions, and Royal 
Decree 2606/1996 of 20 December 1996 on 
deposit guarantee schemes of credit institutions. 
— 14 October 2011: Royal Decree-Law 16/2011 
unifying the three deposit guarantee schemes.
— 30 November 2011: Banco de España Circular 
5/2011 amending Circular 4/2004 of 22 
December 2004 on public and confidential 
financial reporting rules and formats. 
box 2.4 MAIN REgULAToRY ChANgES IN SPAIN, IN ChRoNoLogICAL oRDER (2008-2011)
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A.  2008: Measures to strengthen the liquidity of financial institutions and enhance  
depositor and investor confidence 
As discussed earlier, the onset of the international financial crisis led to the adoption of 
extraordinary measures in the main economies, which aimed to improve the liquidity of credit 
institutions in response to the tension present in the wholesale capital markets. In Europe, the purpose 
of these measures was twofold: 1) to ensure appropriate liquidity conditions for the functioning of 
credit institutions that would improve lending conditions for households and firms, thereby 
mitigating the possible transfer to the real economy of the difficulties credit institutions were facing 
obtaining funding on the wholesale markets; and 2) to strengthen coverage of deposits, providing 
greater certainty and guarantees of protection to depositors and investors. 
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Measures to strengthen the liquidity of institutions
Although the impact of the first wave of the financial crisis was more limited in Spain, Spanish 
authorities developed two measures to improve liquidity in concert with the other euro area countries: 
the establishment of a fund for the acquisition of high-quality financial assets and the development 
of a system to grant State guarantees for certain issuances. 
— Royal Decree-Law 6/2008 of 10 October 2008 created the Fund for the Acquisition 
of Financial Assets (FAFA), assigned to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. 
Initially, €30 billion was allocated to the fund,52 expandable to €50 billion,53 to invest in 
high-quality instruments issued by credit institutions holding as collateral new loans54 
granted to individuals, firms and non-financial institutions. Acquisitions were made 
through an auction scheme. The objective of the Fund was to provide liquidity to credit 
institutions to encourage lending to firms and individuals. 
 The FAFA was a temporary measure that would, in principle, continue until the financial 
markets stabilised, although a deadline was set for the holding of auctions as at 31 
December 2009. Between November 2008 and January 2009 four auctions were held 
which provided liquidity to 54 credit institutions for an amount in excess of €19 billion. 
The FAFA was wound down in June 2012 with a profit for the State of approximately 
€650 million arising from the interest on transactions granted (equal to an average yield 
of 3.45%)55.
— Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 of 13 October 2008 set up a mechanism for the granting of 
State guarantees within the framework of the concerted action plan among the euro 
area countries. This mechanism enabled the State to guarantee,56 on a temporary basis 
(until 31 December 2009) and under normal market conditions, new issues by credit 
institutions resident in Spain of financial instruments traded on official Spanish 
secondary markets.57 The total maximum amount that could be guaranteed was set at 
€100 billion for 2008. This Royal Decree-Law also authorised the Ministry of Economic 
52 The contribution to the Fund was made with a charge to the State Budget.
53 This maximum amount was reduced to €43.25 billion under Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 of 26 June 2009. 
54 Credit granted after 7 October 2008.
55 http://www.fondoaaf.tesoro.es/Doc/Nota%20prensa%20FAAF%20120601.pdf
56 These guarantees were granted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and accrued a commission reflecting the 
risk assumed by the State on each transaction. 
57 The maximum term for these issues was 5 years. 
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Affairs and Finance (following a report from the Banco de España) to acquire, as an 
exception, eligible securities to strengthen credit institutions’ own funds. The volume of 
issues guaranteed by the State in 2008 and 2009 amounted to approximately €69.7 billion.58
Deposit protection
Royal Decree 1642/2008 of 10 October 2008 raised the maximum amounts guaranteed for 
deposits and investments by individuals from €20,000 to €100,000, ahead of the European regulations 
(Directive 2009/14/EC of 11 March 2009) promoting convergence among the different national 
deposit-guarantee schemes.59 The objective was to achieve greater depositor and investor confidence 
in the safety of balances at credit institutions at a time of notable difficulty, when the first effects of 
the crisis began to be seen. 
B.  2009: Restructuring and consolidation measures for the sector: creation of the Fund for the 
orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FRoB I) 
In former banking crises, deposit guarantee schemes, together with the Banco de España, dealt 
with financial institutions’ individual crises. However, following the intervention of Caja de Ahorros 
de Castilla-La Mancha,60 and in view of the persistence of the crisis, the need to have the necessary 
financial capacity to promote an orderly restructuring of the Spanish banking system became apparent. 
The FROB was created through Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 of 26 June 2009.61 The initial 
provision was €9 billion, with the possibility of funding itself in the market or receiving loans.62 It 
was governed by a Governing Committee consisting of eight members,63 five from the Banco de 
58 For further details, visit: http://www.tesoro.es/emisiones-avaladas-por-la-administraci%C3%B3n-general-del-estado-con-
cargo-al-programa-2008 and http://www.tesoro.es/emisiones-avaladas-por-la-administraci%C3%B3n-general-del-estado-0.
59 Spain set the minimum amount at €100,000 on the basis of the agreement reached by the Council of the European Union 
on 7 October 2008. This agreement gave rise to Directive 2009/14/EC which set the minimum amount guaranteed by 
the deposit-guarantee schemes at €50,000 (previously €20,000) and established a deadline that ended on 31/12/2010 to 
raise that amount to €100,000. 
60 See Box 2.8.
61 Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 of 26 June 2009 on bank restructuring and strengthening of credit institution equity was amended 
on several occasions: Royal Decree-Law 6/2010 of 9 April 2010, Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 of 18 February 2011, and Royal 
Decree-Law 2/2012 of 3 February 2012. It was finally repealed by Royal Decree-Law 24/2012 of 31 August 2012. 
62 The FROB was initially funded with €6.75 billion charged to the State Budget and €2.25 billion provided by the deposit 
guarantee schemes. The borrowed funds obtained by the FROB could not exceed three times the endowment capital 
existing from time to time (with the possibility of reaching ten times that amount, a limit which was reduced to a 
maximum of six times by Royal Decree-Law 2/2012). 
63 Under Royal Decree-Law 2/2011, the Governing Committee came to have nine members (of which two represented the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, four were proposed by the Banco de España and three represented the deposit 
guarantee schemes).
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España (whose Deputy Governor was the Chairman) and three others, each of whom represented one 
of the existing deposit guarantee schemes. 
Objectives of the FROB
The FROB was set up with two objectives: (i) to manage the restructuring processes of credit 
institutions that had been unable to overcome their difficulties; and (ii) to strengthen the own funds 
of credit institutions involved in integration processes, if needed (and if so requested). 
(i)  Management of restructuring processes. The management model for the restructuring 
processes was based on the three then-existing deposit guarantee schemes and this new 
institution, and it had three phases:
1 A credit institution undergoing difficulties and in need of a restructuring process 
was first required to seek a private solution to resolve its problems and ensure its 
future viability. A private solution is defined as an operation involving no 
government agency or State aid of any kind. 
2 If the credit institution was unable to find a private solution on its own to carry out the 
restructuring process required, it had the alternative of designing an action plan with 
aid from the deposit guarantee schemes. Such a plan, which required approval from the 
Banco de España, could entail three actions: (i) the strengthening of equity and 
solvency, (ii) a merger or takeover, and (iii) the full or partial transfer of the business. 
In these cases, the FROB could provide funding to the deposit guarantee schemes so 
that they could carry out the financial support functions included in the action plans.
3 If despite being in a weak position the credit institution failed to submit the above-
mentioned plan or to comply with it once it had been approved, or if such a plan 
were not deemed viable in the supervisor’s opinion, the Banco de España could 
resolve to replace the management bodies of the credit institution concerned, 
appointing the FROB as its provisional administrator. In such an event, the FROB 
would have to submit to the Banco the España for approval a restructuring plan 
ultimately aiming at a merger of the institution or the full or partial transfer of the 
business.64 Also, the FROB was required to submit to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Finance an economic report on the financial impact of the restructuring 
plan on the funding provided from the State Budget. 
64 In this case, the FROB could provide financial support to an institution, provided a restructuring plan were drawn up and 
always in keeping with the principle of the most efficient use of public resources. 
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(ii)  Strengthening the own funds of institutions participating in integration processes. 
This action by the FROB was a stimulus for credit institutions’ merger and rationalisation 
processes to improve their medium-term efficiency. In this case, institutions were 
required to submit an integration plan detailing the terms of the merger and how 
enhanced efficiency and resizing of productive capacity would be achieved. If the plan 
was approved by the Banco de España, the FROB’s aid would consist of the temporary 
Assets (a)ObservationsAmountDateFinancial institutions
Catalunya Caixa (merger of the
Caixa Catalunya, Caixa Manresa
and Caixa Tarragona savings banks) 
March 2010
CEISS (merger of Caja España and
Caja Duero) 
March 2010
BMN group IPS (integration of the
Caja Murcia, Caixa Penedès, Sa Nostra
and Caja Granada savings banks)
June 2010
Banco Financiero y de Ahorros IPS
(integration of the Caja Madrid, Bancaja,
Caja de Ávila, Caja de Segovia, 
Caja de Rioja, Caixa Laietana and 
Caja Insular de Canarias savings banks)
June 2010
Nova Caixa Galicia Banco (merger of
Caixa Galicia and Caixanova) 005,37
Preference shares subsequently capitalised. 261,1June 2010
Unnim (merger of the Caixa Sabadell,
Caixa Tarrasa and Caixa Manlleu
savings banks)
July 2010 Preference shares capitalised and shares acquired by the 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions (DGSCI). 
28,500
Banca Cívica IPS (integration of the
Caja Navarra, Caja Canarias and
Caja de Burgos savings banks in
April 2010 and subsequent
incorporation of Caja Sol and
Caja Guadalajara in December 2010 )
December 2010
4 (b)76,9LATOT 671,200
TABLE 2.5 FROB I INVESTMENTS
€m
SOURCE: FROB and Banco de España.
a Volume of assets resulting from each integration process.
b Independently from the aid to support the integration process by the subscription of preference shares, in May 2010 the FROB approved temporary financial 
assistance of €800 million for CajaSur, through the subscription of non-voting equity units. As this amount was not included in the institution’s restructuring plan 
it was repaid to the FROB in December 2010 when CajaSur was sold to Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa (BBK) in a competitive process.
1,250 Preference shares subsequently capitalised. 76,600
525 Preference shares subsequently capitalised. 45,700
915 Preference shares subsequently capitalised. 73,000
4,465 Preference shares subsequently capitalised. 328,000
380
977 Redeemed by CaixaBank in April 2013. 45,900
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acquisition of equity instruments issued by the institutions, such as preference shares or 
other instruments convertible into capital. The institution would undertake to 
repurchase these securities from the FROB as soon as possible; otherwise, they would be 
converted into capital,65 as finally occurred in most cases.
 This second objective was the main focus of the FROB’s actions during a first phase 
known as FROB I (extending from inception of the FROB in 2009 until Royal Decree-
Law 2/2011 was published, as mentioned later on in this report). The aid which the 
FROB undertook to provide to support the integration processes was based on the 
acquisition of preference shares. In this connection, FROB I’s investment amounted to 
€9,674 million,66 which is broken down in Table 2.5. The restructuring process was 
concentrated in the savings banks sector. Thus, after only three years, 46 groups of 
institutions existing at end-2007 decreased to 15 groups at end-2011.67
C. 2010: Strengthening of the soundness of institutions and reform of the savings bank sector
Strengthening of the soundness of credit institutions
In June 2010, an additional step was taken to strengthen the soundness of credit institutions 
through the entry into force of Banco de España Circular 3/2010 of 29 June 2010.68 The objective 
was for credit institutions to improve their credit transaction management policies in order to reduce 
non-performance,69 and to increase coverage of defaulted exposures and of assets foreclosed in 
satisfaction of debt (see Box 2.5). In the latter case, the intention was to encourage credit institutions 
to sell these assets in view of their increasing real estate portfolios.70 
65 If the buy-back had not taken place within five years from the disbursement or if the Banco de España considered it 
unlikely to occur, the institution could request that they be converted into capital.
66 In addition to this amount, €800 million of non-voting equity units in CajaSur were purchased. See note (b) to Table 2.5 
67 These data do not include the Spanish Savings Bank Confederation (CECA), which not only acts as the Spanish savings 
bank association, but also has a banking licence (currently operating under the name of Cecabank).
68 This Circular amended Banco de España Circular 4/2004, known as the accounting Circular.
69 Essential credit policy aspects were addressed which constituted ex-ante risk management principles. These included the 
appropriate assessment of a borrower’s payment capacity, the role that collateral should have in analysing the granting of 
loans and management thereof, the adoption of an appropriate policy to establish the conditions for renegotiation of a 
borrower’s debts, and the need to be extremely prudent in the use of appraisal or similar values. 
70 Credit institutions did not wish to record losses on the sale of foreclosed properties, considering that their market price 
was lower than their carrying amount. Circular 3/2010 required an increase in coverage which, in principle, narrowed the 
distance between the carrying amount and potential market value, which meant that the institutions had to record the 
potential loss in case of sale, eliminating obstacles to such sale. 
Prior to the circular, the estimated impairment 
of loans and receivables was calculated on the basis of 
a schedule that took into account how long a 
transaction was past-due (as the transaction became 
past-due for a longer period of time, provisioning 
increased). This schedule differed depending on 
whether or not the loans were secured and, if 
appropriate, depending on the nature of the security 
(there was a “long schedule” which extended full 
coverage of the exposure to six years for loans with 
real estate collateral on finished dwellings and a “short 
schedule” under which full coverage was achieved in 
24 months in all other cases). 
Circular 3/2010 unified these schedules into 
a single progressive schedule under which the 
exposure was fully provisioned once 12 months had 
elapsed from its classification as non-performing, 
net of the value of any collateral securing the loan. 
This value, in the case of real estate collateral, was 
subject to certain conditions (the circular recognised 
real estate collateral for a first mortgage at the lower 
of the cost in the deed and the appraisal value, but 
applying a series of haircuts ranging from 20% in 
the case of finished houses used as the borrower’s 
principal residence to 50% for building lots and 
development land). 
As regards the value of assets arising from 
foreclosures in payment of debt, the circular required 
provisioning therefor to increase in accordance with 
the number of months the foreclosed assets were in the 
portfolio (20% if the property was between 12 and 24 
months in the portfolio and 30% from then on).
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box 2.5  CIRCULAR 3/2010 oN TIghTENINg oF PRoVISIoNINg REqUIREMENTS FoR PAST-DUE LoANS 
AND FoRECLoSURES. 
Reform of the savings banks sector
The reform of the sector was begun with Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 of 9 July 2010. The 
persistence of the financial crisis and its particular impact on this sector made it necessary to establish 
a framework endowing it with greater flexibility to attract high-quality capital, adjust their operating 
structure and improve governance. The main elements of the reform were as follows:
(i) Measures promoting access to capital markets. These included the possibility of 
issuing equity units with voting rights71 and the obligation to list equity unit issues 
offered to the public in general on secondary markets. Additionally, the limits on 
ownership of equity units per unit-holder were abolished, enhancing acquisition 
flexibility. 
71 The voting rights were to be exercised in proportion to the related share in equity. 
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(ii) Measures on institutional organisation alternatives to provide access to the market. 
Thus, savings banks could engage in their financial activity either by establishing a bank 
through which they would indirectly engage in banking business (maintaining their 
legal status as a savings bank or becoming a foundation) or by means of an Institutional 
Protection Scheme (IPS), which the savings bank would become a part of (section 2.5.B 
details these processes). 
 In the case of IPSs, the regulations then in force were characterised by the pooling of 
earnings, solvency and liquidity, and the creation of a system around a central credit 
institution that functioned as a central decision-making unit (see Box 2.6). These 
regulations were amended as follows:
— the commitment of permanence and stability of institutions in the IPS was strengthened 
by authorising the Banco de España to assess an institution before its withdrawal from the 
IPS in order to determine both its individual viability and that of the system as a whole, and 
— the central institution was required to be a public limited company and at least 
50%-owned by the savings banks. 
(iii) Measures promoting greater professionalisation of savings banks’ governing bodies. 
These included the following: 
— an adequate level of knowledge and experience was required of the members of the 
board and the oversight committee in the performance of their tasks, 
— the maximum weight of public authorities in the governing bodies was reduced to 
40% from the previous limit of 50%),72 
— the incompatibility of elected politicians and high-ranking government officials was 
established, precluding their appointment as members of the governing bodies, 
— savings banks were required to set up two new committees, the appointments and 
remuneration committee and the welfare projects committee, and 
— with a view to reinforcing transparency and market discipline, all savings banks 
were required to publish a corporate governance report annually. 
72 Also, the possibility was established for the different regional governments to participate in savings banks’ governing 
bodies through members of renowned prestige and professionalism appointed by their regional parliament. 
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— Law 36/2007 of 16 November 2007 amending 
Law 13/1985 of 25 May 1985 introduced 
Institutional Protection Schemes (IPSs) for the first 
time. In 2008, Royal Decree 215/2008 (Art. 26(7)) 
and Banco de España Circular 3/2008 (Rule 15(5)) 
adapted IPSs to the framework of capital 
requirements for credit risk (in line with Directive 
2006/48/EC). This rule permitted exposures to 
counterparties belonging to the same IPS to have a 
weighting of 0% under certain conditions. 
— In 2010 Royal Decree-Law 6/2010 of 9 April 2010 
once again amended Law 13/1985 by recognising 
that IPSs complying with certain requirements 
(stricter than stipulated by Royal Decree 215/2008 
and Banco de España Circular 3/2008) could be 
considered as a consolidable group of credit 
institutions for capital requirement compliance 
purposes (Art. 8(3)(d)). The purpose of this reform 
was to “pave the way for integration agreements to 
be reached among a type of institutions (savings 
banks) which, given their corporate nature and 
complex governance, do not have the same 
flexibility as banks to close merger agreements”.1
It should be borne in mind that when it 
became essential to restructure the savings bank 
sector, in an attempt to conduct a concentration 
process that would allow the sector to gain in 
efficiency and face the crisis with greater strength, 
stiff resistance to the disappearance of savings banks 
as individual institutions arose, as a result of the 
importance of their economic role in the territories 
where they operated, against a backdrop of significant 
representation of regional public authorities in their 
management bodies. The aim with IPSs was to meet 
the objectives of a merger without the individual 
institution disappearing, although it would be 
subordinated in the main management aspects to the 
IPS’s central body. 
The basis of the reinforced IPSs, which were 
those used in restructuring the sector, was a 
contractual agreement among the participating 
institutions involving the assignment to a central 
institution of the capacity to establish and implement 
business strategies and internal and risk control tools. 
Participants also agreed to pool at least 40% of their 
liquidity, solvency and earnings, and that they should 
remain within the IPS for a minimum period of ten 
years, which could not be shortened without the 
Banco de España first analysing the viability of the 
outcome of such fragmentation. IPSs formed in this 
manner became consolidable groups of credit 
institutions dominated by a central institution which 
were, in essence, de facto mergers (“cold mergers”, as 
they were called) since, for economic, albeit not legal, 
purposes, each participant lost its individuality. Full 
pooling of liquidity, solvency and results was achieved 
at most of the IPSs formed.
box 2.6 INSTITUTIoNAL PRoTECTIoN SChEMES (IPSs)
1  Speech by the Deputy Governor of the Banco de España at 
the conference “Savings bank restructuring and institutional 
protection systems” organised by Caja de Ahorros de 
Granada http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/
SalaPrensa/IntervencionesPublicas/sub171210.pdf
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D. 2011: Strengthening financial institutions’ solvency and other measures 
Additional steps were taken in 2011 to strengthen the solvency of institutions, in line with the 
regulatory developments which the Basel Committee and the EU were coordinating (resulting in 
Basel III and CRR/CRD IV, see Section 2.3.A). In Spain these measures resulted in several regulations, 
including most notably Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 of 18 February 2011 on the strengthening of the 
Spanish financial system. 
Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 of 18 February on the strengthening of the Spanish financial system 
This included two main elements: (i) the new capital requirements regulation (in line with the 
new international regulatory framework) and (ii) a second FROB action phase (known as FROB II), 
extending its actions to participation in the shareholder structure of credit institutions, thereby 
supporting institutions having more difficulty meeting the new regulatory requirements. 
(i)  Capital requirements. The Royal Decree-Law sought to strengthen the level of solvency 
of national credit institutions, in line with the aims pursued by the revision of 
international standards which the Basel III accord entailed. On one hand, the notion 
was introduced of core capital as top-quality capital ensuring a high loss-absorption 
capacity. It comprised, among others, the following items: capital, reserves, share 
premium accounts, revaluation surpluses, minority interests (in the case of subsidiaries, 
the percentage of own funds held by natural or legal persons not belonging to the 
group) and, additionally, the instruments subscribed by the FROB. Revaluation losses 
and intangible assets were deducted from these items. 
 Additionally, institutions were required to achieve a minimum core capital of 8% of 
their risk weighted assets, or 10% in the case of institutions facing stronger constraints 
on raising quality capital when necessary.73 The deadline for this requirement was 10 
March 2011 (practically one month after the publication of the Royal Decree-Law), 
with the possibility of establishing a strategy of phasing in compliance up to 30 
September 2011 with the consent of the Banco de España (which could also authorise 
73 Basically, institutions with a wholesale funding ratio of over 20% and not having at least 20% of their capital held by third 
parties. The ratio was obtained by dividing the net wholesale funding of liquid assets by the amount representing credit to 
customers. Wholesale funding was the sum of: deposits at central banks and credit institutions, securities issued placed 
with wholesale or institutional investors and deposits from professionals in the financial sector or large firms, provided the 
balances were non-operating. Liquid assets available comprised cash balances at central banks, deposits at other credit 
institutions and debt and equity securities readily convertible into liquidity. 
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a further extension of up to three months in certain cases). In this connection, the 
institutions could undertake their recapitalisation to reach the minimum requirement 
through private investor fund-raising, stock market launches, corporate transactions or 
resorting to the FROB as allowed by this Royal Decree-Law. 
 The Royal Decree-Law also provided that, once the institutions had reached the new 
capital requirements, in the event of a short-term non-compliance of up to 20% of the 
required core capital ratio, the Banco de España could impose restrictions on the 
distribution of dividends, funding for welfare projects, the remuneration of preference 
shares and the variable compensation for directors and managers. 
(ii)  Establishment of the FROB II. In order to mitigate Spanish institutions’ difficulties 
accessing wholesale financial markets, the FROB’s role as a public instrument was 
adapted. For this purpose, provision was made for the FROB to be able give support 
through the acquisition of ordinary shares74 from institutions not meeting the required 
capital levels (and requesting such support), in such a way that the FROB would directly 
participate in the Board of Directors of the issuing institution in proportion to its 
percentage of ownership in the capital. The institution was required to submit a 
recapitalisation plan, including a business plan, and the undertaking of several 
commitments, such as the reduction of overheads, enhancement of corporate governance 
and the development of its lending activity. 
 The FROB could have a holding in the capital of a credit institution on a temporary 
basis and was required to sell the shares acquired under market conditions, either to the 
institution itself or to third parties, within five years.
Other additional measures to strengthen the solvency of credit institutions 
— Royal Decree 771/2011 of 3 June 2011, addressing in particular: (i) the requirement 
for institutions to establish liquidity risk identification, measurement and monitoring 
systems, and (ii) the development of a new regime on remuneration policies and practices 
74 This requirement obliged the institution receiving support from the FROB to be a bank. Therefore, if the institution 
requesting such aid was a savings bank, it was required to transfer its financial activity within three months either to a bank 
through which it could indirectly engage in such activity (maintaining its legal status as a savings bank or becoming a 
foundation) or to a bank acting as a central institution of an institutional protection system which the savings bank would 
become a part of. Notwithstanding the above, in order for credit cooperatives to participate in this process if necessary, 
provision was made for the FROB to be able to acquire preference shares convertible into contributions to the share capital 
of such credit cooperatives.
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aiming to avoid policies that would undermine the soundness of institutions and 
contribute to excessive risk-taking, establishing certain principles to be followed in 
connection with the remuneration of employees whose professional activities have an 
influence on the institution’s risk profile. Also, in the case of institutions receiving public 
aid for restructuring or balance sheet clean-up, additional specific requirements were 
defined which the remuneration schemes of these institutions were required to meet. 
This rule established for the first time a specific oversight capacity over aspects relating 
to credit institutions’ remuneration policy.
— Royal Decree-Law 16/2011 of 14 October 2011, unifying the three then-existing 
deposit guarantee schemes (for banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives) into a single 
scheme, and strengthening one of the functions traditionally being performed by the 
schemes, that of strengthening the solvency of institutions in difficulty. For this purpose, 
the scheme’s scope of operation was broadened allowing it to adopt preventive and 
balance-sheet clean-up measures75 within the framework of an institution’s restructuring 
plan, provided it was approved by the Banco de España.
— Banco de España Circular 5/2011 of 30 November 2011. In order to improve 
confidence in credit institutions through enhanced balance sheet reporting, the 
Circular established market transparency requirements for credit institutions with 
regard to their exposures to the real estate sector.76 They were required to disclose (at 
individual and consolidated level) qualitative and quantitative information on such 
exposures.77
Overall, these measures form a general strategy of strengthening of solvency and, if appropriate, 
restructuring of financial institutions. Box 2.7 summarises the main regulatory developments 
approved from 2009 in this field. 
75 These measures could consist of: (i) financial assistance in the form of the granting of soft loans or the acquisition or 
impaired or non-performing assets (ii) capital restructuring of the institution, (iii) support to merger processes or the 
transfer of a business to another credit institution; and/or (iv) improvement of management. 
76 Transparency, which the Banco de España had already recommended to institutions in 2010. In November of that year, a 
letter was sent to professional associations asking institutions to disclose information on their exposure to the construction 
and development sector and to retail mortgages following a previously defined template and to make public the policies 
set in place to deal with the sector’s troubled assets. 
77 In particular, as regards financing to construction, real estate development and housing purchases, as well as foreclosed 
assets in payment of debt. 
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box 2.7 SUMMARY oF ThE MAIN REgULAToRY MILESToNES RELATINg To RESTRUCTURINg
ImplicationsDate
FROB Law
08/07/2009 
Parliament validates 
Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 
of 26 June 2009 
— Provided support to voluntary integration processes among viable institutions involving 
    enhanced efficiency, rationalisation of management and downsizing of productive capacity. 
— Promoted the resolution of crises at non-viable institutions when a solution cannot be reached 
    within the framework of the deposit guarantee schemes. This entailed the replacement of the 
    institution’s directors by the FROB and the drawing up of a restructuring plan.
Savings Bank Law
21/07/2010 
Parliament validates 
Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 
of 9 July 2010 
— Allowed the savings banks to conduct banking business through a commercial bank, thus 
    facilitating their market access. 
— Promoted the professionalisation of savings banks' governing bodies.
Royal Decree-Law on Recapitalisation  
10/03/2011 
The Banco de España published 
all financial institutions' capital needs
— 13 institutions (four commercial banks, nine savings banks) did not meet the 8%-10% core
     capital requirement. 
— The system’s overall shortfall was estimated at €15,152 million.
14/04/2011 
The Banco de España approved 
the strategies and compliance 
timetable
— Two subsidiary banks of foreign institutions received a capital injection from their parent. 
— Two national banks envisaged a strategy of issuing instruments qualifying as core capital.
— Four groups of savings banks opted for a stock market launch or for raising capital from private 
     investors, with support from the FROB if necessary.
— One savings bank considered merging with another more capitalised institution, also with support 
     from the FROB if necessary. 
— Four savings banks resorted to the FROB directly.
15/04/2011 
The FROB formally undertook 
to provide the funds required 
The legal provisions were specified for FROB support to institutions whose strategies envisaged 
resorting to its aid.
28/04/2011 
The recapitalisation plans were 
submitted to the Banco de España 
The Banco de España, the FROB and the European Commission analysed the plans in depth: 
business plans (efficiency, profitability, leverage levels, liquidity, etc.) and commitments. 
30/09/2011 
Deadline for recapitalisation of 
the financial system
All the institutions met the core capital levels set by the Royal Decree-Law. 
2.5 SUPERVISORYACTIONS
During the early years of the financial crisis, the Banco de España’s supervisory activity was 
progressively adapted in line with the changes being made to the regulatory framework, to which the 
Banco de España contributed both directly (by publishing circulars) and indirectly, through its advice 
to the Government on the reforms being put in place. 
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In part, due to certain features of regulatory and supervisory policy (such as the treatment of 
structured vehicles and the existence of countercyclical provisions), the initial impact of the crisis (from late 
2007 to the first half of 2008) was absorbed by the financial institutions without serious difficulty, although 
the existing imbalances were becoming more pronounced. The unfolding turmoil in the wake of the 
worsening international crisis in late 2008, which has been discussed in previous sections, led to the period 
2009-2011 being marked by the consolidation of the savings banks sector.78 Several of the integration 
processes involved needed public support and some financial institutions received assistance on more than 
one occasion, as their future earnings forecasts deteriorated and their estimates of future impairments rose.
Strategy and course of action
From 2009, as the economic and financial conditions worsened, the outlook for the Spanish 
financial system became tougher, and the problem went from being one of liquidity, caused by the 
imbalance between deposits taken and increased lending, to one of solvency, deriving from the 
economic recession and its impact in terms of the rising NPL rate. 
The crisis at the savings bank Caja de Ahorros de Castilla La Mancha79 in March 2009 brought 
about in a turning point in the strategy for restructuring of troubled institutions (basically savings 
banks), which was set out in Royal Decree-Law 9/2009, constituting the Fund for the Orderly 
Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB). This two-pronged strategy entailed a case-by-case 
study, giving priority to private solutions:80 
78 As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the savings banks sector faced a serious constraint on its ability to raise top-quality 
capital by any means other than through earnings, as the instrument available was that of non-voting equity units, which 
were relatively unattractive to investors, given their lack of voting rights. There was also resistance from governing bodies 
to steps of any kind that might result in the disappearance of the institution or its losing its independence by joining a 
group managed by another savings bank. 
79 This case influenced subsequent legislative developments as it involved a number of additional factors on top of the 
difficulties inherent in any restructuring: (i) the destabilisation of the institution before and after the intervention, with 
significant outflows of deposits that could only be stabilised with the adoption of a Royal Decree-Law (4/2009 of 29 
March 2009) whereby the State guaranteed all the institution’s liabilities to avoid its collapse and contagion of the system. 
This led the Banco de España to grant emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of €1.5 billion; and (ii) the financial sector’s 
scant appetite to buy the institution, as evidenced by the fact that just two offers were received, resulting in a high level of 
aid, although this was met by the DGS and the sector, and cost less than its liquidation would have done. All the foregoing 
took place in a context in which the savings bank’s general assembly remained the most senior governing body. 
80 Up until 2009, the model for resolving banking crises was based on the Banco de España’s taking control over the institution 
affected or replacing its directors. There was also the option of the sectoral deposit guarantee schemes lending funds to their 
member institutions. This approach, which had been followed since the banking crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
(replacing the directors was first provided for by Royal Decree-Law 5/1978 and subsequently in Law 26/1988 of 29 July 1988; 
and the deposit guarantee schemes were created in 1977 when the private banks were established) suffered from a number of 
limitations. In particular, the financial capacity of the schemes had not been calibrated to address a systemic crisis, and 
extraordinary contributions could lead to contagion. Moreover, recapitalisation normally required the approval of the institution’s 
general assembly, and no provision had been made for special authority to be granted to allow emergency recapitalisation.
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— Restructuring non-viable crisis-stricken institutions when no solution can be found 
within the framework of the deposit-guarantee scheme. This entailed the FROB’s 
replacing the institution’s directors and the drafting of a restructuring plan.
— Support for voluntary mergers between viable institutions to yield efficiency gains, 
rationalise their administration, and downsize their productive capacity.
Bearing in mind the lack of legal tools with which to apply resolution processes,81 this strategy was 
considered to be better than winding up insolvent institutions through insolvency proceedings, which 
experience had shown to result in a substantial loss of value. In particular, when there are thousands of 
creditors, as in the case of a credit institution’s depositors, liquidation through insolvency proceedings 
would almost certainly result in losses for the depositors concerned (over and above the amount guaranteed 
by the deposit guarantee scheme) as well as a paralysis of banking services, with the consequent negative 
impact on confidence in the system and the risk of contagion to the rest of the sector. Compared with 
winding-up through insolvency proceedings, the strategy of supporting institutions meant shoring up 
their viability by strengthening their regulatory capital and ensuring the continuity of their essential 
functions, so as to protect depositors,82 while minimising the cost in terms of public resources and the 
risk of contagion affecting the stability of the financial system as a whole. In this connection it is worth 
noting that the regulations on the resolution and restructuring of credit institutions did not come into 
effect until 2012. The new regulations opened up a new route for managing crisis-stricken institutions by 
offering an alternative to insolvency proceedings, when in the public interest (see Section 3.4.B.2).
Other alternatives, such as injecting public funds in the form of instruments not convertible 
into capital and without voting rights, without forcing the institution into a merger, or that of bailing 
out, restructuring and selling institutions considered non-viable, were ruled out, either because they 
only addressed the symptoms, without inducing the necessary restructuring (for example, as regards 
the governance of the savings banks), or because they would have required massive injections of 
public funds at a time when there had been a significant deterioration in the fiscal situation and the 
conditions under which the public sector could raise finance.
The strategy of supporting concentration and restructuring in the banking industry basically 
aimed to shore up confidence in the financial system and ensure its stability while safeguarding 
81 Resolution is understood to mean the set of measures adopted by the authorities to deal with a financial institution’s non-
viability while safeguarding the public interest. The basic goals are to protect depositors and minimise the cost to taxpayers 
(compared to the insolvency proceedings normally used to wind up companies).
82 Indeed, from the depositors’ point of view, this strategy made it possible to keep the entire value of their deposits intact. 
If crisis-stricken institutions had been wound up through insolvency proceedings, the DGS would only have covered 
€100,000 per depositor per institution. Depositors would have been forced to seek recovery for any amounts in excess of 
this limit through insolvency proceedings, with no guarantee whatsoever.
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depositor protection. Table 2.6 summarises this strategy’s main objectives and instruments. Within 
this general framework, the steps taken by the Banco de España can be summarised as: (a) strengthening 
institutions’ solvency (balance-sheet clean-up and recapitalisation); (b) fostering restructuring of the 
system through voluntary mergers and the resolution of less viable institutions; and (c) improving 
information on the banking sector (through stress-tests).83 
A. Enhancing Spanish credit institutions’ solvency
To address the financial sector restructuring and concentration process (see Section B, below), 
financial institutions were obliged to embark on a significant effort to clean up their credit portfolios 
so as to comply with the Banco de España’s accounting requirements. These included the 2010 
reform to the rules on write-downs, which, among other things, significantly shortened the schedule 
for provisions, as mentioned earlier. Between January 2008 and December 2011 the volume of 
provisions set aside came to €138,353 million (13% of Spain’s GDP).84
83 Section (D) summarises the figures on the adjustment to the financial system over the period 2008-2011.
84 Of this amount, €87,407 million was debited against the profit and loss account, €32,847 million was charged against reserves, 
and €18,098 million came from general provisions (figures for business in Spain from the consolidated balance sheet).
TABLE 2.6 RESTRUCTURING PROCESS. OBJECTIVES
SOURCE: Banco de España.
GENERAL OBJECTIVES INSTRUMENTS
2 Downsizing the financial system — Integration of financial institutions— Capacity reduction plans
3 Encouraging the entry of private investors — Incentives for new private capital
4 Improving financial institutions' governance — Incentives for the conversion of savings banks
5 Reducing the cost to taxpayers — Stimulating the clean-up through integration processes— Entry of private investors
6 Reassuring the markets
— Increased solvency and recapitalisation requirements
— Transparency:
· Detailed disclosure of each institution's exposure to property
   developer and real estate risk
· Inclusion of the whole sector in the EU stress tests
1 Cleaning up financial institutions'
balance sheets before recapitalising them
— Provisioning
— Write-downs against reserves during mergers
FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES — Maintaining confidence in, and stability of, the financial system— Ensuring depositor protection
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In late 2010, as a result of the problems arising in the Irish banking sector, there was a second 
episode of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which again placed a question mark over the capacity 
of the Spanish financial system. It was in this context, as mentioned in Section 2.4.D above, that 
Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 (new capital requirements and FROB II) was adopted, with the aim of 
strengthening the solvency of Spain’s financial institutions in order to dispel these doubts. 
The Banco de España evaluated the additional capital each institution85 needed to reach the level 
of core capital required (8% and 10% of risk-weighted assets) and published its findings in March 
2011. Thirteen institutions were identified as having a core capital shortfall and required to submit 
their recapitalisation strategies in which they were to set out the measures they intended to take to 
reach these levels.86 The strategies approved by the Banco de España in April 2011 were the following:87
— Four institutions opted to raise private capital, either by the incorporation of private 
investors, or through stock market launches whereby the institutions sought to place at 
least 20% of their share capital. In this case, a minimum core capital ratio of 8% would 
be sufficient for them to comply with Royal Decree-Law 2/2011. Bankia and Banca 
Cívica concluded their stock market flotation in July, raising €3,092  million and 
€600 million, respectively. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN) issued convertible instruments 
with voting rights for €242 million and Liberbank, which initially opted to raise private 
capital, finally raised the necessary capital internally.
— Two institutions opted to recapitalise using additional funds provided by their foreign 
parents. These were Barclays Bank and Deutsche Bank. 
— Two institutions undertook capital increases and corporate operations. These were 
Bankinter and Bankpyme.
— Caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria, Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad –CEISS 
(resulting from the merger of Caja España and Caja Duero) opted for integration with 
Unicaja.88
— Four institutions (Novacaixagalicia, Catalunya Caixa, Caja de Ahorros Unión de Cajas de 
Manlleu, Sabadell y Tarrasa (Unnim) and Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo, CAM) requested 
85 This analysis covered all 114 credit institutions registered in Spain that were able to accept reimbursable funds from the public. 
86 Institutions had the option of adjusting their capital ratios through extraordinary operations of the types indicated in 
Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 (by selling off branches, strategic shareholdings, or asset portfolios), which would reduce their 
initially estimated capital requirements if these operations materialised. 
87 See the November 2011 Financial Stability Report for details. 
88 The process was complex and did not reach fruition until 2014. 
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financial assistance from the FROB, as allowed by the legislation, whereby the FROB acquired 
ordinary shares in the beneficiary institutions’ capital, thus obliging them to convert into 
commercial banks. The institutions that requested this public support presented a recapitalisation 
plan89 (as required by law) and, before the FROB provided the capital, they were valued by 
independent experts in order to set the institution’s value, which, in turn, determined the 
FROB’s percentage stake. Table 2.7 lists the institutions that opted for this alternative, the 
contributions made by the FROB, and the percentage equity interest:
For its part, CAM presented additional capital needs of €2.8 billion. Its first option was to 
request €1,031  million in convertible preference shares and supplement this amount with 
€1,769 million in shares. However, the problems affecting the institution led to its directors being 
replaced on 22.07.11 by a board appointed by the FROB. On 07.12.11 the Banco de España approved 
the institution’s restructuring plan drawn up by the FROB, which envisaged its integration with 
Banco Sabadell, which was the winning bidder in the competitive auction. The DGS approved capital 
aid of €5,249 million90 and granted an asset protection scheme (APS) with an expected value91 in 
December 2011 of €1,145 million. The Banco de España began sanction proceedings against the 
CAM’s directors in 2013. 
B. Bail-outs, restructuring and concentration: transformation of the savings banks sector.
In the years 2008-2010, the changes in the financial system were centred on the savings banks 
sector, which underwent a radical transformation, both as a result of its concentration and of the 
direct intervention from the Banco de España. All in all, 42 of the 45 institutions existing at the end 
of 2007 were affected. 
89 As these plans envisaged public support, they were also subject to approval by the European Commission.
90 The €5,249 million capital injection from the FROB included €2.8 billion it had previously earmarked.
91 The expected value of the APS on a given date is the expected amount the guarantor would have to meet based on the 
NPL ratio of the portfolio subject to APS.
Financial Institution
FROB aid
(amount in €m) Percentage of capital
39564,2Novacaixagalicia
09817,1BancaynulataC
001865m
SOURCES: Banco de España and FROB.
innU
157,4LATOT
TABLE 2.7 FROB II SUPPORT
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CCM
Following a series of inspections in 2008 and 
2009, a serious shortfall was detected in the 
provisions covering loan impairment, in conjunction 
with an unstable funding structure (increased 
recourse to wholesale markets as a result of continuous 
investment growth despite the steady decline in 
deposits and the worsening economic climate). At 
the same time, the governance framework was clearly 
deficient and the measures needed to shift away from 
the management model of the boom years had not 
been taken.  This led to an unsustainable liquidity 
situation in which the institution’s rating was cut 
from BBB+ to BB+1  (Fitch) in February 2009, 
cutting it off from interbank funding. The situation 
was exacerbated by the lack of assets eligible as 
collateral with the European System of Central 
Banks. In addition to the foregoing, the investment 
coverage needs led CCM to breach the solvency 
ratio, with two-year write-down forecasts that were 
impossible to meet, apart from showing a high 
concentration of exposures to two economic groups.
CCM accounted for less than 1% of the 
Spanish banking system’s assets.  Solutions other 
than taking control of the savings bank had been 
sought through the DGS. However, these efforts 
proved fruitless, such that, given the breach of the 
required levels of capital and the financial outlook, 
on 28.03.092 the Executive Commission of the 
Banco de España resolved to replace CCM’s 
directors.3 In view of CCM’s precarious liquidity 
situation, in order to be able to provide the Banco de 
box 2.8 FIRST INTERVENTIoNS bY ThE bANCo DE ESPAñA: CCM AND CAjA SUR
First interventions by the banco de esPaña: caja castilla-la Mancha and cajasur
During this period, the Banco de España had to replace the directors of certain institutions, 
such as Caja de Ahorros de Castilla-La Mancha (CCM) and CajaSur (although the circumstances 
were different in each case). In the latter case, the Banco de España intervened under the framework 
established by Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 mentioned earlier, which entailed appointing the FROB as 
the provisional administrator, thus streamlining the process of crisis management since the experience 
with CCM. In the case of both CCM and CajaSur, the Banco de España began disciplinary proceedings 
against the institutions’ directors (see Box 2.8).
1  The ratings given by rating agencies are an important 
factor in raising funds on the financial markets. If the 
rating drops below investment grade (BBB- in the case of 
Fitch and Standard & Poor’s) it is extremely difficult to 
obtain wholesale funding.
2  http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/SalaPrensa/Notas 
Informativas/09/Arc/Fic/presbe102.pdf
3  The Banco de España thus exercised its authority to take 
control of any credit institution pursuant to Article 31 of 
Law 26/1988 of 29 July 1988 on the discipline and 
intervention of credit institutions.
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box 2.8 FIRST INTERVENTIoNS bY ThE bANCo DE ESPAñA: CCM AND CAjASUR (cont’d)
España with the collateral it needed to grant 
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of €900 
million,4 and so meet the needs arising following the 
measures adopted, the Government enacted Royal 
Decree-Law 4/2009 of 29 March 2009 allowing a 
central-government guarantee of up to €9 billion to 
be given in 2009. With the backing of this guarantee, 
the Banco de España granted CCM the ELA for 
€900 million. 
On 03.11.09 the Executive Commission of the 
Banco de España approved CCM’s draft proposal for 
its integration with Caja de Ahorros de Asturias. 
Finally, on 30.06.10 CCM’s general assembly approved 
the integration plans. The Deposit Guarantee Scheme5 
decided to support the plans financially with capital 
aid of €1,740 million6 and an asset protection scheme 
(APS) with an expected value in December 2011 of 
€1,715 million.
CajaSur
The case of CajaSur was similar to that of 
CCM, the similarities including a shortfall in 
coverage of investments, excessive growth, an 
unstable financial structure and a rating downgrade. 
However, unlike CCM, in CajaSur’s case integration 
was possible (with Unicaja), in principle, enabling 
these problems to be solved. Nevertheless, after 
various ups and downs, the board of directors 
rejected the proposed merger, without having a 
viable alternative plan. In the light of these problems, 
on 21.05.107 the Banco de España resolved to replace 
CajaSur’s directors and appoint the FROB as the 
provisional administrator. The FROB supported the 
institution with the subscription and disbursement 
of €800 million in non-voting equity units issued by 
CajaSur, thus giving the FROB control over the 
savings bank.
This took place under the new framework 
established by Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 and, 
therefore, with the participation of the FROB, which 
enabled a quicker, more flexible and efficient solution 
to be found than in the case of CCM, which was 
handled under the traditional framework (in which 
any rupture required the approval of the general 
assembly and the regional government).
On 15.07.10 a restructuring plan was approved 
that envisaged the acquisition of CajaSur by Bilbao 
Bizkaia Kutxa (BBK), following a competitive process. 
The FROB granted an APS of €392 million (the 
FROB’s maximum liability) to cover a portfolio with 
a book value of around €5,540 million,8 with the 
€800 million in non-voting equity units issued and 
subscribed by the FROB being redeemed.
4  Under the ESCB procedures for the provision of emergency 
liquidity assistance.
5  http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/
NotasInformativas/09/presbe132.pdf
6  €1.3 billion was initially granted, finally rising to €1,740 
million.
7  http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/
NotasInformativas/10/Arc/Fic/presbe141.pdf
8  The details of the restructuring plan are available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/237557/ 
237557_1164518_62_2.pdf
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integration Processes in the savings bank sector
The bulk of savings bank integration processes used the institutional protection scheme (IPS) 
mechanism. The nature of the savings banks and their complex governance meant that the conditions 
under which traditional mergers are carried out (with the disappearance of the merged entities) were 
an obstacle to integration, particularly where savings banks from more than one region were 
concerned. The legal form and design of the IPS mechanism sought to provide a flexible integration 
formula analogous to that of a merger in terms of the practical outcome, including the fact that 
control would go to a core institution within the IPS (see Box 2.6). Precisely because the IPS’s effects 
were analogous, in economic terms, to those of a merger (given the pooling of solvency, liquidity 
and earnings between the member institutions, but without their disappearance as legal entities), all 
the constituent savings banks in an IPS drew up their individual accounts, charging the same value 
adjustments to reserves as on the consolidated accounts of the IPS, thereby avoiding any discrepancy 
between the valuations on the consolidated accounts and those on the stand-alone accounts of the 
constituent savings banks (credit cooperatives belonging to an IPS also made this same value 
adjustment). This was equivalent to making these adjustments on the consolidated accounts and 
was carried out following consultation with the Banco de España,92 IPSs not being regulated as such 
under the existing accounting legislation.
As already mentioned in section 2.4.B, the tasks of the FROB (created in 2009) included 
supporting the integration of viable institutions that voluntarily agreed to merge or to participate in 
IPSs, so as to achieve greater efficiency, administrative streamlining and downsizing of their productive 
capacity. In this framework, the Banco de España’s efforts focused on analysing and, where applicable, 
approving these processes. In those cases where the FROB provided financial support, the European 
Commission’s approval was also necessary, as this support constitutes State aid, which means that a 
series of conditions have to be met and commitments made in order to safeguard competition.93 
2010 and 2011 were marked by the downsizing of the banking sector, particularly in the case 
of the savings banks (there was also merger and take-over activity among the commercial banks and 
rural credit cooperatives,94 but to a lesser extent). Through various integration processes, affecting 42 
financial institutions, the savings banks sector contracted from 45 groups of institutions to just 15. 
Three of these processes took place without financial support from the FROB or the deposit guarantee 
scheme (DGS) (La Caixa-Girona, Unicaja-Jaén and Caja 3). 
92 Under Rule 8.3 of Circular 4/2004.
93 State aid must not put institutions that did not resort to it in a less favourable competitive position than those that did. 
94 By way of example, in 2010 the merger of Banco Guipuzcoano with Banco Sabadell began, and the operational integration 
of Caja Rural de Casinos, Caja Rural de Albalat dels Sorells and Caja Campo with Cajamar was completed. 
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An asset protection scheme is a mechanism 
whereby the granting institution (the Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme or the FROB) wholly or partly guarantees the 
value of a portfolio to a credit institution, over and above 
the provisions set aside by the beneficiary institution to 
cover these assets. Given that this mechanism gives a 
degree of certainty to the value of the assets covered, it is 
a particularly useful tool when troubled institutions are 
being sold. 
Two types of APSs were used in the restructuring 
of the Spanish banking system: 
i) APSs with an explicit maximum guaranteed amount, 
such that the first losses incurred on operations covered 
by the APS are met by its guarantor up to that limit. 
This was the mechanisms chosen for the APS the 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) granted to CCM.
ii) Those in which the party granting the APS 
guarantees a given percentage of the final losses 
incurred as losses materialise on operations covered 
by the APS, with the beneficiary institution assuming 
the remainder (known as the “shared risk scheme”). 
Some also set an upper limit on the guarantor’s 
liability (as happened in the case of CajaSur). 
The guarantor indemnifies the net aggregate 
losses (losses less recoveries) deriving from the protected 
portfolio, with annual valuations against the guarantor, 
if the aggregate losses grow from year to year, or in the 
guarantor’s favour otherwise. An annual estimate is 
made of the APS’s effective losses on the covered risks 
(in general, an independent expert is engaged to make 
the estimate).
box 2.9 ASSET PRoTECTIoN SChEMES (APSs)
At the institutions’ request, the FROB provided financial support95 to seven projects by 
subscribing convertible preference shares, eligible as Tier 1 capital, with a commitment to repurchase 
them within not more than five years (extensible for a further two years), with a yield of 7.75%. This 
process, known as FROB I, required aid totalling €9,674 million96 (see Table 2.5). The new capital 
requirements subsequently led some financial institutions to request fresh support from the FROB, 
in this case through subscriptions of shares worth €4,751 million (FROB II). In some cases this aid 
was complemented with the use of asset protection schemes (APSs) through the FROB and the DGS 
(see Box 2.9).
95 For reference, aid came to around 2% of the institution’s risk-weighted assets (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
legislation/restructuring_paper_en.pdf )
96 In addition to this sum, in 2010 the FROB subscribed €800 million of non-voting equity units in CajaSur, which were 
redeemed that same year (see Table 2.5 and Box 2.8).
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stock-take oF the transForMation oF the savings banks sector at deceMber 2011
All these actions brought about a transformation of the savings banks sector, the progress of 
which is shown in Table 2.8 below. Within these processes, the BFA-Bankia process in 2010-2011 
deserves special mention.97
bFa-bankia (2010 - 2011)
The agreement constituting the BFA group was signed in June 2010, forming an IPS comprising 
seven institutions: Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid, Caja de Ahorros de Valencia, 
Castellón y Alicante (Bancaja), Caja Insular de Ahorros de Canarias, Caja de Ahorros y Monte de 
Piedad de Ávila, Caixa d’Estalvis Laietana, Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Segovia and Caja 
de Ahorros de la Rioja. The stated goal of the savings banks concerned was to improve their ability to 
confront the financial crisis.
The group was established in December 2010, with the founding of BFA as the group’s core 
company. BFA was created with assets of around €328  billion, a banking book of €230  billion, 
customer deposits of €165 million, own funds of €13.9 billion (BIS II solvency ratio of 12.1%) and 
over 27,700 employees. 
The FROB provided financial support of €4,465 million through the subscription of preference 
shares. The overall goal of the planned integration was to bolster solvency, while adapting to the new 
regulatory requirements for own funds in the most efficient way possible. To overcome their 
profitability problems, arising from their relatively unproductive assets associated with the real estate 
sector, the member savings banks needed both to set aside provisions to cover possible future losses 
and to undertake a process of internal restructuring to reduce their capacity (adjusting the size of their 
branch networks and central services). 
The group’s initial characteristics included:
— Its strong positioning in the Spanish market, with a geographically diversified business. 
At national level, the joint market shares of the savings banks comprising the IPS came 
to 11.23% of the credit portfolio and 10.67% of deposits. By joining forces, the group 
of savings banks aimed to build a network of branches with the capacity to achieve the 
group’s strategic objectives.
97 Apart from the case of BFA-Bankia, other significant processes affected Catalunya Caixa, NovaCaixaGalicia and Banco de 
Valencia. A summary of the processes in given in Section 3.5.C
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— The integration sought to embark on a round of branch closures to enable it to benefit 
from synergies allowing it to raise efficiency through cost rationalisation.
— Measures were adopted with a view to bringing forward the timetable of write-downs 
required and to step up liquidity generation, so as to reduce dependence on wholesale 
markets. Provisions of €9,207 million were set aside from reserves to cover expected losses. 
FROB I (a) FROB II (b) DGS (c)
Caja Madrid, Bancaja, Caja Ávila, 
Caja Segovia, Caja Rioja, Caixa 
Laietana, C.I. de Canarias
343,213564,4IPS)0102( aiknaB-AFB
Caja Murcia, Caixa Penedès, 
Sa Nostra, Caja Granada
102,76519IPS)0102( NMB
Caja Navarra, Caja Canarias, Caja 
Burgos, CajaSol, Caja Guadalajara
728,17779IPS)0102( acivíC acnaB
Caja Inmaculada,  
Caja C. de Burgos, Caja Badajoz
527,02IPS)0102( 3 ajaC
Caixa Catalunya, Caixa Manresa, 
Caixa Tarragona
940,77817,1052,1Merger )0102( axiacaynulataC
Caixa Sabadell, Caixa Terrasa,  
Caixa Manlleu
882,92865083Merger)0102( minnU
733,24525Merger)0102( SSIECoreuD ajaC ,añapsE ajaC
632,27564,2261,1Merger)0102( aicilagaxiacavoNavonaxiaC ,aicilaG axiaC
551,83Merger)0102(  ajacinUnéaJ ajaC ,ajacinU
107,673Merger)0102( axiaC aLanoriG axiaC ,axiaC aL
Caja Asturias + CCM, Caja 
Cantabria, Caja Extremadura
Liberbank (2011)
1,740 +
APS 1,715
50,847
159,07
800 +
APS 392
IPS
IPS
)1102( knabaxtuKaxtuK ,latiV ajaC ,ruSajaC + KBB
441,54—
419—
353—
CAM
5,249 +
APS 1,145
70,805
TOTAL
10,474 +
APS 392
4,751
6,989 +
APS 2,860
Total assets
at 31.12.2011
Aid
    Ibercaja
    Ontinyent
    Pollença
Sold to Banco de Sabadell (2011)
Original savings banks
(45 groups)
New groups
at 31.12.2011
(15 groups)
Model
of integration
TABLE 2.8 TRANSFORMATION OF THE SAVINGS BANK SECTOR
€m
SOURCES: FROB, DGF and Banco de España.
a Aid granted pursuant to Royal-Decree Law 9/2009 (FROB I) through subscription of preference shares.
b Aid granted pursuant to Royal-Decree Law 2/2011 (FROB II) through subscription of ordinary shares.
c Expected value of asset protection schemes (APSs) at 31.12.11 is given.
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— Despite the integration, the governance problems deriving from the savings banks’ 
legal form remained, resulting in a two-headed organisation (Caja Madrid and 
Bancaja).
— Integrating systems and procedures proved slow and complex, although there were no 
serious incidents. 
In the first half of 2011, to meet the higher capital requirements laid down by Royal Decree-
Law 2/2011 (the group was required to meet a 10% core capital ratio, unless it placed at least 
20% of its capital in the hands of third parties, as its wholesale funding ratio was over 20%), the 
group decided to float most of its business on the stock market. To this end, BFA was apportioned 
the whole financial business of the savings banks and then a significant part of this business was 
then apportioned Bankia.98 This left BFA (apart from its holding in Bankia) with government 
bonds, financial investments, risks with real estate developers classed as non-performing or 
substandard, foreclosed land, etc. totalling €40 billion in assets, and the subordinated debt. In 
short, BFA ended up holding the assets whose valuation was surrounded by the greatest uncertainty. 
The aim was to launch Bankia on the stock market99 in order to meet the 8% core capital ratio. 
The flotation took place in July 2011, with 47.6% being placed (824,572,253 shares). The price 
of the initial public offering was set at €3.75 per share (74% discount on the underlying book 
value, set by common accord between Bankia and the underwriters) for both the wholesale and 
retail tranches. BoA-Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank and UBS took part, along with 
Bankia, in the placement of the wholesale tranche.
The stock market launch improved the group’s solvency by raising capital of €3,092 million on 
the markets. This enabled the IPS to comply with the levels of core capital required by Royal Decree-
Law 2/2011 referred to above, and to pass the EBA’s stress tests in July 2011.
Following the IPO, the group’s core capital ratio stood at 8.5% at 30.09.2011 (above the 
8% minimum the group was required to meet pursuant to Royal Decree-Law 2/2011, having 
placed at least 20% of its share capital on the stock market). The preference shares subscribed by 
the FROB contributed 200 bp to it. The core capital ratio maintained by the BFA-Bankia group 
was in line with that of top-tier Spanish banks at the start of the fourth quarter of 2011.
98 The group had a banking licence in the name of Altae Banco, which it changed to Bankia.
99 Certain aspects of this group’s management, such as Bankia’s IPO, gave rise to preliminary proceedings being instituted at 
central criminal court number 4 of the National High Court, and proceedings are currently under way. Having regard to 
these circumstances, the contents of this section do not aim to assess those matters which are subject to investigation 
within the aforementioned proceedings.
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For its part, the BIS II solvency ratio, for which the minimum level was 8%, and which 
included preference shares and subordinated debt held by customers in its calculation, was 
13.66%. The BFA-Bankia group’s deleveraging policy enabled it to bolster its solvency. The 
policy’s aim was also to improve the structural liquidity position it had inherited from its founding 
savings banks (which had increased their indebtedness during the years of extremely strong credit 
growth). 
A review of the combination of businesses deriving from the IPS was also carried out in 2011. 
This led to an increase in provisions of €3,931 million, charged to reserves and prepaid taxes. 
As 2011 progressed, the economic situation deteriorated and there was a significant rise in the 
NPL rate and refinancings of loans on the real estate developer portfolio that were still classed as 
standard exposures. This fact had a particularly severe impact on financial institutions holding a large 
percentage of real estate developer exposures on their portfolio, such as the BFA- Bankia group. These 
factors, in conjunction with the new write-down requirements established by Royal Decrees 2/2012 
and 18/2012, affected the group’s position (see Section 3.5 of this report).
C. Stress testing in a process of improving the information on the banking industry
During the period covered by this chapter, efforts were made to enhance the market disclosure 
of credit institutions’ situation. Spanish financial institutions were required to disclose more information 
about the restructuring process, detailed information about their exposure to the real estate sector, and 
their participation in stress tests. Having covered these first two topics above, this section will discuss 
the stress tests performed to allay doubts about the Spanish banking system, which largely revolved 
around the situation of the savings banks and their exposure to the real estate sector. 
actions in 2010
In 2010, Spain’s banks took part in the EU-wide stress tests coordinated by the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS),100 the results of which were published on 23 July 2010. The tests were based 
on the balance sheets for the year ending 31 December 2009 and the time frame of the exercise was two 
years (2010 and 2011). To ensure maximum transparency, the Banco de España decided that the exercise in 
Spain should be as broad as possible. This affected: (i) the number of financial institutions, with 27 Spanish 
institutions being included (all the listed banks and the savings banks resulting from the restructuring 
100 Unlike the tests carried out in 2009, in which only the aggregate situation of the 22 largest European cross-border groups 
was examined, the tests in 2010 extended to the main domestic banking groups, covering at least 50% of each country’s 
system (in Spain 90% was covered).
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processes under way at the time of the exercise101) and (ii) the information supplied, as in Spain information 
on credit portfolios (particularly the real estate portfolio) was included, along with information on public 
support already committed before the stress tests were carried out. As regards the results obtained from the 
exercise, on the baseline scenario none of the Spanish institutions was below the target set (6% Tier 1 capital) 
and, in the adverse scenario, only four savings banks failed to meet the 6% minimum.102 
actions in 2011
In Spain’s case, the stress test coordinated by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2011 
also included all the listed banks and savings banks (in all 93% of the system was covered, which was 
well above the 50% required by the EBA). In this exercise the minimum capital level required was 5% 
core Tier 1.103 No Spanish institution was finally below this level (the final core Tier 1 for Spanish 
institutions as a whole came to 8.6%).104 
Subsequently, also in 2011, in response to the heightening of financial market tensions, the EU 
adopted new measures which, in the banking supervision area, centred on the EBA’s performing a 
recapitalisation exercise before the end of the year. The participation of Spanish institutions in this 
exercise was limited to the system’s five largest. The arrangements assumed that financial institutions 
were to hold a temporary capital buffer to restore market confidence. The institutions included in the 
exercise were to achieve a 9% level of core Tier 1 capital (as defined by the EBA) by June 2012, and to 
add a buffer for their sovereign debt exposures. The capital needs of the participating Spanish institutions 
rose to €26,170 million. The Banco de España required them to prepare compliance plans, which were 
completed in 2012, with all the institutions having capital in excess of the required levels. 
D. The 2008-2011 adjustment in figures
Finally, to conclude this section, some of the figures showing the changes taking place in the 
sector between 2008 and 2011 are set out. 
101 Although the starting date was 31.12.2009, and at that point the majority of the integration processes had not taken 
place, the target years being 2010 and 2011, the integration processes completed in 2010 were taken into account, along 
with the public support committed at the time. 
102 Catalunya Caixa (3.9%), Unnim (4.5%), CEISS (5.6%) and Banca Cívica (4.7%). As mentioned earlier, to comply with 
Royal Decree-Law 2/2011, the first three received support from the FROB in the form of share subscriptions, whereas 
Banca Cívica raised capital from its stock market flotation. http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/
InformesBoletinesRevistas/InformesEstabilidadFinancera/10/Arch/IEF_INTERNET_27-10.pdf
103 Much higher than the European requirements at that time (2%) and those of Basel III in the year it came into force (4.5%).
104 http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/InformesEstabilidadFinancera/11/
IEF_NOV2011.pdf y http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/IntervencionesPublicas/DelGobernador/
mfo150711.pdf
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In short, by the end of 2011 there had been:
— A major restructuring of the financial system, mainly affecting the savings banks, which 
went from 45 to 15 institutions/groups, of which 13 converted into banks. Both the 
DGS (financed by its member institutions) and the FROB contributed with financial 
support to enable this process.
— A downsizing of bank branch networks in order to raise efficiency (see Table 2.9).
— A significant restructuring effort, as is shown by the figures for provisioning charges, 
which had risen to almost 13% of GDP in 2011, €138,353 million in the period from 
2008 to 2011.
— An increase in institutions’ capitalisation. Deposit-taking institutions’ overall solvency 
ratios went from 10.6% at 31 December 2007 to 12.2% at 31 December 2011. Over 
this same period the Tier 1 capital ratio rose from 7.5% to 10.2%.
— Stress tests showing that, following the restructuring undergone, the Spanish financial 
system’s solvency levels were adequate. 
— Favourable economic forecasts. 
Nevertheless, the foregoing proved insufficient when, in the second half of 2011, financial 
market tension intensified in the euro area and the lack of investor confidence pushed up sovereign 
risk premia in the main countries, as described in Section 2.1. In this context, there was a worsening 
of the crisis, with a second recession in Spain and the euro area, forcing Spanish credit institutions to 
confront new and serious difficulties, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
No. EmployeesNo. branchesYear
558,072266,548002
390,362580,449002
875,752498,240102
627,242348,931102
Cumulative change
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Deposit-taking institutions
TABLE 2.9 DOWNSIZING OF THE BANKING NETWORK
-12.7 %   -10.4 %

3 THE WORSENING OF THE CRISIS (2012-2013)
3.1 MACROECONOMICENVIRONMENT
A. the international environment
In 2012, global economic activity decelerated again, both as a result of the complex macroeconomic 
and financial environment in the euro area and the further slowdown in the pace of growth of the 
emerging economies, leading to significantly lower world trade growth. The sluggishness continued 
until mid-2013. From then on, global economic activity began to pick up, mainly in the advanced 
countries, while growth rates in the block comprising the emerging and developing economies remained 
subdued (see Chart 3.1). Overall, in 2012 and 2013, world GDP rose by 3.5% and 3.3%, respectively, 
clearly below the growth rates posted in the expansionary period of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
In this scenario, the monetary policies of advanced countries continued on an expansionary 
path, underpinned by very low policy interest rates and the application of new non-conventional 
measures by the main central banks. Specifically, in the United States, in 2012 operations were aimed 
at lengthening the maturity of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio, without increasing its size (known as 
“Operation Twist”) and, in the final months of the year, the programme referred to as qE3 was 
CHART 3.1 REAL GDP GROWTH AND POLICY INTEREST RATES
SOURCES: IMF and Banco de España.
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introduced (new purchases of mortgage-backed securities and Treasury bonds). The US monetary 
authority also renewed the commitment to maintain the federal funds target rate at exceptionally low 
levels, making it dependent upon the state of the economy. 
In contrast, fiscal policies maintained a moderately contractionary stance on the whole, in 
response to the need to bring the high deficit and public debt levels caused by the crisis back onto a 
sustainable path. This led to an intense debate about the appropriate pace of fiscal consolidation, 
given the weak economic activity and some political tensions, such as those surrounding the so-called 
“fiscal cliff ”, in early 2013, or the partial shutdown of the Federal Administration in October that 
year. The announcement by the Federal Reserve in May 2013 that a gradual process of withdrawing 
expansionary monetary stimuli might be initiated also had an unusually strong, albeit temporary, 
adverse effect on international financial markets, particularly on those of the emerging countries.
B.  the crisis and renewed political momentum in mid-2012 in the euro area
The euro area was particularly hard hit by the slump in activity in the second recession, with 
negative rates of change of GDP both in 2012 and 2013 (0.9% and 0.2%, respectively). However, 
this aggregate behaviour was compatible with very different developments across countries. Thus, 
compared with the significant downturn in economic activity in countries such as Spain, Italy or 
Portugal (with a cumulative decline of 4% and 5% over two years) and, in particular, Greece (10%), 
Germany and France only experienced a slowdown in economic growth, their GDP standing at 1.3% 
and 0.8%, respectively, in 2013, above that recorded two years earlier (see bottom panels of Chart 3.2).
In the financial markets of the euro area, the early months of 2012 saw some improvement with 
regard to the strong tensions of the latter part of 2011. The ECB’s monetary policy measures, the 
approval of a second bail-out plan for Greece, following the private-sector restructuring of its debt (in 
March of that year), and the progress made in the euro area economic governance reform process all 
contributed to this improvement. 
The measures adopted by the ECB notably included reducing the interest rate on the main 
refinancing operations to 1% at the end of 2011 (see Chart 3.3) and the liquidity injection, in 
December 2011 and February 2012, amounting to slightly more than €1 trillion, with a maturity of 
three years, in two exceptional long-term lending operations to credit institutions (known as “very 
long-term refinancing operation” or VLTRO). The latter helped mitigate the refinancing problems of 
European banks. Within the framework of European governance reforms, the launch of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) was brought forward to mid-2012, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, which includes the Fiscal Compact, was 
signed in March of that year, and the European Commission published the first annual Alert 
Mechanism Report, designed to detect and remedy macroeconomic risk situations.
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The moderation of sovereign risk premia in the early months of 2012 was particularly 
pronounced in the short-term. Thus, the two-year yield spread against Germany narrowed with 
respect to the highs reached in November 2011, by around 500 bp for Italian debt (to 200 bp in 
March 2012), by 350 bp for Belgian and Spanish debt (to 110 bp and 220 bp, respectively), and by 
80 bp for French debt (to 50 bp). However, the longer-term sovereign risk premia remained high, 
above those posted before the summer of 2011 (see top panels of Chart 3.2). Despite these 
improvements, the euro area’s public debt markets continued to be characterised by a high level of 
uncertainty and volatility.
There was a fresh bout of tension at the beginning of April, this time owing to investors’ 
growing concern over the weak economic growth and high public indebtedness of Italy and the 
situation of part of Spain’s financial system and its budgetary imbalances. 
In parallel, another political crisis in Greece, following inconclusive elections at the beginning 
of May, triggered new fears that it would have to exit the euro area, and the consequent tensions 
regarding bank deposits and financing flows to this country from abroad. In turn, Cyprus, a country 
heavily exposed to Greece, which had accumulated serious imbalances during the expansionary phase 
preceding the crisis, became the fourth country to request a full financial assistance package from the 
European authorities in July.
CHART 3.3 EUROSYSTEM MONETARY POLICY
SOURCE: ECB.
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This new episode in the euro area crisis affected the capacity of the more vulnerable economies 
to obtain financing from abroad, leading to sizeable capital outflows to the core countries. As a result, 
credit institutions in the more vulnerable countries increasingly resorted to Eurosystem financing, 
but this did not prevent financing conditions in those countries from becoming more restrictive, 
giving rise to a process of growing financial fragmentation1 among euro area countries which severely 
limited the effectiveness of the single monetary policy. 
In the sovereign debt markets, the risk premia of some countries rose sharply, with the two-
year yield spread against the German bond occasionally exceeding 700 bp in Spain and 500 bp in 
Italy. Stock prices fell, more markedly in the more vulnerable countries, particularly those of bank 
securities, and the euro exchange rate depreciated by 8% against the dollar, from early April to the 
end of July.
Given the gravity of the situation, which called into question the very survival of the single 
currency project, the Heads of State or Government of the euro area, at their meeting at the end of 
June 2012, adopted a series of agreements to promote firm progress towards a fuller economic and 
monetary union, which would curtail the feedback loop between sovereign risk and bank risk. To this 
end, it was decided to immediately take the necessary steps to set up a banking union in the euro area. 
This new project would begin, in its initial phase, with the establishment of a centralised supervisory 
system (Single Supervisory Mechanism), in which the ECB would play a key role. It was also agreed 
that once this single supervisory mechanism was in place, the ESM would be able to directly recapitalise 
credit institutions. Lastly, a programme to boost growth in the EU by mobilising EU funds through 
the European Investment Bank, was approved.
Along the same lines, at the end of July, the President of the ECB stated that, within the 
limits of its mandate and exercising independence, this institution was prepared to do whatever 
was necessary to safeguard the euro. The ECB then announced a programme to intervene on the 
sovereign debt secondary markets (known as Outright Monetary Transactions, or OMT), 
consisting of the unlimited purchase of sovereign bonds maturing at between one and three 
years, for those countries that formally requested it and subject to strict conditionality, under 
the framework of some of the programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
or the ESM. This programme, the details of which were set out at the beginning of September, 
aimed to dispel fears about the reversibility of the euro and contribute to restoring the functioning 
of single monetary policy in the euro area. Finally, in October, the European Stability Mechanism 
began to operate.
1 The growing financial fragmentation became particularly apparent in the pronounced increases in the sovereign and 
financial risk spreads in the more vulnerable economies and the sizeable capital outflows from these countries to the core 
countries. 
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In 2012 and 2013, the ECB continued to lower policy interest rates, bringing the rate for main 
refinancing operations down to 0.25% (a historical low at the time), while maintaining a generous 
supply of long-term liquidity, and issuing indications of the future course of monetary policy (“forward 
guidance”) in the summer of 2013, announcing that it expected interest rates to remain at their 
prevailing or lower levels for an extended period of time.
These actions, particularly the potentially unlimited nature of the ECB’s possible intervention 
on the sovereign debt secondary markets, provided considerable relief for the financial instability 
situation in the euro area from September 2012. This was felt both in the sovereign debt prices, where 
yield spreads narrowed significantly, and in corporate bonds, where issues were reactivated. An easing 
of financial conditions was also observed on the interbank markets, while stock prices recovered. 
However, the financing conditions in the euro area’s more vulnerable countries remained very tight, 
with a persistently high level of fragmentation across countries throughout 2013.
C.  the Spanish economy
The worsening political situation in Greece in the first half of 2012 heightened tensions in the 
euro area as whole, as investors’ concern over the risk of reversibility of the single currency grew. 
Against this background, the recession of the Spanish economy intensified in 2012, revealing great 
vulnerability arising from the persistent macroeconomic and financial imbalances accumulated in the 
expansionary phase, the doubts over the soundness of certain parts of the Spanish banking system and 
the substantial deterioration of public finances and of employment.
In early April 2012, the already tight funding conditions on wholesale markets for Spanish 
banks became even tighter, influenced by fears of the impact the new recession would have on credit 
institutions’ balance sheet positions and concerns regarding the feedback loop between sovereign risk 
and bank risk. At the beginning of May, these fears were to some extent confirmed by the BFA-
Bankia group’s request for public recapitalisation. 
In parallel, the net outflow of funds abroad, which had already started in mid-2011, began to 
gather pace, leading to a severe external financing crisis in Spain (see Chart 3.4). In cumulative 
twelve-month terms, net outflows peaked mid-year (€320 billion, representing 29% of GDP), mainly 
as a result of the divestment by non-residents of securities issued by resident sectors (€141 billion), 
and of the decline in interbank deposits held by Spanish credit institutions (€189 billion). 
As in other vulnerable euro area countries, these tensions resulted in a substantial increase in the 
recourse of Spanish credit institutions to Eurosystem financing, which reached €412 billion in August 
2012, accounting for 13% of their total assets and 34% of the liquidity provided by the Eurosystem 
to banks throughout the euro area. Consequently, in the summer months of that year, the Spanish 
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government debt yields were at their highest since the start of the European Monetary Union (7.5% 
for ten-year debt, towards the end of July), stock prices dropped by as much as 30% with respect to 
2011 year-end, and credit risk premia reached the highest levels recorded since the beginning of the 
sovereign debt crisis, for both credit institutions and non-financial corporations (see Chart 3.2 for the 
changes in the risk premium proxied by the ten-year sovereign spread against Germany, and Chart 3.5 
for stock prices and financing costs).
The Spanish Government adopted a number of budgetary and other measures early in the year 
and, as discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of this chapter, in June 2012 it requested 
financial assistance from European institutions in a context of increasingly fragile financial institutions 
and difficulties in obtaining funds on international capital markets. This assistance, together with the 
subsequent steps taken to clean up and recapitalise the weaker institutions in the Spanish banking 
sector and the measures adopted in the euro area, gave way to a gradual easing of tensions in the 
domestic and international financial markets from September, and to a recovery of investment flows 
to Spain.
In the fiscal domain, in April the Government approved the Organic Law on Budgetary Stability 
and Financial Sustainability, aimed at strengthening the budgetary discipline framework. This law 
established balanced budget objectives for all tiers of general government, limits on public debt and 
transparency and deviation-correction requirements. Subsequently, the Government approved new 
fiscal consolidation measures to reduce the budget deficit which, for 2012 as a whole and excluding 
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State aid to the financial sector, stood at 2.5 pp of GDP, and which, in terms of changes in the 
structural primary balance,2 reached 4 pp of GDP (see Chart 3.6). However, the total general 
government balance, net of State aid to the financial sector, recorded a deficit equivalent to 6.8% of 
GDP. The amount of State aid that year represented 3.7 pp of GDP, including which the deficit stood 
at 10.5% of GDP, bringing government debt to 86% of GDP. In July of that year, the Law on Urgent 
Measures for the Reform of the Labour Market entered into force, broadening the scope for 
decentralising collective bargaining, increasing the internal flexibility of firms and rationalising the 
conditions for terminating permanent contracts. In addition, measures to deregulate certain sectors 
and to promote competitiveness were approved throughout the year, and a payment-to-suppliers plan 
was adopted which helped mitigate the corporate sector’s liquidity constraints arising from the delays 
in payment by the regional and local governments.3 In parallel, the Government set up a complementary 
mechanism known as the Regional Government Liquidity Fund (FLA, by its Spanish abbreviation), 
initially aimed at providing liquidity to regional governments requiring it to meet major financing 
needs at times of limited access to credit.4
CHART 3.6 FISCAL POLICY IN SPAIN
SOURCES: IGAE and Banco de España.
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2 A measure which excludes interest payments and eliminates the estimated effect of the economic cycle (negative that year) 
on the balance of public revenue minus public expenditure.
3 In total, the Fund for the Financing of Payments to Suppliers paid €30.2 billion to regional governments and €11.6 billion 
to local governments in three phases, between 2012 and 2014.
4 From the start, the FLA was funded through the issuance of public debt by the Treasury and directly paid regional 
governments’ securities and loans falling due which could not be refinanced. From the end of 2012, the FLA also paid 
regional governments’ outstanding supplier bills. Overall, from 2012 to 2014, an additional €25.1 billion were released 
through this mechanism to pay regional government suppliers.
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Despite these measures, a great deal of uncertainty remained and the financing conditions of 
the Spanish economy continued to be very tight in 2012, with the economic downturn, which had 
started in 2011, prevailing throughout 2012 and even part of 2013. Overall, GDP fell by 4.6% over 
those two years (2.9% in 2012 and 1.7% in 2013), and there was a cumulative decline in domestic 
demand of 8% by the end of the period, which was only partially offset by the positive contribution 
of the external sector (see Chart 3.7). The two, practically consecutive, recessions, led to a 10% 
decline in the level of economic activity, in cumulative terms, from the start of the crisis in 2008 until 
the third quarter of 2013, with falls in private consumption and investment of 13% and 38%, 
respectively, in the period. Moreover, the unemployment rate rose to a record high of 27% in the first 
quarter of 2013. 
In the real estate sector, prices and construction activity continued to decline until the end of 
2013, making this episode Spain’s most severe and long-lasting real estate slump since at least the 
Civil War (see Chart 3.8). To illustrate the extent of the slump, the volume of house sales and purchases 
in 2013 was 300,000 units, compared with almost a million transactions in both 2005 and 2006. At 
the end of 2013, housing investment accounted for only 43% of the peak reached in 2006 and, as a 
share of GDP, it had decreased from 12% to 4% in the period. Bank lending to households and 
Spanish non-financial corporations continued to fall at an increasingly fast pace in all segments (see 
Section 3.2). In this period, house prices saw a cumulative decline from their peak of 37% in nominal 
terms, and 44% in real terms. 
From mid-2013, a scenario of incipient recovery of the Spanish economy emerged, with 
subdued falls in GDP in the second and third quarters and a rise in the fourth quarter, while the 
unemployment rate improved slightly throughout the year. This scenario was brought about by 
improvements in the international environment, including the recovery of the euro area and the 
world economy in the second quarter, the ECB’s expansionary policies, progress on the reform of 
euro area economic governance, and, on the domestic front, the aforementioned reforms undertaken 
and the progress made to gradually redress the main macro-financial imbalances of the Spanish 
economy. 
In the first half of the year, in addition to completing the key measures in the programme to clean 
up, recapitalise and restructure Spanish credit institutions, major progress was also made in recovering 
competitiveness, in a context of lower labour costs, which led to a gradual slowdown in the rate of job 
destruction. In terms of the unit labour costs of the Spanish economy relative to those of the euro area, 
by mid-year, slightly more than 70% of the loss of competitiveness accumulated from the launch of the 
single currency to the onset of the crisis had already been recovered. 
The European Commission, for its part, revised the deficit targets of the different countries to 
further tailor them to the each economy’s cyclical position, which for Spain, in particular, meant a 
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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more gradual budgetary adjustment path, thus enabling the economic recovery to begin in the latter 
part of the year. In 2013, a new public pension reform was passed which defined a sustainability 
factor and a revaluation mechanism linking pensions to the system’s balance of revenue and 
expenditure, and thus improved the pension system’s financial sustainability in the medium and long 
term. In 2013, the budget deficit represented 6.7% of GDP, net of State aid (7% including aid to 
banks). In any event, after deducting the cyclical component, budgetary policy adopted a contractionary 
stance, with an increase in the primary structural surplus net of State aid of 1.1 pp of GDP. However, 
the government debt/GDP ratio stood at 95% at the end of 2013.
The start of the recovery was accompanied by improved financing conditions and the restoration 
of confidence among economic agents. The ten-year Spanish government debt yield returned to 
levels below 5% (with the spread over the German bond declining by more than 300 bp), compared 
with the peaks exceeding 7% in the previous year (when this spread exceeded 600 bp). Notwithstanding 
these improvements, bank lending interest rates remained throughout the year at levels similar to 
those of 2012, with no significant progress yet being made to reduce the financial fragmentation in 
euro area countries. 
The recovery of investor confidence was also reflected in the changes in the Spanish economy’s 
external financing flows. Following the outflow of funds amounting to more than €170 billion in 
2012 (16% of GDP), 2013 saw a net inflow of funds of almost €85 billion (8% of GDP). Specifically, 
net portfolio investment of non-residents rose by nearly €49 billion that year, compared with the 
contraction of more than €51 billion a year earlier.
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3.2 THEFINANCIALSECTOR
As described in the previous section, in 2012 and early 2013, the macroeconomic situation 
worsened rapidly, with a 4.2% fall in real GDP in the two years. In parallel, the financial sector 
became significantly more unstable, with a marked increase in non-performing assets, a significant 
decline in lending and a growing uncertainty about the solvency of some credit institutions and, by 
extension, of the banking sector as a whole. 
Indeed, there was a sttepening of the decline in lending to households, the contractions sharpening 
from 2% in 2011 to 5% in 2013, as well as a 5% decrease in loans for house purchases. Likewise, loans to 
businesses fell from 6% to 13.5% in those years, affecting construction and real estate firms and other types 
of firms. These declines were accompanied by an increase in the ratio of non-performing loans. The reduction 
in lending was determined by the need for deleveraging of the household sector as a whole and of non-
financial corporations, as well as by the impact of the weak economic outlook on demand and on the credit 
quality of borrowers. Meanwhile, the difficult financing conditions of Spanish banks on the international 
markets were reflected in their restrictive lending policies and the maintenance of relatively high lending rates, 
bearing in mind the notably expansionary monetary policy stance in the Eurosystem. The implementation of 
bank restructuring plans may also have contributed to curtailing the credit supply at the time.
A.  Credit to the resident private sector
In 2012, several economic policy measures were adopted with the aim of reorganising, 
recapitalising and restructuring the Spanish banking sector.5 These measures included the approval of 
Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012, of 3 February, and 18/2012, of 11 May, which increased the provisioning 
requirements for real estate financing. In addition, on 20 July, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) on financial sector policy conditionality was signed between Spain and the European 
Commission, which contained an external financial assistance commitment of up to €100 billion and 
was accompanied by an exhaustive review of the quality of bank assets.
In 2012 and 2013, the conditions set out in the MoU were met, including the legislative 
reforms which strengthened the framework for the resolution and recovery of credit institutions, 
improved transparency in relation to refinancing criteria and the exposure to the real estate sector and 
reformed the savings banks sector. 
The programme of reforms also included the segregation and transfer of the real-estate related 
troubled assets of institutions receiving State aid to an asset management company for assets arising 
from bank restructuring (“Sareb”, by its Spanish acronym). 
5 For a detailed explanation of these measures, see Sections 3.4 and 3.5 below.
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These transfers of troubled assets relating to the real estate sector affected outstanding credit in 
the Spanish financial system as a whole during this period. The volume fell by more than €324 billion 
from December 2011 to December 2013, a cumulative decline of 19% over two years. Of this decrease, 
commercial banks accounted for €62 billion and savings banks for €255 billion6 (these amounts take 
into account the transfers to the Sareb). These developments are shown in Chart 3.9 below. 
By institutional sector, there was a decline in the accumulated outstanding credit in the case of 
both households (10%) and non-financial corporations (26%). The decline was more pronounced 
for non-financial corporations, owing to the particular circumstances of the business sector in those 
crisis years and to the transfer of real estate-related assets to the Sareb (see Chart 3.10).
In the case of lending to households, loans for house purchases fell by a cumulative 8% during 
those two years. This decline ran parallel to that of house prices, which fell by an additional 14% (see 
Chart 3.11), while loans for other purposes decreased by more than 20% in the same period. It 
should be noted that the outstanding balance of such loans, mainly intended for consumption and 
with relatively short maturities, may rise or fall much faster than loans for house purchases (generally 
long-term mortgages).
CHART 3.9 LENDING TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR IN SPAIN AND PERCENTAGE OF GDP
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6 From 2010 on, the comparative analysis of commercial banks and savings banks was affected by the reform process in the 
savings banks sector which started with RDL 11/2010, of 9 July (discussed in Section 3.4 below), and concluded with the 
conversion of most of the sector into commercial banks. However, a comparative analysis of developments regarding 
commercial banks and savings banks has been included in the review of the financial sector, purely for illustrative and 
information purposes. For the purposes of this analysis, the group of savings banks is that comprising the “former savings 
banks sector”, that is, the institutions whose legal status was once that of savings banks, regardless of whether they were 
subsequently transformed into banking institutions.
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As regards lending to businesses, the aforementioned transfers to Sareb mainly affected loans to 
the real estate and construction sectors, substantially reducing the volume of outstanding loans to 
these sectors. From December 2011 to December 2013, this volume fell by more than 40%, while 
lending to businesses in other sectors decreased by 13%. 
In comparative terms, the decline in lending was more pronounced in savings banks than in 
commercial banks, since the former had expanded the most in the preceding years and had accumulated 
the largest imbalances. Thus, from December 2011 to December 2013, while total lending in Spain 
decreased by 8% at commercial banks, it declined by more than 31% at savings banks.
Non-performing loans
In 2012 and 2013, there was a sharp increase in the volume of non-performing loans (see 
Chart 3.12). However, year-on-year growth rates were lower than in 2011, as a result of the transfers 
of loans to Sareb in December 2012 and February 2013. 
The non-performing loans ratio (NPL ratio) for private-sector lending stood at around 14% in 
December 2013, the highest in the period analysed in this report (see Chart 3.13), both at commercial 
banks and savings banks. However, the NPL ratio for lending to the real estate and construction 
sector was significantly higher, above 37%, followed by lending to non-financial corporations for 
other activities and lending to households for other purposes (in both cases, above 10%), and by 
lending to households for house purchases, which was below 6% (see Chart 3.13).
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During these years, NPL coverage ratios increased substantially to levels above 45%, especially 
in the case of loans for construction and real estate activities (with coverage ratios exceeding 50% and, 
in the case of savings banks, above 60% (see Chart 3.14).
Once the full effects of the crisis were felt, the analysis of a new variable became increasingly 
important, namely the volume of foreclosed assets, which arose as a result of default on secured loans.7 
7 Banco de España Circulars 5/2011, of 30 November, and 6/2012, of 28 September, established additional transparency 
requirements for deposit institutions, including in relation to assets foreclosed or received in payment of debts.
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The volume of foreclosed assets was also affected by the transfer of assets to Sareb mentioned 
earlier. As a result of these transfers, the volume of foreclosed assets decreased from December 2011 
to December 2013, as shown in Chart 3.15. In turn, the coverage ratio was influenced by the entry 
into force of Royal Decree-Law 2/2012, standing at close to 38% in December 2013, albeit with 
differences across groups of institutions.
In this setting, and given the insufficient information on mortgage foreclosure proceedings in 
relation to housing (repossessions arising from lending to households for house purchases), the Banco 
de España published for the first time in May 2013 (using 2012 data) statistical data on these processes, 
based on a survey conducted at the main banks. From then on, the Banco de España required all banks 
to provide such information (as part of statutory reporting), publishing it on its website in the form of 
briefing notes.8 From 2016, once the INE (the National Statistics Institute) had started to publish a 
new, more detailed and more frequent statistic on mortgage foreclosures, the Banco de España stopped 
publishing these notes. 
B.  Government debt
During the second phase of the crisis, deposit institutions’ holdings of Spanish government 
debt continued to rise, from €194 billion in December 2011 to €238 billion in December 2013, with 
8 The Banco de España published six briefing notes on mortgage foreclosure processes, available at www.bde.es/bde/en/
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average overall growth of 17.8% in 2012 and 3.8% in 2013 (see Chart 3.16). This increase can be 
largely explained by the behaviour of savings banks, whose annual rates of change of the volume of 
government debt on their balance sheets stood at 18.8% and 10.2% in those years. Commercial 
banks accumulated a substantial volume of government debt in 2012 (13.8%), which, however, was 
reduced in 2013 (by 8.2%).
The increase in deposit-taking institutions’ holdings of government debt during this period was 
partly boosted by their use as collateral in the ECB’s liquidity-providing operations with different 
maturities, and also by the easing of conditions in sovereign debt markets, following the ECB’s 
announcement in August 2012 that it would launch a secondary markets public sector purchase 
programme (the so-called Outright Monetary Transactions). 
During these years, deposit institutions’ business in Spain, in terms of assets, contracted by 
around 14%. In the case of savings banks, the decline began in 2012, but not until 2013 in the case 
of commercial banks. Consequently, the percentage of government debt on financial institutions’ 
balance sheets continued on the upward trend which had started in the early crisis years, to stand at 
8.8% in December 2013 (see Chart 3.17). 
The greater growth in the volume of debt held by savings banks and the higher level of deleveraging 
explain the particularly significant increase in their government debt-to-assets ratio, which rose to 
11.6% in December 2013 from 7.2% two years earlier. In the case of commercial banks, the ratio 
increased by only 1 pp, from 5.5% to 6.5% in two years.
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C.  Deposits and securitisations
In 2012, the volume of total deposits increased somewhat (see Chart 3.18) since, despite the 
decline in private-sector deposits (see Charts 3.18.3 and 3.19)9, deposits received from the Eurosystem 
increased significantly from the final quarter of 2011 (with year-on-year rates of change of more than 
100% in 2012), to close to €365 billion at the end of 2012 (compared with a volume of less than €70 
billion in 2010, see Chart 3.18.2). The higher volume of central bank deposits was accompanied by 
the strong growth in deposit institutions’ government debt holdings mentioned in the previous 
section. In any event, the volume of central bank deposits steadied in 2013, albeit at much higher 
levels than in the earlier preceding period, while private-sector deposits began to recover. In addition, 
asset securitisations dropped sharply, mainly in the case of commercial banks (see Chart 3.20). 
D.  Profitability
Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012 required further efforts to write down loans relating 
to real estate activity (see Sections 3.4 and 3.5 below). To a large extent, these extraordinary provisions 
led to a fall in the ROE to -21% in 2012 and to -1.2% in ROA at deposit institutions overall (see 
Chart 3.21). Net interest income, fee income and operating expenses remained at levels which were 
relatively similar to those of previous years, although the provisions had a major impact on the final 
profit or loss for 2012 (see Chart 3.22). The following year, the system overall once again obtained 
profits, with ROE of 5.2% and ROA of 0.31%. 
The full impact of the extraordinary provisions was felt by the business in Spain, particularly at 
institutions (mainly some savings banks) with a higher portfolio concentration of loans to non-
financial corporations in the construction and real estate sectors. For institutions with a greater 
presence abroad, the improved performance of the foreign business tended to offset that of the 
business in Spain. 
E.  Solvency
While institutions had strengthened their solvency in the early crisis phase (2008-2011), the 
trend reversed in 2012, especially for savings banks (consolidated data, including business abroad, 
were analysed). The losses reported in 2012 translated into a decrease in institutions’ capital, which 
was partly reversed the following year (see Chart 3.23). The total capital of the Spanish financial 
9 The sharp decline in lending led to a substantial improvement in deposit institutions’ loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio, from 
143% at 31 December 2011 to 115% at 31 December 2013, despite the slight fall in private-sector deposits, with significant 
reductions at commercial banks and savings banks (whose ratios dropped from 140% to 112% and 149% to 120%, 
respectively).
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CHART 3.18 DEPOSITS AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIABILITIES
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system as a whole fell by more than €40 billion in 2012 (a decrease of 17%), and there was a similar 
decrease in Tier 1 capital, in relative terms (15.9%), although somewhat lower in absolute terms 
(€31.6 billion). This strong decline was felt mainly in savings banks, since the total capital of banks 
remained stable that year (with an increase of 0.1%) and their Tier 1 capital rose by 2.7%. The capital 
of savings banks fell substantially by more than 40% in the two capital definitions. Their total capital 
contracted by €38.6 billion in 2012 (42.5%) and their Tier 1 capital by €33.3 billion (47.1%).
As in the previous phase, risk-weighted assets (RWAs) continued to decline, albeit more 
markedly (by 11.8%) in 2012 (see Chart 3.23). The largest decline was in savings banks, which 
continued the process of reducing their exposure initiated in 2007. While commercial banks reduced 
their RWAs by 1.6% in 2012, those of savings banks fell by almost 30% in the same year. In relation 
to these declines, account must be taken of the transfer of assets to Sareb.
The fall in RWAs partly tempered the significant drop in capital, so that capital ratios did not 
fall as much as expected and even rose in the case of commercial banks. 
In 2012, in deposit institutions as a whole, the total capital and Tier 1 capital ratios decreased 
by 72 and 47 bp, to 11.4% and 9.8%, respectively (see Chart 3.24). Commercial banks increased 
their total capital and Tier 1 capital ratios by 20 and 44 bp, to 11.8% and 10.7%, respectively. For 
their part, savings banks significantly reduced their capital ratios, with a drop in the total capital 
ratio of 236 bp to 10.6% in December 2012, and of 250 bp in the Tier 1 capital ratio, to bottom 
out at 7.6%.
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In 2013, thanks to the recapitalisation measures agreed within the framework of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (detailed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5), the solvency of institutions 
improved considerably, particularly that of savings banks. The volume of capital increased, RWAs 
continued to decline and, as a result, capital ratios improved notably, especially at savings banks.
Chart 3.23 shows the rise in capital in 2013 following the decline in 2012. The total capital of 
deposit institutions as a whole rose by almost €7 billion (3.5%) and Tier 1 capital by almost twice as 
much (€14 billion, 8.2%). This increase was largely accounted for by savings banks, whose total 
capital rose by more than €4 billion (8%) and Tier 1 capital by almost €11 billion (28.5%). It was 
less pronounced at commercial banks, whose total capital and Tier 1 capital increased by around 2%. 
In 2013, RWAs declined again, by 10.6%, at both commercial banks (7.4%), and, to a greater extent 
at savings banks, in line with the trend of previous periods (18.3%).
In this context, the increase in the volume of capital and the decrease in RWAs translated into 
significantly improved capital ratios. The total capital ratio for institutions as a whole rose by 180 bp, 
to 13.2% in December 2013 and the Tier 1 capital ratio by 206 bp, to 11.8% at the end of the 
period. These ratios improved both at commercial banks and substantially more so at the former 
savings banks. The capital ratios of commercial banks rose by 117 bp and 111 bp, respectively, 
resulting in a total capital ratio of 13% and a Tier 1 capital ratio of 11.8% in December 2013. The 
increase in the capital ratios of savings banks was very pronounced: the total capital ratio rose by 340 
bp and the Tier 1 capital ratio by 434 bp, to stand at 14% and 11.9% at the end of the period, 
respectively.
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
 TOTAL CAPITAL 
 TIER 1 CAPITAL 
 RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS (right-hand scale)
€bn
CHART 3.24  TOTAL CAPITAL RATIO AND TIER 1 
CAPITAL RATIO
Total deposit-taking institutions. Consolidated data
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
 TOTAL CAPITAL RATIO
 TIER 1 CAPITAL RATIO
%
SOURCE: Banco de España.SOURCE: Banco de España.
CHART 3.23  TOTAL CAPITAL, TIER 1 CAPITAL AND
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS
Total deposit-taking institutions. Consolidated data
159RepoRt on the financial and banking cRisis in spain, 2008-2014
In short, at the start of the period analysed (2012), the greater economic slowdown was reflected 
in the steady decline in lending both to households and to businesses, more pronounced in the case 
of real estate-related activity. The NPL ratio reached highs of around 14%, particularly in financing 
to the construction and real estate development sector, which came to exceed 37%. 
The low profitability of institutions, owing mainly to the higher provisioning needs and the 
difficulties in obtaining funding from the markets led then to request substantially higher funding 
from the Eurosystem (of up to €365 billion at the end of 2012, compared with €70 billion in 2010). 
These funds were largely invested in government debt, which generated significant income from 
interest rate spreads (operations known as “carry trade”). 
The financial market tensions reflected a situation of manifest instability and uncertainty about 
the solvency of credit institutions which, in view of the existence of troubled assets in the real estate 
sector amounting to more than €322 billion, led to the approval of legislation to speed up provisioning 
for non-performing loans and strengthen institutions’ solvency (Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 
18/2012), entailing provisions of more than €62 billion and capital requirements of more than €15.5 
billion. The Spanish Government’s request for external financial assistance from the European authorities 
in June 2012 facilitated the cleaning up of financial institutions’ balance sheets, thanks to the transfer of 
troubled assets to Sareb, and allowed for the weaker institutions to be recapitalised (see Sections 3.4.A 
and 3.4.B). 
The process of recapitalisation and restructuring of the Spanish banking sector substantially 
improved solvency ratios and profitability indicators, placing institutions in a more favourable 
position in 2013, while the Spanish economy was set on a path of incipient recovery.
3.3 INTERNATIONALREGULATORYFRAMEWORK
The Basel Committee continued to develop the Basel III regulatory framework. It also devoted 
part of its efforts to assessing the implementation of the new capital and liquidity requirements 
through the publication of reports detailing the countries which had made legislative or regulatory 
changes in this area.
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) pushed ahead with the “ending too-big-to-fail” project in 
relation to systemically important domestic (not only global) banks, non-banking sectors and bank 
resolution. Also, once progress had been made towards correcting the main problems identified in the 
banking sector during the crisis, the FSB shifted its attention to implementing the reforms. Monitoring 
consistency in the implementation of the reforms, a task that the FSB undertook in coordination 
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with other international committees, sought to prevent regulatory differences which could affect the 
overall effectiveness of the agreed measures.
In 2012, there were advances in other areas, including: the international regulation of non-
banking sectors such as “shadow banking”, for which the regulatory strategy and areas requiring 
measures to be developed were defined; and the derivatives markets (OTC), where progress was made 
on the reforms advocated by the G20 (for example, the reduction of bilateral exposures between 
institutions arising from derivatives.) 
A.  Basel banking regulation
In June 2011, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published the final text of 
what is known as Basel III, to address the lessons learned from the crisis10 (see section 2.3.A.1). The 
gradual implementation of these regulations in Europe began in 2013 and will foreseeably be 
completed by 2019, except in relation to instruments not qualifying as eligible under the new 
definition of capital, which can be only be partly included until 2023.
In January 2013, the revised short-term liquidity ratio (LCR) regulations were published, which, 
among other things, increased the number of eligible instruments such as high-quality liquid assets, 
and reviewed their implementation, which changed from full in 2015 to gradual from 2015 to 2019.
In October 2012, the BCBS published the review of the Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, a set of standards which contribute to ensuring sound regulation and prudential 
supervision of the banking sector. These standards are used by the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank in their Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) to verify the effectiveness of 
banking supervision systems and practices across countries.
B.  other areas of regulatory reform – FSB
During these years, the FSB pressed ahead with its regulatory agenda on several fronts, most notably:
— A framework for the treatment of systemically important institutions (“ending too-
big-to-fail”). The FSB made further progress in the development and implementation of 
a regulatory framework for global systemically important institutions, including global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs11), domestic systemically important banks 
10 Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems - revised version June 2011 – BCBS.
11 For a brief overview of the progress made and remaining issues in the SIFIs project, see Progress and Next Steps Towards 
Ending “Too-Big-To-Fail” (TBTF) (September 2013) – FSB.
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(D-SIBs),12 non-banking sector institutions such as insurance firms,13 central counterparty 
clearing houses (CCPs) (in coordination with the CPMI14 and IOSCO15), or securities 
firms. The FSB continues to publish a list of global systemically important institutions 
(G-SIBs) identified annually.16
— Regulation and monitoring of shadow banking. The FSB applied a dual strategy 
which consisted of: (i) creating a monitoring framework to analyse the risks of shadow 
banking in greater depth; (ii) developing regulatory measures to address systemic risks 
identified. In 2013, the FSB presented the G20 with a regulatory policy framework to 
strengthen the monitoring and regulation of shadow banking entities.17 It also sent a 
summary of the measures adopted to address the systemic risks that shadow banking may 
pose to the financial system.18
— OTC derivatives markets. In 2013, the FSB also noted the progress made in ensuring 
that these derivatives are traded on organised platforms and transactions are reported to 
central registers (trade repositories). In its progress reports on the implementation of the 
reforms in OTC derivatives markets, the FSB stressed the lower bilateral exposure 
between institutions to such transactions, owing to the growing use of centralised clearing 
through CCPs and, in some cases, to the introduction of minimum capital and buffer 
requirements, while pointing out that progress was not uniform across jurisdictions. 
— Other developments. In April 2012, in response to one of the causes of the crisis,19 the 
FSB released a set of principles which included criteria for granting residential mortgages, 
further developing the recommendations previously issued by the Joint Forum.20 The 
12 D-SIB: Domestic Systemically Important Bank. See Extending the G-SIFI Framework to Domestic Systemically Important 
Banks (April 2012) – BCBS. The Principles published by the BCBS nevertheless allow countries a certain degree of 
discretion when identifying and implementing measures, in view of the structural features of the different financial 
systems.
13 FSB identifies G-SIIs and the Policy Measures that will Apply to Them (July 2013) – FSB.
14 BIS Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI).
15 International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO).
16 The FSB publishes the updated lists of G-SIBs annually in Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). 
The list published in 2013 also indicated the capital surcharge corresponding to each G-SIB on the basis of its systemicity. 
The FSB also supports the setting up of so-called “crisis management groups” (CMG) for most G-SIBs.
17 Policy Framework for Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities (FSB, August 2013).
18 An Overview of Policy Recommendations for Shadow Banking (FSB, August 2013).
19 Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices (FSB, April 2012).
20 The Joint Forum was set up in 1996 under the auspices of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS). See Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation-Key Issues and Recommendations (January 
2010), Joint Forum.
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FSB also promoted the formulation of recommendations on the public dissemination of 
information by the banking industry and continued to strengthen the analysis of the 
unintended effects of the regulatory reforms in emerging and developing economies.
C. European regulations (2012-2013)
At this stage of the crisis, the European Banking Authority (EBA), established in January 2011, 
was already fully operational, with well-defined regulatory capacities and powers to: (i) draw up 
binding regulatory technical standards and (ii) issue guidelines which, although not binding, are to 
be adopted by national authorities (which must provide an explanation for not doing so).21
The EBA’s work during these two years largely consisted of developing, through technical 
standards and implementing guidelines, the various mandates contained in the European Directive 
and Regulation on capital requirements (CRD IV and CRR22). In 2012 and 2013, the EBA completed 
and submitted around 50 technical standards and published eight sets of guidelines. 
The technical standards notably included:
— Own funds. The CRR, which transposed Basel III into European legislation, conferred 
on the EBA the task of developing the new capital requirements, particularly in relation 
to the standardisation of supervisory criteria for specific preferential treatment provided 
for in the law. This resulted in four technical standards which were submitted to the 
Commission between 2013 and 2014. 
— Additional information to be provided by institutions to supervisors. The lack of 
information on the state of assets in institutions’ balance sheets and on asset encumbrance 
(which hindered adequate assessment of risks), was one of the weaknesses identified when 
analysing the causes of the financial crisis. To address this problem, the EBA prepared three 
implementing standards for institutions to submit detailed information on non-performing 
mortgage loans and forbearance measures, and on their level of asset encumbrance.
— Remuneration. CRD III and IV proposed measures for monitoring and controlling 
remuneration in the banking sector, considering that institutions’ incentives policies in the 
years preceding the crisis had led to excessive risk-taking on their part, and was one of the 
21 The technical standards are submitted by the EBA to the European Commission. Once they are adopted by the 
Commission, they become directly applicable Commission Regulations. Although the guidelines issued by the EBA are 
not binding, supervisory authorities must adopt them or else provide an explanation for not doing so.
22 Directive 2013/56 and Regulation 575/2013, both dated 13.06.2013. See Box 4.1.
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factors contributing to the crisis. Both directives conferred on the EBA the task of developing 
different aspects of these measures, in the form of technical standards and guidelines. Thus, 
in 2013 the EBA presented the Commission with a technical standard to identify categories 
of staff with a material impact on an institution’s risk profile, to which remuneration 
policies which did not encourage excessive risk-taking would be applied.
The most significant guidelines were those focusing on aspects of the legislation relating to 
management staff at institutions and control of remuneration.
— Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body 
and key function holders (EBA/GL/2012/06). Aimed at addressing problems of 
governance and lack of suitability of managers, both of which contributed to excessive 
risk-taking and led to critical situations at institutions.
— Guidelines on the data collection exercise regarding high earners (EBA/GL/2012/05). 
Measures established to monitor remuneration included: inventory of bank staff earning 
a total remuneration of more than €1 million per year, for subsequent publication. This 
is one of the elements that enables supervisors to assess, under Pillar 2, if incentives 
applied by institutions are aligned with their long-term objectives.
— Guidelines on the remuneration benchmarking exercise (EBA/GL/2012/04). 
Guidelines to conduct the remuneration benchmarking exercise at European institutions. 
The results of this exercise are part of the tools that the authorities can use to carry out 
the supervisory review of remuneration policies.
In addition, in 2012 and 2013, the recapitalisation exercise initiated at the end of 2011 was 
completed. This process began with the publication of an EBA recommendation (EBA/REC/2011/1) 
urging banks to reach a 9% Core Tier 1 ratio by June 2012, with an additional buffer for sovereign 
debt exposures. In October 2012, in response to the adverse financial market conditions, the EBA 
announced that it would issue a new recommendation for institutions to preserve the level of Core 
Tier 1 capital attained. In July 2013, it published recommendation EBA/REC/2013/03, advising 
institutions to preserve the level of Core Tier 1 capital they had reached at 30 June 2012, during the 
transitional period leading to the entry into force of CRD IV - CRR (December 2014).
Also to restore market confidence in the EU banking sector, the EBA issued a new recommendation 
in October 2013 (EBA/REC/2013/04) urging authorities to undertake asset quality review exercises at 
institutions under their supervision, specifically of asset classes considered to be high risk. The 
recommendation aimed to contribute to the adoption of a more uniform supervisory approach when 
analysing banks’ portfolios, so that the capital levels required to cover actual risks could be properly assessed.
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3.4 SPANISHREGULATORYFRAMEWORK
In the regulatory arena, the first half of 2012 was characterised by write-down of credit 
institutions’ exposures to the real estate sector. From July 2012, the regulatory initiatives in the 
banking sector were conditioned by the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
between the European and Spanish authorities, under which an independent assessment was made of 
the Spanish banking sector. 
Other legal changes in the period included most notably the Europe-wide approval of the 
solvency rules set out in Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR) 
and the transposition to Spanish law of the former in Royal Decree-Law 14/2013 of 29 November 
2013. Also notable was the publication of Banco de España Circular 6/2012 of 28 September 2012, 
the main objective of which was to increase the transparency of credit institutions regarding their 
forbearance transactions and the provisions for them (see Box 3.1).
A.  Write-down of exposures to the real estate sector23 
In February and May 2012 two royal decree-laws were promulgated for the purpose of 
reducing the uncertainty persisting over the on-balance-sheet valuation of assets associated with 
construction and real estate development: Royal Decree-Law 2/2012 of 3 February 2012 on 
balance sheet clean-up of the financial sector (Royal Decree-Law 2/2012) and Royal Decree-Law 
18/2012 of 11 May 2012 on the write-down and sale of financial sector real estate assets (Royal 
Decree-Law 18/2012). 
A.1 The measures introduced by Royal Decree-Law 2/2012 were threefold:24
— Specific provisions for troubled loans: 25 additional specific provisions were set to cover 
losses on troubled assets derived from construction and real estate development lending 
(including non-performing and substandard loans26 and foreclosed assets). These 
provisions varied depending on the type of asset involved: 
23 Section 3.5.A describes the main effects of the application of this legislation.
24 Taking as a reference the outstanding amount of institutions’ on-balance-sheet exposures to the real estate sector as at 
31.12.2011.
25 Troubled loans are those credit transactions in which objective factors (e.g. instalments more than 90 days past due) or 
subjective factors (e.g. borrower company with high recurring losses) cast doubt on the ability of borrowers to meet their 
obligations as and when required. Performing loans are those transactions where, in principle, there is no doubt about 
their repayment.
26 Defined as credit which, although not in arrears, exhibits weaknesses which may entail future losses exceeding the general 
provision calculated for performing transactions.
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— 3 February 2012: Royal Decree-Law 2/2012 on 
balance sheet clean-up of the financial sector.
— 11 May 2012: Royal Decree-Law 18/2012 on the 
write-down and sale of financial sector real estate 
assets.
— 20 July 2012: Signature of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the European 
Commission and Spain, containing two 
documents:
•   Memorandum  on  financial-sector  policy 
conditionality, and
•   Framework  agreement  on  financial  assistance 
between the European Financial Stability 
Facility, Spain as beneficiary Member State, the 
Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the 
Banking Sector (FROB, by its Spanish acronym) 
as guarantor and the Banco de España.
•   Legislative measures relating to the MoU:
— 31 August 2012: Royal Decree-Law 
24/2012 on restructuring and resolution of 
credit institutions (later included in Law 
9/2012).
— 14 November 2012: Law 9/2012 on 
restructuring and resolution of credit 
institutions.
— 15 November 2012: Royal Decree 
1559/2012 establishing the legal regime 
governing asset management companies.
— 22 March 2013: Royal Decree-Law 6/2013 
on protection of the holders of certain 
savings and investment products and other 
financial measures.
— 27 December 2013: Law 26/2013 on the 
savings banks and banking foundations.
— 28 September 2012: Banco de España Circular 
6/2012 amending Circular 4/2004 of 22 
December 2004 on public and confidential 
financial reporting rules and formats. 
— 26 June 2013: Directive 2013/36/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms. 
— 26 June 2013: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions 
and investment firms. 
— 29 November 2013, Royal Decree-Law 14/2013 
on urgent measures for the adaptation of Spanish 
law to European Union rules on the supervision 
and solvency of financial institutions.
box 3.1 MAIN LEgAL ChANgES IN SPAIN IN ChRoNoLogICAL oRDER (2012-2013)
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—  60% in land financing transactions; 
— 50% in financing of property developments in progress (excluding developments 
that continued in progress and were classified as substandard, in which case the 
provisioning level was 24%);
— up to 50% in the fourth year on the balance sheet (40% for houses of individuals) in 
the case of foreclosed completed developments and other collateral; 
— in other non-performing real estate loans, the provision had to be for 25% of the 
loan, and in other transactions classified as substandard the provision had to be at 
least 20% or 24%, depending on whether or not there was collateral. 
— Capital surcharge: also, troubled assets linked to land and to developments in progress 
had to be covered by additional amounts of top-quality capital (core capital). 
— Provisions for performing loans:27 performing (current in payment) land, construction 
and real estate development loans had to be provisioned at one time for 7% of their 
outstanding amount as at 31.12.2011.28
Credit institutions had to comply with all these requirements during 2012, for which purpose 
by 31 March they had to submit for approval by the Banco de España a plan detailing the strategies 
they would pursue to ensure such compliance. The compliance deadline could be extended by 12 
months more in the case of institutions that underwent mergers in 2012.29 To encourage such mergers, 
Royal Decree-Law 2/2012 empowered the FROB to purchase convertible bonds wherever necessary.
A.2  Subsequently, Royal Decree-Law 18/2012 established two additional measures to bolster 
the balance sheet clean-up: 
— First, additional provisions were required to cover performing loans linked to the real 
estate sector. The provisioning level varied depending on the type of collateral backing 
the loans, being highest for those lacking collateral or with collateral in the form of land. 
27 See footnote 25.
28 The provisions thus set aside, although classified as general, were for the loans which had served as a basis for their 
calculation, and, accordingly, could only be used to cover the needs derived from subsequent reclassifications of these 
loans or those derived from foreclosure of assets in satisfaction of the loans. 
29 Mergers which, moreover, had to meet certain conditions such as a minimum size of the resulting institution, improvements 
in corporate governance, household and SME lending targets and objectives for the reduction of exposure to construction 
and real estate development.
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Institutions had to submit to the Banco de España, no later than 11 June 2012, their 
plans for complying with this new requirement, including also a programme and a 
timetable for divestment of assets linked to the real estate sector. 
— Second, public limited companies had to be formed to which institutions had to transfer 
the real estate foreclosed or received in satisfaction of debts relating to land, construction 
and real estate development. The purpose of this was to isolate such assets and facilitate 
their sale on the market.30 
B.  Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European Commission 
On 25 June 2012, in view of the situation of the sovereign debt markets and the need to 
support the restructuring and recapitalisation of the banking sector, the Spanish Government 
formally requested financial assistance from the European authorities, such assistance being 
approved by the Eurogroup at the Brussels Summit on 29 June. The MoU between the European 
Commission and Spain consists of two documents: (i) memorandum of understanding on 
financial-sector policy conditionality conditions, signed on 23 July and (ii) framework agreement 
on financial aid, 24 July. The MoU contained a financial assistance commitment of up to 
€100 billion. 
The ultimate objective of the MoU was to support the Spanish banking sector and restore 
confidence in order to regain access to the international financial markets. For this purpose, the 
programme had three main components (see Box 3.2): 
(i) Determination of the capital needs of each credit institution, which gave rise to a 
classification of institutions into four groups (groups 0 to 3, based on capital shortfall 
and whether or not they needed State aid). The basis of this exercise was a top-down test 
initiated in May and whose results were published on 21 June 2012;
(ii) Establishment of strategies for the recapitalisation, restructuring and/or resolution of 
the more vulnerable institutions, for which strategies were set depending on the group 
in which the institution had been classified; and
(iii) Segregation of impaired assets31 of the institutions which received public support for 
their recapitalisation. 
30 These companies, if they received financing from the contributor, were obliged to sell each year at least 5% of their assets 
to third parties. 
31 Particularly real estate development loans and assets derived from mortgage foreclosure.
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Main components of the MoU1
Determination of capital needs. The capital 
needs of each bank were determined through asset 
quality analysis and stress tests, taking as a basis the 
diagnosis resulting from the external assessment tests 
which were being conducted. The results served to 
classify banks into four groups: 
— Group 0 (banks meeting the required solvency 
levels and not having any capital shortfall). 
— Group 1 (banks already owned by the FROB2).
— Group 2 (banks with capital shortfalls detected in the 
stress test and which needed State aid to cover them).
— Group 3 (banks with capital shortfalls detected 
in the stress test and which were able to meet 
them without State aid).
Recapitalisation, restructuring and/or 
resolution of the most vulnerable banks
Based on the capital shortfalls detected in the 
stress tests, a strategy was established for each 
institution according to the principles of viability, 
limitation of distortions in competition and 
minimisation of the taxpayer burden through a 
burden-sharing system which, in addition to 
shareholders, affects the holders of hybrid instruments 
(preference shares) and subordinated debt3 through 
voluntary and mandatory subordinated liability 
exercises.
— Groups 1 and 2: these had to submit restructuring 
or resolution plans (depending on whether they 
were viable or not, respectively) which had to be 
approved by the European Commission before 
assistance was provided. 
— Group 3: Two cases were distinguished: (i) banks 
planning to increase capital significantly (by more 
than 2% of risk-weighted assets). These institutions 
had to issue, as a precautionary measure, convertible 
bonds which could be subscribed by the FROB and 
had to be redeemed by 30.6.2013 if they succeeded 
in raising the envisaged private capital (otherwise, 
the bonds were to be converted into common shares 
and the institutions had to submit restructuring 
plans), and (ii) banks planning to increase capital by 
less than 2% of risk-weighted assets, which had until 
30.6.2013 to achieve their objective (otherwise, they 
would be recapitalised with State aid, having to 
submit restructuring plans).
Segregation of impaired assets in banks 
receiving public support for their recapitalisation, 
and transfer of the impaired assets to an external 
asset management company. The transfer would 
be made taking into account the long-term real 
economic value of the assets4 and losses realised 
in the banks at the time of the segregation.
box 3.2 MAIN ELEMENTS oF ThE MEMoRANDUM oF UNDERSTANDINg (MoU)
1  The process of determination of external aid under the 
MoU for financial system restructuring is described in 
Section 3.4.B.2. 
2  BFA-Bankia, Catalunya Caixa, NCG Banco and Banco de 
Valencia.
3  Which entails these securities being converted into equity 
by means of public capital injection or by buying them 
back at considerable discounts. 
4  Which meant the use of more prudent criteria allowing a 
sustainable market reference avoiding extremes (excessive 
value due to bubble effects or reduction in value due to crises).
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Other regulatory commitments under the 
MoU
— Strengthen the solvency of institutions through 
compliance by all of them with CET1 ratio of 9%. 
— Strengthen the governance of savings banks.
— Limit the remuneration of executives and 
directors of banks receiving State aid.
— Additional transparency exercises on the situation 
of the sector. Commitment to review and fine 
tune supervisory procedures in order to strengthen 
the supervisory framework.
box 3.2 MAIN ELEMENTS oF ThE MEMoRANDUM oF UNDERSTANDINg (MoU) (cont’d)
Additionally, the MoU established horizontal conditionality for the sector as a whole, as follows: 
— Strengthen the solvency of institutions such that all of them meet a CET1 ratio of 9%. 
— Strengthen the governance of savings banks and limit the remuneration of executives and 
directors of the institutions which received State aid. 
— Conduct additional transparency exercises on the situation of the sector. 
The MoU also included the decision to review the Banco de España’s supervision procedures in 
order to strengthen the supervisory framework. 
The pre-defined road map in the MoU was initiated in July 2012 with the provision of the first 
tranche of assistance, €30 billion,32 and extended over 18 months. Finally, the State aid disbursed, at 
€41,333 million, was less than the agreed maximum,33 which, as noted above, was €100 billion. Of 
that amount, €38,833 million were used directly for restructuring certain credit institutions (listed in 
the following section) and €2.5 billion were used by the FROB to capitalise Sareb. 
A delegation from the European Commission and the ECB, in cooperation with the IMF, the 
EBA and the ESM, periodically monitored compliance with the financial assistance programme and 
32 The FROB, acting as a government agent, channelled the funds to the institutions affected.
33 At present, €6,612 million have been voluntarily repaid.
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fulfilment of the commitments given. This monitoring was carried out through periodic missions by 
a delegation of these institutions in Spain.34
Once the stress tests had been carried out to determine the capital needs of the banking sector 
in general and of each institution in particular, the commitments under the MoU were written into 
the respective implementing legal provisions listed in Box 3.1, which included most notably those 
relating to: (i) credit institution restructuring and resolution; (ii) creation of Sareb and (iii) reform of 
the legal framework for savings banks.
B.1.  Stress tests and identification of capital needs35
On 11 May 2012, to strengthen confidence in Spanish credit institutions and determine the 
sector’s capital needs, the Government entrusted the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness 
with an external analysis at aggregate level (known as a top-down analysis) to assess the resilience of 
the Spanish banking sector to the severe deterioration affecting the Spanish economy. The results of 
this exercise were published on 21 June. 
Once the MoU had been signed, in early July the aforementioned exercise was supplemented 
with a second analysis, disaggregated bank by bank (known as a bottom-up analysis), to determine the 
specific needs of each of them, including a detailed review of the institutions’ asset portfolios. As stated 
in the press release published by the Banco de España when the test was completed on 31 July 2012, 
“This process is one of the most relevant steps of a holistic strategy to restore and strengthen the 
soundness of the Spanish banking sector. It is also an integral part of the Memorandum of Understanding 
on Financial-Sector Policy Conditionality (MoU) approved by the Eurogroup on 20 July” (Section 
3.5.B gives details of these exercises). 
B.2  Recapitalisation, restructuring and/or resolution of credit institutions (Royal Decree-Law 
24/2012 and subsequent Law 9/2012). 
On 31 August 2012, the Government approved Royal Decree-Law 24/2012 on the restructuring 
and resolution of credit institutions, with immediate effect. It was subsequently replaced by Law 
9/2012 of 14 November. This legislation legally recognised the commitments given under the MoU 
34 The monitoring can be divided into two phases. The first phase took place during the programme and the last visit was in 
December 2013 (it was the fifth and last review). The official communication of the result expressly indicated that “A 
delegation from the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank, carried out the fifth and last 
review of the financial sector assistance programme for Spain from 2 December to 13 December 2013”. The second phase 
was undertaken within the framework of the post-programme visits. The first visit of this type was in April 2014 (report 
dated 9.4.2014).
35 Details and results of these tests are described extensively in Section 3.5.B.1 below.
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and strengthened the mechanisms available to the Spanish authorities to reinforce and clean up the 
financial system.36 Its main features are summarised below.
crisis ManageMent 
A strengthened bank crisis management framework was designed which wrote into Spanish law 
many of the measures included in what was then only a draft of the European bank recovery and 
resolution directive. Depending on the seriousness of the situation of the distressed bank, the measures 
available for effective restructuring or orderly resolution, as applicable, were as follows:
(i) Early intervention measures, at the request of the Banco de España, for when a bank 
failed (or would foreseeably fail) to meet solvency, liquidity, organisational structure or 
internal control requirements, but would foreseeably be able to return to compliance 
through its own means or with exceptional financial support.37 The bank had to prepare 
an action plan describing the measures for ensuring its long-term viability and subject 
to approval by the Banco de España,38 which, moreover, had to be informed quarterly 
of its degree of compliance. In this phase, if the bank’s situation deteriorated significantly, 
the Banco de España could require the provisional replacement of directors.
(ii) Restructuring measures, to be applied to banks requiring public support to ensure 
their viability but having the capacity to return the State aid received within the legally 
stipulated time period for each support instrument. A restructuring plan prepared by 
the bank and subject to the Banco de España’s approval was necessary. The restructuring 
instruments envisaged were various types of financial support39 and the transfer of assets 
or liabilities to an asset management company.
(iii) Resolution measures, to be applied to banks considered non-viable but whose winding-
up was to be avoided for reasons of public interest. The tools envisaged here were the 
36 This law incorporated the elements of Royal Decree-Law 24/2012 of 31 August 2012 which wrote into Spanish law the 
commitments under the MoU of July 2012 within the framework of credit institution restructuring and resolution. This 
Royal Decree-Law was subsequently repealed by Law 9/2012, which thenceforth regulated this area.
37 Through instruments convertible into shares with a repurchase or maturity period not exceeding two years.
38 It also had to set out, inter alia, specific targets for efficiency, profitability, solvency and liquidity, improvement of corporate 
governance, reduction of overhead costs and resizing of productive capacity. If the bank requested public financial support, 
the FROB had to issue a report prior to the plan being approved by the Banco de España. 
39 Including the granting of guarantees/collateral or loans, purchase of assets or liabilities, recapitalisation through common 
shares or equity contributions (representing an equity holding based on the bank’s economic value and conferring on the 
FROB voting rights in the same proportion) or instruments convertible into shares (commonly called “CoCos”, short for 
contingent convertible bonds), with a maturity not exceeding five years. These instruments would count as Tier 1 capital 
and core capital without limitation. 
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sale of the business for the transfer of assets and liabilities to a bridge bank or asset 
management company.40 Once the resolution process had commenced, the Board of 
Directors had to be replaced. The FROB had to draft a resolution plan setting out, inter 
alia, the economic valuation of the bank and the arrangements made so that, apart from 
the bank’s shareholders, the holders of preference shares and subordinated debt would 
bear a part of the restructuring costs. These plans were subject to approval by the Banco 
de España and the European Commission in the final instance. 
It should be noted that, prior to adopting any restructuring or resolution measure, it was 
necessary to determine the economic value of the bank (determined by one or more independent 
experts in accordance with Article 5 of Law 9/2012). This enabled the recognition of the losses 
derived from application of the instruments to be used and the determination of the advisability of 
these solutions as alternatives to winding-up, by comparing the loss of value entailed in each alternative. 
This valuation also served as a basis for the granting of the agreed public financial support. 
allocation oF recaPitalisation costs
In accordance with the MoU, to lighten the burden on taxpayers, the law established, in 
addition to the costs to be borne by stakeholders, members or non-voting equity unit holders (as 
applicable), mechanisms by which the holders of hybrid capital instruments (preference shares) and 
subordinated debt, in line with their hybrid nature, would bear a portion of the bank recapitalisation 
costs. These hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercises entailed a haircut on the nominal value of 
the securities and their subsequent reinvestment in shares or other equity instruments. These 
mechanisms, known as “burden-sharing”, could either be voluntary41 or imposed compulsorily by 
the FROB.42 
A special feature of the Spanish case was the large proportion of these instruments (83% of the 
volume invested) which had been placed with retail investors. The application of this burden-sharing 
mechanism requiring the holders of preference shares and subordinated debt to bear losses (to 
contribute to meeting the cost of restructuring those banks receiving public support) revealed, 
moreover, a problem of inappropriate marketing of a portion of these instruments to retail customers, 
who were unaware of the risk they were assuming by purchasing these products. 
40 To these instruments should be added the possibility of receiving public support.
41 Such as exchange offers for the bank’s equity instruments; offers to repurchase securities (in cash based on their present 
value or reinvestment in shares or other banking product); reduction of the nominal value or early repayment at a value 
other than nominal amount. Haircuts on the value were applied in accordance with European law on State aid.
42 Such as postponement, suspension, modification or suppression of certain rights of the holder (interest, reimbursement 
of principal, maturity and others), repurchase by the bank of the shares in question at the price set by the FROB (market 
price with haircuts according to EU law on State aid) or reinvestment of that amount in the subscription of shares.
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In most cases, the holders of preference shares and subordinated debt had to exchange their 
securities for actions of the bank in question, which, being unlisted, had limited (or no) liquidity. As 
described in Section 3.5.B.4 below, the Spanish authorities took diverse action to ease the burden 
falling on retail investors and to provide for restitution of damages in those cases in which the 
information on these hybrids had not functioned properly. 
In particular, Royal Decree-Law 6/2013 of 22 March 2013 on the protection of holders of 
certain saving and investment products and other financial measures (hereafter Royal Decree-Law 
6/2013) adopted a number of measures:
— First, to provide liquidity to unlisted shares, the Deposit Guarantee Fund was endowed 
with the capacity to purchase from retail customers the shares they received in exchange 
for their investments in bank preference shares and/or subordinated debt. This purchase 
was at market price. To enable the Deposit Guarantee Fund to carry out these transactions, 
it was endowed with sufficient funds through an extraordinary contribution by member 
credit institutions in the amount of 3‰ of the deposits taken (which serve as the basis for 
calculating contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Fund). 
— Second, a hybrid capital and subordinated debt instrument monitoring committee, 
attached to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness and chaired by the 
CNMV, was set up and entrusted with analysing the various reasons giving rise to 
court and out-of-court claims relating to the marketing of these instruments 
(preference shares and subordinated debt) by the FROB’s investees. Its function, 
among others, was to determine the basic criteria to be employed by FROB investees 
in order to offer their customers the option of submitting disputes over hybrid capital 
and subordinated debt instruments to arbitration, so that they could be duly 
compensated for the economic loss incurred, in the event of an arbitration decision 
in favour of those customers. 
segregation oF assets to an asset ManageMent coMPany and strengthening oF the Frob’s 
Powers 
To smooth the clean-up of bank balance sheets, the FROB was endowed with the power to 
oblige banks receiving public support to transfer their troubled assets (real estate loans unlikely to be 
recovered and foreclosed assets) to an asset management company. Law 9/2012 created Sareb and the 
Bank Asset Funds (Fondos de Activos Bancarios), which are described below. 
An essential part of the strategy was the strengthening of the powers of the FROB. To do so, it 
was given the form of a State public law entity headed by a governing committee, the members of 
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which were changed upon the entry into force of Law 9/2012, which removed from it the representatives 
of the Deposit Guarantee Funds. Law 9/2012 delimited its competences and conferred on it public 
law powers to take administrative action43 with immediate legal effect. 
other signiFicant Matters included in law 9/2012 
The following are worthy of note:
(i) change in capital requirements, setting a single requirement consisting of core capital of 
9%44 to be met by all institutions from 1 January 2013; 
(ii) endowment on the Banco de España of powers to authorise credit institutions and 
impose all manner of sanctions on them (tasks previously shared with the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Competitiveness), and 
(iii) setting of a limit of €500,000 on the total fixed compensation received by executive 
chairpersons, managing directors and managers of institutions receiving State aid that 
are not majority owned by the FROB.45 
B.3 Creation of Sareb 
Sociedad de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria (the Spanish asset 
management company for assets arising from bank restructuring – “Sareb” by its Spanish acronym)46 
is regulated by the seventh additional provision of Law 9/2012 and by Royal Decree 1559/2012 of 
15 November 2012 establishing the legal regime for asset management companies.
Sareb was formed as a public limited company47 55%-owned by private shareholders48 and 45%-owned 
by the FROB, for the sole purpose of purchasing, managing and divesting the assets which had to be 
43 These powers were necessary for the execution of restructuring and resolution instruments (determination of value and 
suspension of contracts and collateral/guarantees, among other things). 
44 According to the EBA definition discussed above.
45 In the case of institutions majority owned by the FROB, the limit was €300,000 (set by Royal Decree-Law 2/2012) and, 
furthermore, in 2012 the directors and managers of these institutions could not receive variable remuneration.
46 This company was created in November. Royal Decree-Law 24/2012 of 31 August 2012 had already set guidelines for the 
regulation of the asset management company to which nationalised institutions and those subjected to a restructuring or 
resolution process had to transfer their troubled assets. That Royal Decree-Law was replaced by Law 9/2012, as noted 
above. Sareb is an entity supervised by the Banco de España (supervision is limited to compliance with the company’s sole 
purpose and its transparency and governing bodies) and subject to specific accounting rules.
47 Royal Decree 1559/2012 limits its duration to 15 years.
48 The main subscribers were Banco Santander, CaixaBank, Banco Sabadell and Banco Popular. 
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transferred to it by institutions receiving public support, i.e. the institutions which as a result of the bottom-
up exercise were classified in group 1 (now nationalised), in group 2 (those which needed State aid) and in 
group 3 (those which may need public support). The assets transferred were basically those relating to the 
real estate sector.49 Sareb had the power to create “Bank Asset Funds” structured as separate pools of assets 
lacking legal personality whose purpose was to serve as Sareb divestment instruments.
A key element in the transfer of assets was their valuation, which had to be performed by the 
Banco de España on the basis of the valuation reports of independent experts.50 Prior to transfer, 
institutions had to adjust their valuations.51 
The volume of assets initially transferred was €50,782 million,52 with an average haircut of 
around 53% on the book value. The consideration received by the institutions consisted of Sareb 
senior bonds guaranteed by the State. 
B.4 Reform of the legal framework for savings banks 
Law 26/2013 of 27 December 2013 on savings banks and banking foundations fulfilled the 
commitment given by Spain to its European partners when it requested financial assistance in July 2012.
This Law marked a radical change in the legal regime governing savings banks53 which culminated a 
regulatory process aimed at ensuring that institutions opting to remain as savings banks returned to their 
traditional characteristics (strong community and territorial ties) and professionalised their management. 
Among the measures adopted to achieve the first objective, Law 26/2013 obliged savings banks 
which exceeded certain limits, set in terms of their territorial scope or their business volume, to 
transform themselves into ordinary or banking foundations,54 foregoing their status as a credit 
49 The law established certain requirements to be met, including that the real estate development loans transferred had to 
exceed €250,000 and the foreclosures had to exceed €100,000. 
50 Taking as a reference the valuations made within the framework of the bottom-up stress test on each bank and the analysis 
of their portfolios. 
51 In no case could those adjustments be lower than the adjustments applicable in application of the Banco de España 
Accounting Circular and the royal decree-laws on real estate sector clean-up. 
52 Section 3.5.B.5 below lists this amount by institution.
53 Royal Decree-Law 11/2010, discussed in the previous chapter, was largely the predecessor of the reforms introduced by 
Law 26/2013. That royal decree-law offered savings banks the option of adopting the form of a commercial bank to 
engage in their activity as a credit institution (thus increasing their ability to raise funds) and introduced changes designed 
to improve the professionalism of their governing bodies. 
54 Transformation into a banking foundation is compulsory when the percentage of ownership of the bank to which the 
activity pursued by the savings bank was transferred is greater than or equal to 10% or allows it to appoint/dismiss any 
member of the board of directors.
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institution and having to devote themselves to their welfare projects. In addition, this Law set certain 
specific obligations for banking foundations whose percentage of ownership of a credit institution 
exceeded a certain level.55 
The measures introduced by Law 26/2013 to achieve greater professionalism of governing bodies 
and improve corporate governance included the following: (i) requirements of good repute, experience 
and good governance to be met by all directors, the majority of whom must be independent; (ii) increase 
in the number of members designated by depositors56 in the general assembly and the cessation of 
representation of non-voting equity unit holders;57 (iii) requirement for a full-time executive chairman, 
the post of which is incompatible with any other remunerated activity, and (iv) requirement for 
publication of a yearly report on directors’ remuneration complementing the report on corporate 
governance introduced by Royal Decree-Law 11/2010.
other legal changes 
There were two other significant legal changes in this period. The first was to increase the 
transparency and uniformity of institutions’ accounting policies. Banco de España Circular 6/2012 
(amending Banco de España Circular 4/2004) required institutions to disclose in their annual 
accounts information on their forborne exposures. Furthermore, it introduced precise definitions 
concerning forbearance transactions which had to be taken into account in estimating possible 
impairment in accordance with Circular 4/2004.58 
The second change (relating to credit institution solvency) was the approval, in June 2013, of 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR) of 26 June 2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) (see 
Box 4.1). This legislation, already mentioned above and to which we will return in the following 
55 Thus, whenever the percentage of ownership reaches 30%, banking foundations must draw up a management protocol 
and an annual financial plan. If the stake is 50% or more, or control is held, banking foundations have to reinforce this 
financial plan by including an investment diversification plan and setting up a reserve fund to cater for possible equity 
needs of the investee (alternatively, a plan to divest from the investee credit institution within a maximum of five years 
may be submitted). 
56 Greater than or equal to 50%.
57 This is a consequence of the new regime established by the law for non-voting equity units: savings banks which had issued 
them had to submit to the Banco de España for approval, within six months from the entry into force of the law, a specific 
plan for their redemption. After those six months elapsed, non-voting equity units ceased to be eligible as own funds. 
58 The Banco de España considered that the information disclosed by institutions in application of this circular evidenced 
differences between institutions that might be due to different business profiles, but also to differences in the accounting 
policies applied. Therefore, the Banco de España (in April 2013) decided to draft a set of criteria which institutions had 
to take into account in preparing and approving their forbearance policies and in classifying the affected transactions for 
accounting purposes. These criteria did not constitute new regulation, but rather a reference to be used by institutions in 
complying with CBE 4/2004.
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chapter, introduced into European banking law the Basel III international accords born out of the 
response of European regulators to the financial crisis.59 
The CRR, being a regulation, was directly applicable in the Member States from January 2014 
and the CRDIV, being a directive, had to be transposed into national law, with stepwise application 
over time for some of the requirements. In order to introduce the required regulatory changes into 
Spanish law, Royal Decree-Law 14/2013 of 29 November 2013 was promulgated at the end of 2013 
on urgent measures for the adaptation of Spanish law to European Union rules on the supervision 
and solvency of financial institutions.60 
3.5 SUPERVISORYACTIONSOFTHEBANCODEESPAÑA
The supervisory actions during this period are related to the main legal landmarks discussed in 
Section 3.4. 
A.  Write-down of exposures to the real estate sector 
As discussed,61 Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012 forced credit institutions to undertake 
further balance-sheet write-downs during 2012, which required recording provisions to increase 
coverage of their exposures to the construction and real estate development sector (especially as 
regards transactions relating to land and developments under construction, for which there were no 
valid benchmark prices, given market conditions). 
In April 2012 the Banco de España approved the plans submitted by institutions to meet the 
requirements of Royal Decree-Law 2/2012.62 Overall, the institutions communicated additional 
provisioning needs totalling €29,077  million and higher “capital principal” (top-quality capital) 
requirements63 amounting to €15,573 million. To these amounts must be added the extraordinary 
59 They include notably the requirement that institutions hold a higher proportion of high quality capital, the introduction 
of macroprudential elements through, inter alia, the rule that institutions have high-quality capital buffers to increase their 
resilience particularly in economic downturns, and an increased role of the requirements relating to liquidity management. 
60 This Royal Decree-Law included most notably: (i) additional measures which the Banco de España could adopt when an 
institution failed to meet solvency requirements, such as prohibiting or restricting the distribution of dividends or 
requiring the institution to cease activities that put its soundness at excessive risk, and (ii) changes in limitations on the 
variable remuneration of managers, basically to limit it to a maximum of 100% of fixed remuneration (save authorisation 
from the shareholders’ meeting or equivalent body, in which case the limit was 200%).
61 See Section 3.4.A above.
62 See press release of 17 April 2012.
63 Additional capital required by Royal Decree-Law 2/2012 to shore up the solvency of the institution faced with possible 
higher losses due to troubled assets connected to land and developments under construction. 
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write-downs of €9,192 million made at the close of 2011. Thus, the total amount required in terms 
of provisions and capital was €53,842 million. 
The plans approved by the Banco de España showed that, in most cases, the institutions had 
already met the requirements or could do so without any particular difficulty. In other cases, 
compliance with the new write-down and recapitalisation obligations was envisaged to be more 
difficult and, consequently, the Banco de España, in addition to stepping up its surveillance of these 
institutions, required additional contingency measures to ensure compliance (this was the case of 
BFA-Bankia which is discussed below).
Subsequently, in June the Banco de España approved64 the plans presented by the institutions 
to comply with the requirements of Royal Decree-Law 18/2012 for additional write-downs of 
performing (up to date in payment) transactions connected to the real estate sector. The institutions 
indicated that they had additional provisioning needs of €24,335 million resulting from this Royal 
Decree-Law. 
The banks’ total write-downs recorded in 2012, taking into account those arising from Royal 
Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012, amounted to almost €100 billion (€85,366 million were charged 
to income, €2,120 million to general provisions and €12,479 million to reserves). These write-down 
efforts gave rise to total accounting losses in the system of €43.7 billion that year. Taking stock, from 
2008 to 2012 Spanish banks’ total efforts in terms of write-downs of their credit portfolio exceeded 
€238 billion, 23% of GDP (see Table 3.1). 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Subtotal
377,271663,58175,92659,81018,32070,51Charged to income
912,02121,2771,2564,3385,7378,4Decrease in general provision
623,54974,21209,8549,3200Provisions with a balancing entry in reserves (b)
813,832669,99056,04663,64393,13349,91LATOT
TABLE 3.1 BREAKDOWN OF WRITE-DOWNS IN THE PERIOD 2008-2012 (a)
Data in €m
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Consolidated data of business in Spain.
b In order to make adjustments to the fair value of loan portfolios in integration processes, charges could be made to reserves to set aside provisions. The amounts 
set aside in provisions were higher than the charge in reserves since the latter was net of the prepaid taxes generated by the provisions.
64 However, it was pointed out to the institutions that, depending on how events unfolded and, in particular, on the outcome 
of the independent assessment of the banking sector (which had already commenced at that time and is described below), 
modifications or measures in addition to those previously submitted in the plans could be necessary. Note that the scope 
of the institution-by-institution independent evaluation exercise of the banking sector included an exhaustive review of 
the loan book i.e. of the loans extended by institutions, which was more in-depth than that relating to the real estate 
sector, since lending to households and non-financial corporations (including the financing of SMEs) was also analysed. 
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B.  Actions relating to the MoU entered into by the Spanish Government and the European 
Commission 
B.1 Stress tests and identification of capital needs65
B.1.1 Prior indePendent assessMent oF the sPanish banking systeM (aggregate exercise)
The objective of the external assessment of the Spanish banking sector, decided in May 2012 
by the Council of Ministers, was to ascertain, on an aggregate basis, the sector’s ability to withstand 
particularly adverse economic developments (this exercise was known as a top-down analysis). The 
Banco de España in coordination with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness, led 
this assessment of the banking sector, for which purpose two independent international consultants 
were hired (Roland Berger and Oliver Wyman).
14 banking groups66 representing approximately 90% of the Spanish banking system’s assets 
took part in the exercise. The analysis of the banking system’s resilience covered three years (2012-
2014) which strengthened the severity of the exercise and two macroeconomic scenarios were 
considered:
— The baseline scenario, which was more likely to happen, under which institutions were 
required to have a top-quality capital (“core capital”67) ratio of 9% by end-2014.
— The adverse scenario, based on a very severe downturn in the economy,68 with a likelihood 
of occurring of less than 1%, under which institutions had to have a top-quality (“core 
capital”) ratio of 6% by end-2014. 
The results of this stress test were published on 21 June and limited the capital needs of the 
banking system as a whole to within a range of €16 billion to €26 billion under the baseline scenario 
and within a range of €51 billion to €62 billion under the adverse scenario. 
65 These tests have already been discussed in Section 3.4.B.1 above.
66 Santander, BBVA & Unnim, Popular & Pastor, Sabadell & CAM, Bankinter, CaixaBank & Banca Cívica, Bankia-BFA, 
KutxaBank, Ibercaja & Caja3 & Liberbank, Unicaja & CEISS, Banco Mare Nostrum, Catalunya Banc, NCG Banco and 
Banco de Valencia.
67 This top-quality capital had to meet the EBA’s definition which was slightly more restrictive than the concept of “capital 
principal” (also top-quality capital required from institutions at that time and introduced by Royal Decree-Law 2/2011).
68 For example, cumulative declines of 6.5% in GDP for three years (2012-2014), an unemployment rate of 27.2%, 
additional falls of 25% in house prices and of 60% in land values were considered. 
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B.1.2 individual assessMent oF sPanish institutions 
To complement this initial exercise, within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU), in July 2012, a second institution-by-institution stress test, known as a bottom-up analysis, 
was performed. As a result of this second exercise, it was possible to determine the precise capital needs 
of each institution, which was the first step needed to implement the strategy of the reform programme 
agreed as part of the MoU. The exercise was divided into two phases. First, an exhaustive detailed 
review of the quality of credit institutions’ assets was conducted, covering, in addition to loans relating 
to the real estate sector, those extended to households and other non-financial corporations, including 
SMEs.69 Second, a bottom-up, institution-by-institution stress test was performed. 
Despite the short time available – scarcely three months – the exercise was conducted to meet the 
highest standards. It covered virtually the whole of the Spanish banking sector, was based on highly 
exhaustive information70 and was tightly controlled with the participation of Spanish authorities (the 
Banco de España, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness and the FROB) and 
international ones (the European Commission, the ECB, the EBA and the IMF), thus ensuring the 
high quality and consistency of the work performed. 
The results of the second exercise were published on 28 September 2012 and revealed that the 
needs of the banking system, as a whole, under the adverse scenario were €55.9 billion. The institution-
by-institution analysis showed that almost 90% of capital needs were concentrated in the four 
institutions which were already majority-owned by the FROB, while the core of the Spanish banking 
sector did not require additional capital or could obtain it by its own means71 (see Table 3.2).
B.2  Measures arising from the signing of the MoU with the European Commission in July 2012
In tandem with the bottom-up analysis, as explained above, in July 2012 Spain requested external 
financial assistance from the European authorities and, to this end, signed the MoU with the European 
69 The exercise was coordinated by The Boston Consulting Group and Oliver Wyman was responsible for conducting it. The 
four main audit firms in Spain were also involved (they performed an accounting review of the loans extended to the 
resident private sector in Spain and of the foreclosed assets of participating institutions, ensuring that the information was 
consistent), as well as six national and international appraisal companies.
70 The information handled in the exercise comprised:
   — The institutions’ own databases which provided detailed information on 36 million loans and 8 million collateral assets. 
   — Information generated by the work of the audit firms engaged which analysed data quality and reviewed more than 
115,000 transactions.
   — Asset valuation review for which 1.7 million automatic appraisals of houses and more than 8,000 appraisals of singular 
assets were conducted. 
   — Institutions’ business plans which were analysed in depth (they were adapted to the exercise’s scenarios using conservative 
assumptions about credit and deposit growth). 
71 See Chapter 3 of the November 2012 Financial Stability Report of the Banco de España for more details. 
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Commission,72 which set out the road map that had to be followed to complete the restructuring 
process of the Spanish financial system. Diagram 3.1 illustrates this process. 
BREAKDOWN OF CAPITAL NEEDS BY INSTITUTION 
Capital needs
(€m)Institution
347,42aiknaB-AFBGroup 1
528,01 cnaB aynulataC
671,7 aicilaG axiaC avoN
264,3 aicnelaV ed ocnaB
802,2 murtsoN eraM ocnaBGroup 2
791,1 knabrebiL
CEISS 2,062
Caja3 779
322,3ralupoP ocnaBGroup 3
Ibercaja 225
TOTAL 55,900
TABLE 3.2 STRESS TEST RESULTS
Top-Down
Analysis
Bottom-Up
Analysis
Determination of 
system-wide capital needs
Determination of capital
needs for each institution.
Furthermore, portfolio quality was
also verified
1 2
Estimated needs under
two scenarios
Baseline scenario
(€bn)
16-26
Adverse scenario
(€bn)
51-62
Overall estimated needs
amounted to (a)
26,987
55,900
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: The figures provided at year-end were €26 billion under the baseline scenario and €54 billion under the adverse scenario. They differ from the breakdown 
included here because, at that time, the merger of Ibercaja, Caja3 and Liberbank had been agreed but did not finally occur. The top-down analysis studied the 
aggregate institution and each institution individually.
a For more details, see the report of 28.9.2012 "Individual bank-by-bank results" (Banco de España website: www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/ 
resultados_inidviduales_ow28092012e.pdf).
Baseline scenario
(€m)
Adverse scenario
(€m)
72 Section 3.4.B above describes the main points of the MoU.
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Determination of capital needs of each institution
(results of bottom-up analysis)
Classification of institutions into four groups
Group 0: institutions with no capital shortfall
Group 1: institutions already nationalised (owned by the FROB)
Group 2: institutions with a shortfall which need State aid
Group 3: institutions with a shortfall which they can cover without State aid
Approval of recapitalisation, restructuring and/or
resolution plans of institutions with a shortfall
Banco de España
and European Commission
Segregation of impaired assets
(compulsory for institutions which receive public support)
Granting of public support
DIAGRAM 3.1 PROCESS OF OBTAINING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
SOURCE: Banco de España.
(compulsory for institutions which receive public support)
Burden-sharing
by shareholders and holders of preference shares and subordinated debt
"hybrid instrument burden-sharing"
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Identifying the capital needs of each credit institution allowed them to be classified into four 
different groups (see Box 3.2 and Table 3.2) based on their capital shortfalls and the strategy that had 
to be followed for their recapitalisation. 
B.3 Recapitalisation of credit institutions
The recapitalisation strategy of each institution was included in the restructuring or resolution 
plans, as appropriate, subject to approval by the Banco de España and the European Commission. 
Specifically, the situation was as follows:
— The restructuring/resolution plans of the four group 1 institutions controlled by the 
FROB (BFA-Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc and Banco de Valencia) were approved 
by the European Commission on 28 November 2012. The preceding day, these plans had 
been sent by the FROB to the Banco de España which approved them. The recapitalisation 
of these institutions, totalling €36,968  million (see Table 3.3 for a breakdown of the 
€m
State
aid
Capital
increase
Hybrid instrument
burden-sharing
Transfer to
Sareb (b)
Sale of
assets (b) Other (b)
Group 1
    BFA-Bankia Restructuring 24,743 17,959 0 6,669 191 0 0
    Catalunya Banc Resolution 10,825 9,084 0 1,676 188 0 0
    Nova Caixa Galicia Resolution 7,176 5,425 0 1,959 -276 0 0
    Banco de Valencia Resolution 3,462 4,500 0 416 208 0 63
Group 2
    Banco Mare Nostrum Restructuring 2,208 730 0 425 382 851 0
    Liberbank Restructuring 1,197 124 0 850 145 215 0
    CEISS Resolution 2,062 604 0 1,433 263 0 0
    Caja3 Restructuring 779 407 0 44 228 0 108
Group 3
71482300005,20322,3ralupoP ocnaB    
390510000522ajacrebI    
186445,1923,1274,31005,2338,83009,55LATOT
Measures to cover the shortfall (a)
Capital
needsType of planInstitution
TABLE 3.3 RESULTS BY INSTITUTION AND GROUP
SOURCES: FROB and Banco de España.
a The sum of the measures indicated in the table does not give the amount of capital needs estimated in the aforementioned bottom-up analysis. Note that following 
said analysis, compliance or resolution plans were prepared which considered different measures to cover capital needs. Subsequently, when the plans were put 
into practice, as in the case of the hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercise or the sale of assets, the outcome of the specific measure in question was different 
from that envisaged initially, thus giving rise to the above-mentioned differences.
b Reduction of capital needs due to the transfer of assets to Sareb, the sale of assets and other measures, respectively.
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amounts by institution), was completed by the FROB on 26 December 2012. The real 
estate assets were transferred to Sareb on 31 December 2012.
— On 31 October 2012 the Banco de España, based on a study of the plans submitted, 
reached the conclusion (shared by the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Competition) that the group 2 institutions Banco Mare Nostrum, Caja3 and Liberbank 
required public support within the framework of their recapitalisation processes. The 
restructuring plans of these institutions were approved on 20 December 2012. On 28 
February 2013 the assets relating to the real estate sector were transferred to Sareb and, 
finally, on 12 March 2013 a total of €1,261 million of capital support for these institutions 
was formalised. This aid was in the form of contingent convertible subordinated bonds 
(CoCos), except for the case of Banco Mare Nostrum where shares were subscribed. 
 Although Banco CEISS73 was classified in this group and had a restructuring plan, its 
performance showed that it was not viable as a stand-alone bank and, consequently, the 
Banco de España and the FROB approved its resolution plan on 19 December 2012 (the 
European Commission did so on 20 December 2012), which was completed with State 
aid of €604  million in CoCos. With the foregoing amount, State aid to group 2 
institutions stood at €1,865 million.
— As for group 3, on 31 October 2012 it was concluded that both Banco Popular and 
Ibercaja were able to cover their capital needs on their own, without resorting to public 
funds. 
Determining the amount of public support which was finally provided to the institutions was 
preceded by two important measures under the commitments assumed in the MoU. First, the balance 
sheets of the most vulnerable credit institutions were restructured in depth, for which purpose Sareb 
was created. The institutions had to transfer their troubled assets to Sareb in exchange for State-
guaranteed debt issued by the latter. Second, prior to the recapitalisation, a hybrid instrument burden-
sharing exercise was performed which meant loss-assumption by shareholders and holders of 
“participaciones preferentes” (preference shares) and subordinated debt.74 The shareholders of group 1 
73 CEISS currently forms part of the Unicaja Banco group.
74 In this respect, note that in the hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercise, which meant the assumption of losses by the 
holders of preference shares and subordinated debt, it was not permitted for these holders to bear higher losses than those 
that would have been incurred if the institution had been wound up. This framework anticipated what is currently known 
as the no-creditor-worse-off (NCWO) principle under the new Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), whereby 
no creditor can incur greater losses in resolution than those that it would incur if the institution had been wound up. 
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institutions lost the whole of their equity interest, except in the case of listed banks (Bankia and Banco 
de Valencia), in which a minimum amount was maintained. 
B.4 Hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercise
The process whereby the holders of hybrid instruments and subordinated debt received shares 
or other securities with a substantial haircut is known as hybrid instrument management. The purpose 
of this process, following the principles established in the MoU and in accordance with their hybrid 
nature, was to reduce as much as possible the final cost in terms of public funds. These exercises, as 
discussed in the previous section (see Section 3.4.B.2), could be voluntary or compulsory, although 
in fact most of them were compulsory. 
Generally, the procedure meant that, through an agreement of the governing committee of the 
FROB, the institution was compelled to repurchase preference shares and subordinated debt from 
their holders and apply haircuts to their nominal value which were calculated according to a 
methodology envisaged in the restructuring or resolution plans approved by the Banco de España and 
the European Commission. Specifically, the average haircuts applied initially were 26% on the total 
preference shares and subordinated debt issues of institutions that had received public support. 
The consideration received by the holders affected was equity instruments (shares or mandatorily 
convertible bonds). The holders of dated subordinated debt could choose the alternative of receiving 
a senior debt instrument, after the appropriate haircut, with a 2% coupon payable on maturity. The 
maturity of these instruments was similar to that of the subordinated debt. 
The breakdown of capital needs by institution in the above-mentioned groups 1, 2 and 3 and 
that of the measures estimated to cover this shortfall are included in Table 3.3 (amount in millions of 
euro).75 As can be seen in the table, the hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercise meant that, 
through the transformation of these instruments into capital and the income generated for the 
institutions participating in this process, the latter’s own funds improved by approximately 
€13.5 billion, which reduced the volume of State aid required by a similar amount.
The proportion of retail investors subject to hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercises was 
high and, as a result, the haircuts were adjusted to make them as low as possible76 and to set up a 
mechanism to give liquidity to retail investors who received as a consideration the ordinary shares of 
unlisted institutions. For this purpose, the Deposit Guarantee Scheme was empowered to acquire 
75 IMF report on the reform of the Spanish financial system (February 2014).
76 Holdings in preference shares or subordinated debt were converted, after the appropriate haircut, into instruments 
qualifying as capital which, logically, reduced the haircuts that had to be applied.
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from these investors the unlisted shares in which they were obliged to reinvest the funds received in 
the framework of the hybrid instrument management process. The funds committed by the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme amounted to €1,803 million.77 
Lastly, considering the problems in the marketing by the institutions affected of the instruments 
subject to haircuts, a hybrid capital instruments and subordinated debt monitoring committee78 was 
created which was responsible, among other functions, for determining the criteria that institutions 
owned by the FROB (Bankia, Catalunya Banc and NCG) would offer their customers for submitting 
disputes to arbitration in order to compensate them for damages, if the case were accepted for 
arbitration (see Table 3.4). This committee acted until 17 April 2015. 
B.5 Restructuring of banks’ balance sheets: transfers to Sareb
As for the segregation of impaired assets to Sareb, this company received approximately 200,000 
assets in total from credit institutions with a value of €50,782 million. The assets were transferred in 
two phases: the first phase for group 1 institutions was at the end of 2012 and the second phase for 
Bankia Catalunya Banc NCG TOTAL
Retail investors Amount (€m)  6.231 1.709 1.832 9.772
585.221509.492Customers 116.660 534.150
Requests received Amount (€m)  4.043 1.125 1.453 6.621
As % of total amount claimable 65 66 79 68
064.79139.922Customers 93.899 421.290
As % of potential claimants 78 80 80 79
Amount (€m)  2.166 463 496 3.125
As % of requests received 54 41 34 47
353.86458.171Customers 58.016 298.223
As % of claimants  75 70 62 71
TABLE 3.4 ARBITRATION RELATING TO HYBRID CAPITAL INSTRUMENTS AND SUBORDINATED DEBT
SOURCE: FROB and Banco de España.
NOTE (1): Breakdown of arbitration and its results for customers who could potentially request arbitration because they were retail investors.
NOTE (2): The data for Bankia and Catalunya Banc are included in the latest quarterly report (the eighth) of the monitoring committee dated 
March 2015. The data for NCG are included in the July 2014 report (the fifth), since this institution was sold by the FROB to Banco Etchevarría 
SA/Banesco group on 25 June 2014.
With a favourable
award
77 In this respect, the FROB granted a guarantee to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme to compensate it for the expenses arising 
from possible claims as a result of the inappropriate marketing of these instruments. The estimated amount of this 
guarantee as at 31.12.15 is €113 million (of which €66 million relate to NCG and €47 million to Catalunya Banc).
78 Monitoring committee mentioned in Section 3.4.B.2, chaired by the National Securities Markets Commission (CNMV).
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group 2 institutions was on 28 February 2013. The transferor institutions received State-guaranteed 
senior debt as a consideration for the assets transferred. The institutions had to record the related 
losses prior to this transfer. Table 3.5 shows the breakdown by institution of the amount of the assets 
transferred which were valued at the corresponding transfer price. 
The transfer price of the assets, determined by the Banco de España, was based on an estimate 
of their real economic value and downward adjustments were applied which resulted in an average 
haircut on their book value of approximately 53%. 
B.6 Other restrictions imposed on institutions which received aid
Furthermore, those institutions which received State aid (and for the duration of this support) 
were generally subject to a series of limitations in order to respect the rule of non-distortion of 
competition in accordance with the framework of State aid of the European Commission. These 
limitations included, for example, that the institutions were subject to reductions in the number of 
branches outside their traditional geographical area, could not implement expansion plans via the 
acquisition of other institutions or via the purchase of specific lines of business,79 could not use the 
fact that they received support from the FROB for commercial or advertising purposes and could not 
apply aggressive commercial policies. 
€m
latoTInstitution
Group 1
    Bankia 22,318
    Catalunya Banc 6,708
    NCG-Banco Gallego 5,707
    Banco de Valencia 1,962
Subtotal group 1 36,695
Group 2
    BMN 5,820
    CEISS 3,137
    Liberbank 2,918
    Caja3 2,212
Subtotal group 2 14,087
TOTAL 50,782
TABLE 3.5 ASSETS TRANSFERED TO SAREB
SOURCE: Banco de España.
79 Unless this was accepted by the European Commission as a change to the corresponding restructuring plan.
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B.7 Other commitments assumed in the MoU of July 2012
To comply with the commitment assumed in the MoU of reviewing its supervisory framework, 
the Banco de España expedited the analysis of its supervisory processes, which was undertaken by an 
internal committee chaired by the council member Ángel Luis López Roa. This work concluded with 
the publication on 16 October 2012 of a report entitled “Analysis of the supervisory procedures of 
the Banco de España and recommendations for their reform”,80 with proposals for improvement 
which included, most notably, the following:
— Establishment of a standardised framework for the adoption of supervisory measures 
based on the risk profile of credit institutions. 
— On-site continuous monitoring at relevant institutions. 
— Formalisation of supervisory conduct. 
— Binding microprudential supervision to macroprudential supervision. 
Regarding the formalisation of supervisory conduct, the following recommendations, 
among others, were made: 1) the delivery to the institution of a summary document after each 
on-site inspection; 2) the preparation of a regular report to the Executive Commission with the 
findings of the on-going monitoring;81 3) the statement in the written report sent to the Executive 
Commission of the Banco de España of any possible discrepancies between the inspection report 
and the proposal sent;82 and, finally, 4) the strengthening of the planning and follow-up of 
actions.
At the end of September 2013, the Banco de España approved an internal circular on the 
procedures applied by the Directorate General Banking Supervision including the proposals indicated 
in the preceding paragraphs. 
80 This report can be found on the Banco de España website: http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/
ComunicadosBCE/DecisionesPoliticaMonetaria/13/Arc/Fic/Informe_de_la_Comision_interna_en.pdf
81 Article 13 of Internal Circular 7/2011 of 26 October 2011, in force at that time, indicated that the inspection divisions 
could prepare a quarterly monitoring report. Likewise, they should update an executive summary on the situation of the 
institution at least annually and provided that there is a considerable change in the risk assessment. 
82 Article 10 of Internal Circular 7/2011 of 26 October 2011, already provided that the Director General Banking 
Supervision should inform the Executive Commission of the above-mentioned discrepancy, although it did not 
specifically state that this should be done in writing in the report sent to the Executive Commission as included in 
the recommendation.
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C.  Actions performed relating to institutions included in group 1 of the MoU
The group 1 institutions were those which received most State aid (see Table 3.3) and when the 
MoU was approved they were already publicly owned through the FROB.83 The different actions 
taken in relation to these institutions were performed on the basis of the legal framework provided 
by: Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 of 26 June 2009 on bank restructuring and strengthening of the capital 
of credit institutions; Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 of 9 July 2010 on the reform of the savings bank 
sector; Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 of 18 February 2011, on the strengthening of the solvency of credit 
institutions; Law 9/2012 of 14 November 2012 on credit institution restructuring and resolution; 
and Royal Decree Law 6/2013 on the protection of the holders of certain savings and investment 
products and other financial measures (the latter two pieces of legislation were adopted within the 
framework of the MoU).
C.1 Additional contingency measures required from BFA-Bankia84
As discussed above in respect of the macroeconomic scenario, in 2011 q4 the incipient 
downturn in the economic outlook had a strong impact on developments in the real estate market, 
to which the institution was highly exposed.
In order to strengthen the restructuring of the financial system, in February 2012 Royal Decree-
Law 2/2012 was approved, whereby in 2012 it was compulsory to provision €802 million of “capital 
principal” (top-quality capital) at BFA and €2,257 million of provisions and €872 million of “capital 
principal” at Bankia.
The plan finally submitted by the group to ensure compliance with the requirements of Royal 
Decree-Law 2/2012 included measures to conform with this precept and to normalise its financial 
situation. The Banco de España required, additionally, further measures to rationalise and strengthen 
the institution’s administration and management structures and to make it more professional, together 
with a divestment programme. 
Differences of criteria arose between the auditors and management of the group in relation to 
the accounts for the year ending 2011. In May 2012 the group published, without the auditors’ 
report, the 2011 annual accounts, which were prepared by its administrators and showed losses before 
taxes of €125 million at the BFA-Bankia group and income of €384 million at the Bankia sub-group. 
83 Table 3.6 at the end of this chapter illustrates the action taken and the aid granted.
84 Certain aspects relating to this group, such as the flotation of Bankia, gave rise to the preliminary proceedings which were 
commenced at Central Criminal Court No. 4 of the Spanish National High Court, a proceeding which is currently still 
in progress. Having regard to these circumstances, the contents of this section do not aim to assess those matters which 
are subject to investigation within the above-mentioned proceedings.
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In this situation, on 7 May 2012 the chairman of Bankia submitted his resignation. On 9 May 
the board of directors appointed a new chairman.
On 14 May 2012 the governing committee of the FROB agreed, at the request of the institution, 
to convert into capital the €4,465 million of convertible preference shares issued by BFA and acquired 
by the FROB in 2010, since it was considered unlikely that the institution would be able to redeem 
or repurchase these preference shares.
At the end of May, the new management of the BFA group restated the 2011 accounts and 
published them together with the external auditor’s unqualified report. The new accounts showed 
losses of €2,978  million at Bankia, which meant that the BFA-Bankia group reported losses of 
€3,318 million, leaving the parent BFA with negative net worth of more than €4,200 million and, 
consequently, subject to winding-up. 
On 27 June 2012, once the conversion into capital of the convertible preference shares was 
completed, which led to the reduction of BFA’s share capital to zero following the redemption of the 
shares owned by the seven savings banks that formed the group, the FROB became the sole shareholder 
of BFA (which also gave it an indirect ownership interest in Bankia of 45.54% through BFA).
During July and August 2012 various events occurred which directly and indirectly affected the BFA 
group, such as: the enactment of Royal Decree-Law 24/2012, which was subsequently repealed by Law 
9/2012 and made the granting of State aid by the FROB conditional upon: the adoption of restructuring 
or resolution measures; the conducting of a stress test by independent firms on the main credit institutions 
in the Spanish financial system; and the request for financial support by the Spanish Government, which 
entailed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the above-mentioned requirements.
On 31 August, while the stress test included in the MoU was being performed, the half-yearly 
accounts as at 30 June 2012 of BFA and Bankia were published, which showed significant losses at 
both institutions: €2,806  million of loss attributed to the group and a loss of €4,486  million at 
Bankia. On 3 September the governing committee of the FROB agreed to inject capital of 
€4,500 million into the BFA-Bankia group in order to restore its levels of regulatory capital through 
a capital increase at BFA which was subscribed by the FROB. 
This increase, which was subject to approval by the Banco de España, the non-objection of the 
Minister of Finance and Public Administration and the authorisation of the European Commission, 
was an advance payment of the capital injected later by the FROB within the framework of the MoU. 
The stress test ended on 28 September 2012 and the capital needs of the credit institutions 
analysed were published on the same day. The needs of the BFA group amounted to €13,230 million 
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under the baseline scenario and to €24,743 million under the adverse scenario. As a result of these 
figures, a restructuring plan was prepared that determined, in addition to the group’s capital needs, 
the measures to which it was committed in order to restore long-term viability, and a business plan 
covering until 31 December 2017 was drafted which included the group’s financial projections under 
a baseline macroeconomic scenario and under an adverse one.
In compliance with the provisions of Law 9/2012, since the BFA-Bankia group received public 
financial support in the terms envisaged in the above-mentioned restructuring plan, before the aid 
was granted, an economic valuation report was prepared based on the due diligence process and the 
valuations issued by three independent experts appointed by the FROB. This report estimated a 
negative value of €10,444 million for BFA and a negative value of €4,148 million for Bankia. In 
parallel, the same valuers estimated a negative value for Bankia in the case of winding-up proceedings 
of €49,635 million. BFA’s value differed depending on the value attributed to its holding in Bankia. 
If the latter was deemed to have a value of zero, BFA had a negative liquidation value of €13,267 million, 
whereas if the liquidation value calculated for Bankia was used, BFA had a negative liquidation value 
of €64,092 million.
On 27 November 2012 the Banco de España and the FROB approved the restructuring plan of 
the BFA-Bankia group and it was approved by the European Commission the day after. This plan 
envisaged the above-mentioned capital needs of €24,743 million, which would be reduced as a result 
of the transfer of assets to Sareb and the implementation of burden-sharing. It was estimated that 
Bankia, which was 48.045%-owned by the FROB through BFA, required a capital injection of 
€15,500 million. On 3 September 2012 the FROB had agreed urgently to advance public support 
amounting to €4,500 million to meet the needs revealed by the stress tests arising from the MoU. 
Subsequently, on 26 December 2012 the FROB carried out another capital increase at BFA amounting 
to €13,459  million (through a non-monetary contribution comprising securities issued by the 
European Stability Mechanism). 
Consequently, the €24,743 million of capital needs were covered with €17,959 million of State 
aid and €6,669 million from the hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercise, in addition to the effect 
of the assets sold to Sareb. €10,620 million of State aid and €4,852 million from the hybrid instrument 
burden-sharing exercise were earmarked for the capitalisation of Bankia.
On 16 April 2013 the governing committee of the FROB issued a resolution containing the 
necessary agreements for completing the recapitalisation of the BFA-Bankia group. These agreements, 
which affected Bankia, comprised a capital reduction by means of a decrease in the nominal value of 
the shares from two euro to one cent. In order to allow Bankia’s shares to continue to trade following 
the above-mentioned capital reduction, a reverse share split was also included in the proportion of 
100x1 (accordingly shareholders would be entitled to one new share of Bankia for every 100 old 
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shares) and two capital increases. The first capital increase (amounting to €10,700 million) had a 
preferential subscription right guaranteed by the FROB through its ownership interest of     100% in 
BFA and the second was for an amount of up to €5,210 million to comply with hybrid capital and 
subordinated debt instrument management exercises.85 
C.2 Catalunya Banc (2010-2014)
In May 2010, Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Caixa d’Estalvis de Tarragona and Caixa d’Estalvis 
de Manresa merged, creating a new savings bank (Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa). 
The integration plan included aid from the FROB (subscription of convertible preference shares) 
totalling €1,250 million (FROB I, see Table 2.5).
In 2011, in order to meet capital needs of €1,718 million arising from Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 
(achieving a “capital principal” – top-quality capital – ratio of 10%), the institution proposed a 
restructuring plan including fresh aid from the FROB and corporate restructuring of the group which 
involved the transfer of practically all of the assets and liabilities, except for those linked to welfare 
projects, to a newly created bank (Catalunya Banc) through which it would indirectly perform its 
financial activity. 
During June and July 2011 the new bank (Catalunya Banc) was created and the financial business 
was transferred to it. In September 2011, following the approval by the European Commission of the 
capital injection, the FROB recapitalised Catalunya Banc with €1,718 million (FROB II, see Table 
2.8) which, in light of the valuation of the bank by independent experts, gave it a holding in the 
institution of 89.79% (the remaining 10.21% remained at the savings bank resulting from the merger).
85 The events described in this section meant that investors in the flotation of Bankia lost virtually all of their investment 
based on the share price performance (considering the capital reductions and increases, and the reverse share split, etc.). 
€1,860 million were invested in the retail segment of the capital increase in July 2011. Bankia compensated its customers 
in two ways: through the payment of the amounts arising from actions brought with rulings in favour of the customer and 
through the payment of claims during the voluntary compensation process between February and May 2016. In those 
cases where there was a favourable ruling or a claim was upheld, the amount invested plus interest was returned as well as 
court fees, where applicable.
   –  In terms of legal action, as at 31 March 2017, 94,466 lawsuits had been filed overall (49.6% of the retail segment) and 
the total amount claimed was €923 million. Of the judgments handed down for an amount of €966 million only 2.1% 
were in favour of Bankia. As at 31 March 2007, €1,115 million had been paid (€738 million of principal, €96 million 
of interest, €55 million of court deposits and €226 million of legal costs, fees and expenses). 
   –  151,799 claims were received through the voluntary compensation process, of which 6,266 were rejected. The amount 
to be paid out was €710 million, €700 million were paid (€669 million of principal and €31 million of interest) and 
€10 million were pending payment. 
   –  Between the lawsuits and the compensation process, it is estimated that 79.2% of the retail segment has actively claimed 
their investment.
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In 2012, as a result of the independent assessment of the financial sector, it was estimated that 
Catalunya Banc had additional capital needs of €10,825 million (under the adverse scenario, see 
Table 3.3). On 27 December 2012, the FROB and the Banco de España approved the resolution plan 
of Catalunya Banc, as did the European Commission a day later. The independent experts estimated 
that the institution had a negative economic value of €6,674 million and a negative liquidation value 
of €17,846 million.
This plan envisaged adopting various measures: transfer of assets to Sareb; hybrid instrument 
burden-sharing exercise; division of the institution for management purposes into a core unit 
comprising the retail business in its territory of origin (Catalonia) and a legacy unit, which would 
include the other assets and liabilities for divestment purposes; the granting of fresh financial support 
by the FROB; and its sale.
Before additional assistance was granted by the FROB, in mid-December 2012, the compulsory 
sale of all Catalunya Banc’s shares, owned by the savings bank resulting from the merger, took place 
for the token price of €1. At the same time, the preference shares held by the FROB were converted 
into ordinary shares (€1,250 million) which was followed by the reduction of share capital to zero 
(the amount of the reduction was earmarked for increasing the institution’s voluntary reserves) and 
there was a fresh capital increase agreed in the same act whereby the FROB subscribed shares totalling 
€9,084 million (see Table 3.3) and became the owner of 100% of Catalunya Banc. This operation 
was part of the financial assistance programme to recapitalise the Spanish banking sector. 
Following the hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercise, since the issues were held by retail 
and wholesale investors, the DGSCI resolved to make a voluntary offer to purchase all the shares 
received by the retail investors affected as a result of the exchange arising from the hybrid instrument 
burden-sharing exercise. As a result of these liquidity arrangements offered by the DGSCI, it became 
a shareholder of Catalunya Banc. As at December 2013, the FROB held 66% of the capital and the 
DGSCI held 32.4%.
In 2014 these holdings in Catalunya Banc were divested through two competitive processes in 
order to maximise their value:
— A specific portfolio, the so-called Hercules portfolio, comprising mortgage loans of 
little marketable value, was sold beforehand to the Blackstone fund; this sale increased 
the attractiveness of the institution and its possible sale in the second phase. The 
portfolio was sold for the same amount as its book value, €4,187 million. The operation 
was structured via the creation of a securitisation special-purpose entity (SPE) whose 
assets were the above-mentioned portfolio (transferred by Catalunya Banc), and which 
issued two types of bonds: (i) senior class A bonds, to be subscribed by the investor, and 
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(ii) class B bonds, to be subscribed by the FROB and which were subordinated to the 
former. 
— 98.4% of Catalunya Banc, which was owned by the FROB and the DGSCI, was sold to 
BBVA for a price of €1,165 million. 
The purchase agreements included certain commitments of the FROB and the DGSCI, 
estimated as at December 2015 to be €561 million and €275 million, respectively (these commitments 
include €525 million of bonds subscribed in the sale of the Hercules portfolio). 
C.3 NCG Banco (2010 -2014) 
In June 2010, Caja de Ahorros de Galicia (Caixa Galicia) and Caixa de Aforros de Vigo, Ourense 
e Pontevedra (Caixanova), began a merger process which led to the creation of Caixa de Aforros de 
Galicia, Vigo, Ourense e Pontevedra (NovaCaixaGalicia). The integration plan included aid from the 
FROB (subscription of convertible preference shares) totalling €1,162 million (FROB I, see Table 2.5).
In 2011, in order to meet capital needs of €2,465  million arising from Royal Decree-Law 
2/2011 (achieving a “capital principal” – top-quality capital – ratio of 10%), the institution proposed 
a restructuring plan including fresh aid from the FROB and corporate restructuring of the group 
which involved the transfer of practically all of the assets and liabilities, except for those linked to 
welfare projects, to a newly created bank (NCG Banco) through which it would indirectly perform 
its financial activity.
On 26 September 2011 the Banco de España approved the recapitalisation plan submitted with 
the corresponding business plan that envisaged fresh aid from the FROB amounting to €2,465 million 
(FROB II, see Table 2.8). Following the approval by the European Commission of the capital 
injection, the FROB subscribed ordinary shares of NCG Banco for the above-mentioned amount, 
which in light of the valuation of the bank by independent experts, was equivalent to a holding in the 
institution of 93.16% (the remaining 10.26% remained at the savings bank resulting from the 
merger).
In 2012, as a result of the independent assessment of the financial sector, it was estimated that 
NCG Banco had additional capital needs of €7,176 million (under the adverse scenario, see Table 3.3). 
On 27 December 2012, the FROB and the Banco de España approved the resolution plan of NCG 
Banco, as did the European Commission a day later. The independent experts estimated that the 
institution had a negative economic value of €3,091  million and a negative liquidation value of 
€13,079 million. This operation was part of the financial assistance programme to recapitalise the 
Spanish banking sector.
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This plan envisaged adopting various measures: the sale of NCG Banco’s holding in Banco 
Gallego; the sale of the EVO business unit (a banking business outside its traditional area); the transfer 
of assets to Sareb; the hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercise; the restructuring of the business 
through certain divestments, the restrictions on exercising the activity and the sharp reduction in size, 
number of employees and offices; the receipt of fresh aid from the FROB; and its subsequent sale. 
Considering these measures, the volume of aid granted by the FROB amounted to €5,425 million 
(see Table 3.3). Before this capital was contributed, in December 2012 share capital was reduced to 
zero and the preference shares subscribed by the FROB in 2010 were converted, thus making the 
FROB the sole shareholder of NCG Banco at that time. 
In December 2012, the FROB sold 2.59% of NCG Banco’s share capital to private shareholders 
for €71 million. Subsequently, following the burden-sharing, the FROB’s holding stood at 62.7% 
and that of the DGSCI at 25.6%. This ownership interest of the DGSCI arose from the use of the 
liquidity mechanism that it offered to retail investors.
In 2013 a competitive process was implemented to divest the holdings of the FROB and the 
DGSCI. Additionally, in order to facilitate and ensure the effectiveness of the sale, on 17 January 
2014, the Banco de España resolved to replace the Board of Directors of NCG Banco and to appoint 
the FROB as provisional administrator. 
On 25 June 2014, after the national and international authorisations had been obtained, NCG 
Banco was sold to Banco Etcheverría,S.A./Grupo Banesco, an entity which on 18 December 2013 
made the winning bid of €1,003  million (it paid 40% in cash, the remaining 60% was paid in 
successive instalments and payment was completed in February 2017).
The purchase agreements entered into included certain commitments of the FROB and the 
DGSCI, estimated as at December 2015 to be €282 million and €115 million, respectively. 
C.4 Banco de Valencia (2011-2013)
Another notable case originating in this period was that of Banco de Valencia. On 21 November 
2011, the Banco de España resolved to replace the directors of Banco de Valencia with the FROB, at 
the request of the institution’s own board of directors, owing to its difficult solvency and liquidity 
situation and the impossibility of finding an immediate viable solution for its future.
To enable Banco de Valencia to continue to pursue its activity while an appropriate resolution 
strategy was designed and implemented, the FROB provided temporary assistance in the form of 
capital totalling €998 million (acquiring 90.89% of its shares in the process) and a credit line for 
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€2 billion. In addition, the Banco de España granted financing up to a ceiling of €6 billion in the 
form of urgent and temporary liquidity assistance.
The independent assessment of the financial sector in 2012 estimated that Banco de Valencia 
had additional capital needs totalling €3,462 million (under the adverse scenario, see Table 3.3).
On 27 November 2012, the FROB and the Banco de España approved the Resolution Plan for 
Banco de Valencia (the European Commission did so on 28 November). In their reports, independent 
experts estimated the entity to have a negative economic value of €2,244.5 million and a negative 
liquidation value of €6,340.5 million. This plan envisaged the sale of the institution.
Following a competitive process involving the participation of various institutions, and in which 
the different alternatives and costs of the ensuing scenarios were evaluated, all of the shares of Banco de 
Valencia owned by the FROB were awarded to CaixaBank. CaixaBank’s bid consisted of the injection by 
the FROB of capital totalling €4.5 billion into Banco de Valencia (in addition to the €998 million already 
committed, see Table 3.3) prior to its sale for one euro, guarantees to the purchaser for €165 million and 
an asset protection scheme (APS) covering 72.5% of the losses of a portfolio valued at €6,424 million, 
along with the transfer of assets to Sareb and burden-sharing exercises.
Once the conditions precedent envisaged in the agreement with CaixaBank were met, the sale 
was executed on 28 February 2013. On 29 July 2013, Banco de Valencia was removed from the 
Banco de España credit institutions register. The Banco de España initiated sanctioning proceedings 
in 2013 against the directors of Banco de Valencia.
D. other supervisory actions
Leaving to one side the actions arising from compliance with the MoU and the completion of 
the various restructuring/resolution processes in progress, in 2013 the following actions of the Banco 
de España are noteworthy:
— Limitations on the distribution of dividends. The Banco de España recommended 
that credit institutions limit their distribution of dividends during 2013 and that, in any 
event, cash dividends should not exceed 25% of attributable consolidated profit. This 
recommendation was maintained in 2014.86
86 However, it was included that this ceiling may, in exceptional cases, be breached as long as the institution could substantiate 
a particularly favourable outlook for its margins and a CET1 capital ratio higher, as at 1 January 2014, than 11.5%, i.e. 
3.5 pp above the CET1 level set as a benchmark for the comprehensive assessment of the European banking system which 
the ECB was going to undertake in 2014.
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The criteria developed are summarised below:
(i) Decisions shall be underpinned by an individualised 
analysis of borrowers’ income sources to determine 
their ability to repay debt to the institution and 
any other debt incurred previously (knowledge of 
borrowers’ track record). 
(ii) The conditions (e.g. interest rate, term, grace 
period) shall be based on realistic payment 
arrangements in accordance with borrowers’ 
ability to pay and the general economic situation. 
(iii) Institutions shall have sufficiently updated 
estimates of the value of the existing collateral. 
Where new collateral is provided, its effectiveness 
and value must be analysed, taking into account 
the time taken by and capacity of the institution 
to liquidate it.
(iv) The decisions adopted shall be periodically 
reviewed to substantiate their effectiveness and 
the possible existence of incidents and to assess 
changing them in view of the results obtained 
(an internal information system is needed for 
this analysis).
Loans shall be classified pursuant to the 
provisions of Annex IX of Circular 4/2004. Loans 
shall be classified as “substandard” unless there are 
objective circumstances warranting their classification 
as “standard” or “doubtful”. However, guidance is also 
provided on this classification. 
Standard: there is objective and verifiable 
evidence making it highly likely that all the amounts 
due will be recovered. The following shall be taken 
into consideration:
1 The inexistence of clauses which prevent, in the short 
term, borrowers’ actual ability to pay from being 
assessed, such as the granting of a lengthy grace period.
2 The existence of a debt repayment scheme which 
ensures adaptation to the demonstrable flow of 
borrowers’ recurring income, after deduction of that 
needed to meet any other debt incurred previously. 
In the case of loans to individuals structured through 
monthly payment instalments, the proportion of 
the monthly recurring income used for loan 
repayment may not exceed 50% of such income.
3 The addition of solvent new guarantors or of new 
effective collateral. 
Doubtful: where the weakness in borrowers’ 
ability to pay is evident. The following shall be taken 
into consideration:
1 The provision of new effective collateral or the 
collection of all outstanding interest without any 
increase in the previous exposure.
2 The granting of principal repayment grace periods 
longer than 30 months, unless the contract 
includes conditions which significantly improve 
the likelihood of collection.
3 The appropriateness of previous refinancings or 
restructurings, unless there is evidence of borrowers’ 
sufficient ability to meet their commitments as and 
when contractually required.
In general, loans or borrowers shall be reclassified 
as “standard” if commitments have been met for a 
minimum of one year from the date the refinancing or 
restructuring was entered into (six months for loans with 
monthly instalments and mortgages on borrowers’ 
principal residence), or when the loan principal has been 
reduced by at least 10%.
box 3.3 CRITERIA oN REFINANCINg AND RESTRUCTURINg
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— Review of forbone loans. As described in the section on the regulatory framework, in 
April 2013 the Banco de España developed a set of criteria that institutions had to take 
into account in formulating and approving loan forbearance policies and in the accounting 
classification of the transactions involved (see Box 3.3). The Banco de España had 
observed differences in the criteria used by the various institutions which needed to be 
standardised. 
 After the institutions were notified of these standardised criteria, they were encouraged 
to review, through an individualised study of their forborne loans, that the latter were 
properly identified, suitably classified for accounting purposes and that their provisioning 
was estimated adequately. The Banco de España’s inspection teams verified this process 
by identifying these loans in the databases used by the institutions as well as their 
characteristics and accounting classification. This review was supplemented with detailed 
analyses of borrowers through specific samples and also through the databases used by 
the institutions. 
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TABLE 3.6 SUMMARY OF THE AID GRANTED UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2013
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In addition to the foregoing, when Banco de Valencia was placed under official administration by the Banco de España in November 2011
and was subsequently awarded by the FROB to CaixaBank, the following aid was granted:
Nova Caixa Galicia Banco held 99% of Banco Gallego's capital stock, following the subscription of a capital increase.
In April 2013 Banco Gallego was auctioned and awarded to Banco Sabadell.
Ibercaja
Ontinyent
Original savings
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Aid
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(a)
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TABLE 3.6 SUMMARY OF THE AID GRANTED UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2013 (cont’d)
SOURCES: FROB, DGS and Banco de España.
NOTES:
1  The amount of the asset protection schemes (APSs) relates to their estimated value as at December 2013 (amounts audited by independent experts).
2  Furthermore, as part of the bank divestment process, the FROB granted other guarantees to buyer institutions. The aim of these guarantees, which is habitual in 
this type of operation, is to limit the liability of the new purchaser to specific, previously identified contingencies. These contingencies are varied in nature, the most 
significant being the coverage of future claims for mis-selling of hybrid instruments and errors arising in transfers to Sareb, among others. As at December 2013, 
guarantees had been granted for the following amounts:
    – CEISS: €429 million.
    – Banco de Valencia: €165 million.
    – Banco Gallego: €95 million.
a Aid granted in accordance with Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 (FROB I) through subscription of preference shares.
b Aid granted in accordance with Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 (FROB II) through subscription of shares.
c Contributions made in the framework of the financial assistance programme subsequent to Law 9/2012.
d Contingent convertible bonds.
e Amount as at 31 December 2013, unless otherwise indicated.
f In addition to this amount, the DGSCI paid €1,803 million (€1,001 million at Catalunya Banc and €802 million at NCG Banco). In 2013 the DGSCI resolved to make 
a voluntary offer to purchase the shares of the retail investors affected by the hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercise who had become shareholders after the 
hybrid instrument exchange performed by Catalunya Banc and NCG Banco (see Section 3.5.B.4 of this chapter).
g The sum of these amounts (37,943 + 1,135 = 39,078), minus the amount contributed to Banco Gallego (39,078 – 245 = 38,833), is the State aid shown in Table 3.3.
CoCos (d)
1,135 (g)
4 NORMALISATION OF THE SITuATION 
AND STRENGTHENING OF THE SYSTEM IN 2014
4.1 MACROECONOMICENVIRONMENT
A.  International economy
In 2014 the world economy still failed to show signs of improvement in activity, against a 
background in which the emerging economies continued on a slowing path and the advanced 
economies exhibited a certain degree of sluggishness in the central months of the year (see Chart 4.1). 
Overall, world GDP grew by 3.4% (1.9% in the advanced economies and 4.6% in the emerging and 
developing economies).
The lack of dynamism of the global economy was particularly noticeable in the euro area. In 
contrast with the relatively positive outlook at the beginning of the year, the growth of activity in the 
central months of the year was very slow, affecting the major euro area economies except Spain, which, as 
noted below, showed significant growth. Overall, euro area GDP grew by 1.2% in 2014. Inflation rates 
remained clearly below the ECB’s medium-term inflation target throughout the year and were even 
negative at the end of the year as a result of the sharp fall in oil prices in the second half of the year.
CHART 4.1 GDP GROWTH AND POLICY INTEREST RATES
SOURCES: IMF and Banco de España.
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In June 2014 the Governing Council of the ECB, in view of the risks to meeting its price target, 
adopted an extensive package of measures, which was supplemented by various additional measures 
in September and early 2015 (see Chart 4.2): key interest rates were cut on two occasions, leaving the 
interest rate on the main refinancing operations at 0.05% and that on the deposit facility in negative 
territory at –0.2%; a new targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) programme was 
adopted with the aim of stimulating lending to the private sector by participating institutions; the 
Governing Council of the ECB confirmed its forward guidance that key interest rates would remain 
at low levels for an extended period of time; and a new asset purchase programme was undertaken 
(initially, secured bank bonds, which include Spanish covered bonds and asset-backed securities) to 
make the monetary policy stance more expansionary. 
This asset purchase programme was extended in early 2015 through the inclusion of a commitment 
by the ECB to purchase government debt securities. The highly expansionary monetary policy stance 
of the euro area contrasted with the first steps in the opposite direction by some central banks, such as 
the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, prompting a depreciation of the euro in the second 
half of 2014.
These developments were accompanied by significant progress in the institutional design of the 
euro area which significantly reversed the process of financial fragmentation between the euro area 
countries. In November 2014 the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the initial and key step in the 
sequence leading to the Banking Union, formally came into operation when the ECB took on the 
supervision of 130 institutions representing 82% of euro area banking assets. Previously the ECB, aided 
CHART 4.2 EUROSYSTEM MONETARY POLICY
SOURCE: ECB.
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by national authorities, conducted a comprehensive assessment exercise to analyse in detail banks’ asset 
portfolios and their resilience to an adverse scenario. The results of this exercise were published in 
October, as described in Section 4.4 of this report. Also, throughout 2014 the first steps were taken 
to set up the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which was to come into operation in early 2015 
and supplement the SSM, enabling the supervision and management of the insolvency of credit 
institutions independently of their geographical location.
B. Performance of the Spanish economy 
2014 confirmed the Spanish economy’s return to positive GDP and employment growth at 
rates even exceeding those of the euro area. In the year as a whole, the Spanish GDP growth of 1.4% 
contrasted with the fall of 1.7% in the previous year. 2014 was the first year of significant growth in 
activity since the outbreak of the crisis in 2008. At the end of the year, the year-on-year growth rate 
was 2.2% and it continued to rise in 2015 (see Chart 4.3).
In addition to the increase in exports (up 4% in 2014 as a whole) since 2010, there was notable 
growth in domestic demand, the rate of which at 1.9% was 5 pp more than in the previous year. This 
fuelled imports (6.5%) and, as a result, the contribution of the external sector, which had been 
positive in the previous six years, turned slightly negative in 2014 (–0.5 pp). Also contributing to this 
was the scant dynamism of the world economy mentioned above. 
The more expansionary monetary policy stance of the Eurosystem, its improved feed-through 
to the euro area as a whole and the latter’s progress towards a single banking market, together with 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE, European Commission and Banco de España.
CHART 4.3 GDP AND INFLATION IN SPAIN AND THE EURO AREA
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Spain’s progressive economic recovery, were propitious to a notable improvement in the confidence 
and financing conditions of the various national agents. 
Ten-year government debt yields decreased rapidly to historically low levels below 2% in 
December (down 2.4 pp from 12 months earlier) and the spread over the German Bund narrowed by 
more than 1 pp, returning to the values recorded in the first phase of the crisis at the beginning of 
2009 before the outbreak of tensions on the euro area sovereign debt markets. Other resident agents 
also benefited from the favourable trend in financing conditions, and the financial markets reopened 
for a growing number of institutions. In particular, credit institutions, which in general comfortably 
passed the ECB’s pre-SSM assessment, enjoyed a notable decrease in their funding costs, both in the 
securities markets and in customer deposits. This allowed a certain relaxation in bank lending 
standards in Spain for the first time since the beginning of 2010 according to the Bank Lending 
Survey, and a decrease in the cost of credit, particularly notable in loans below €1 million, which 
account for most of those to SMEs, so their effect was particularly significant for the recovery of the 
Spanish economy (see Chart 4.4).
In the fiscal arena, the year ended with a total general government deficit of 6% of GDP, 1 pp 
less than in the previous year and in line with the targets set by the European Commission for the 
third year running, prompting a recovery in confidence in sustainable Spanish public finances. 
Moreover, this growth was compatible with less contractionary fiscal policy behaviour, reflected in 
the practically unchanged cyclically-adjusted balance. This represented a notable change with respect 
to the pattern of the previous four years, in which this adjusted balance decreased by more than 7 pp 
in cumulative terms and therefore contributed to fuelling economic growth in Spain. As a result of all 
this, government debt rose further to slightly above 100% of GDP (100.4%) (see Chart 4.5).
The concurrence of these favourable stimuli, to which in the second half of the year was added 
the positive effect on household real income resulting from the sharp fall in oil prices, prompted, as 
noted above, a significant recovery in domestic demand. Specifically, there was initially a very 
significant rise in investment in capital goods, which was followed by an increase in private 
consumption, the growth rates of these two aggregates being 8% and 1.6%, respectively, in 2014. 
Investment in housing also grew notably at 6% in the year, marking the end of a period of somewhat 
more than six years of uninterrupted correction during which this component of national expenditure 
had fallen to less than half. Only government consumption and investment in other construction (the 
latter affected by the fall-off in government investment) continued to post negative rates of change. 
In a setting of moderate wage behaviour, the recovery of activity was also vigorous in employment, 
which grew by nearly the same amount as did GDP itself, equivalent to 381,000 full-time employees, 
reducing the unemployment rate by 2 pp in the year and thus helping to make the upturn more 
sustainable (see Chart 4.6). 
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In contrast to what happened in 2010-2011, this time the correction of the imbalances 
accumulated in the run-up to the crisis was more complete. At the beginning of 2014, more than 
70% of the loss of competitiveness recorded in the initial years of the euro area had been corrected, 
inflation was 0.6 pp below the euro area average and the net lending of the nation had turned positive 
again in 2013, standing at 2.1% of GDP. 
Household and corporate debt had decreased by 24 pp of GDP from the high of 2010. The real 
estate market adjustment had left the weight of residential investment at 4.1% of GDP, down 8 pp 
from the previous high and clearly below its historical average. And confidence in the banking sector 
clean-up was boosted by the good results of Spanish banks in the aforementioned pre-SSM 
comprehensive assessment in November. Also, as noted above, the situation of public finances had 
improved, although both the budget deficit and government debt remained high. The improvement 
was, however, less appreciable in unemployment, with a rate still at 23.7% of the labour force in the 
fourth quarter of the year, and in the international investment position, which was then a negative 
net IIP equivalent to 97.5% of GDP (see Chart 4.7). 
Against this background, the financing conditions of the Spanish economy in 2014 improved 
appreciably. The growth in lending to the resident private sector remained negative in the year as a 
whole, given the sector’s process of deleveraging, but the rate of change rose from –7.2% in December 
2013 to –4.8% in the same month of 2014. Residential market prices rose by 1.8% in the year (the 
first increase since 2007), purchases/sales were more dynamic, increasing by 21%, and housing starts 
were steady after seven years of declines (see Chart 4.8).
CHART 4.5 FISCAL POLICY IN SPAIN
SOURCES: IGAE and Banco de España.
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
 CYCLICALLY-ADJUSTED BALANCE NET OF AID TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
 BALANCE NET OF AID TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
 TOTAL BALANCE
% of GDP
1  SPANISH GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
% of GDP
2  SPANISH GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT
207RepoRt on the financial and banking cRisis in spain, 2008-2014
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
CHART 4.6 GDP, EMPLOYMENT AND PRICES IN SPAIN
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CHART 4.7 BUILD-UP OF IMBALANCES IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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4.2 FINANCIALSECTOR
In 2014 the solvency and profitability of credit institutions improved notably with respect to 
the moments of highest uncertainty in previous periods, thanks to the recapitalisation, restructuring 
and resolution of institutions in distress, the stabilisation of international financial markets and the 
gradual recovery of activity in Spain. This recovery, combined with the consequent improvement in 
employment and the continuing low rates of interest, was propitious to a favourable trend in non-
performing assets which in turn affected institutions’ balance sheets positively. 
A. Credit to the resident private sector and investment in government debt 
The deleveraging of the Spanish economy continued throughout 2014. Against this background, 
the volume of outstanding credit granted by Spanish deposit institutions to the resident private sector 
decreased by 4.4% year-on-year, the decline being greater for non-financial corporations than for 
households and, within the former, particularly pronounced in the construction and real estate 
activities sector (15.6%). 
Compared with the pre-crisis levels (December 2007), the stock of credit in December 2014 
had decreased by nearly €400 billion, or 22.9%. In these seven years, the most notable decline was in 
credit to non-financial corporations (36.8%), while credit to households fell less (13%). Within non-
financial corporations, the fall was much sharper in the construction and real estate activities sector 
(56.1%) than in other sectors (16.3%). Charts 4.9 and 4.10 show the behaviour of credit in the 
period under analysis, including 2015 when the trend held on its downward path. 
CHART 4.9  CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
IN SPAIN, IN ABSOLUTE TERMS AND AS PERCENTAGE
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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A.1. Non-performing loans (NPLs)
2014 was the first year in which the volume of deposit institutions’ NPLs decreased, after reaching 
an all-time high in 2013. In particular, non-performing assets decreased by more than €24 billion in the 
year, or 12.7%. Again, the fall was more marked in NPLs to non-financial corporations (14.3%) than in 
those to households (5.3%). The decrease in the NPLs of the construction and real estate activities sector 
came close to 20% in 2014. Despite these decreases, the total volume of non-performing assets continued 
to be well above the pre-crisis level (see Chart 4.11). 
As a result of these decreases in the volume of non-performing assets, the NPL ratio for credit to 
the resident private sector decreased by 1.2 pp to stand at 12.8% at the end of 2014 (see Chart 4.12). The 
decline was across the board both for households and for non-financial corporations and, despite the 
larger fall in the latter, their NPL ratio (21.6%) stood above that for household credit (6.6%). Despite the 
decreases, it should be noted that the NPL ratio remained at higher levels than those before the crisis 
(which, as described in Chapter 1, were below 1%).
The NPL coverage ratio held at levels similar to those of the previous year, reaching 46.4% in 
December 2014, 10 pp above the pre-crisis level of December 2007. Charts 4.12 and 4.13 show the 
NPL and coverage ratios from 2000 to 2015, this latter year being that in which NPLs improved 
more briskly to stand at around 10%. 
B. Government debt 
As illustrated in Chart 4.14, government debt holdings by credit institutions continued to increase, 
reaching a high of €270 billion in 2014 (10.2% of institutions’ total assets), well above the €79 billion at 
the end of 2007 (2.8% of institutions’ total assets). The upward trend changed in 2015, when the weight 
of government debt in institutions’ balance sheets decreased by around 0.87 pp (€32 billion, of which 
80% were held by the former savings banks). Contributing to this was, among other factors, the 
commencement of the ECB’s secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme in the opening 
months of the year. 
C. Customer deposits 
Deposits decreased by 1.9% in 2014 with respect to the previous year. This fall was mainly due to the 
decline in deposits from central banks (16.3%) and not so much to deposits from the private sector (0.6%).1 
1 The LTD ratio continued to decrease for deposit institutions as a whole and at 31 December 2014 stood at 109% (109% 
in commercial banks and 112% in savings banks). This trend continued in 2015 (106%). 
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The total deposits on the balance sheet of institutions in December 2014 stood practically at the 
pre-crisis level. Chart 4.15 shows the course of this variable, including 2015 when its behaviour was 
similar to that in 2014, with slight declines. 
D. Profitability 
The onset of recovery and the stabilisation of the Spanish financial system brought an 
improvement in institutions’ profitability both at the consolidated level and at the level of business 
in Spain. The aforementioned decrease in non-performing assets reduced the impact of loan loss 
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CHART 4.14 SPANISH GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT SECURITIES
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provisions on the income statement of institutions. Thus, at overall consolidated level, the return 
on equity (ROE) rose to 6.6% in 2014 (up 1.4 pp on 2013), although it was still far from the 
pre-crisis level (near 20% in December 2007). Meanwhile, the return on assets (ROA) recovered 
more strongly, reaching 0.44% in December 2014 (up 13 bp on the previous year) (see Charts 
4.16 and 4.17).
E. Solvency 
The aforementioned advances and improvements helped to strengthen the solvency position 
of deposit institutions as a whole. Their total capital and Tier 1 capital levels increased by 11.2% 
and 8.3%, respectively, from the previous year. Risk-weighted assets also increased with respect to 
2013, so the Tier 1 capital ratio held steady at 11.8%, although the total capital ratio increased 
by nearly 0.4 pp to 13.6% in December 2014. With respect to the solvency position in December 
2007, the Spanish banking system’s ratios improved significantly, as the total capital and Tier 1 
capital ratios increased by 3 pp and 4 pp, respectively. The improvement in capital ratios continued 
in 2015 owing to an increase in own funds and the stabilisation of risk-weighted assets (see Charts 
4.18 and 4.19).
4.3 REGULATORYFRAMEWORK
In June 2012, the European governments agreed to advance towards the establishment of a 
banking union capable of re-establishing confidence in the soundness of the banking system, 
-1.5
-1.2
-0.9
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.5
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
 ROE  ROA (right-hand scale)
CHART 4.16  RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE) AND RETURN
ON ASSETS (ROA)
As percentage. Consolidated data
SOURCE: Banco de España.
CHART 4.17  MAIN INCOME STATEMENT ITEMS AS
A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE TOTAL ASSETS
Consolidated data
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
 NET INTEREST INCOME  FEES AND COMMISSIONS
 OPERATING EXPENSES  PROVISIONING EXPENSES
%
SOURCE: Banco de España.
214 banco de españa
eliminating market fragmentation and restoring the monetary policy transmission channels. The 
so-called Van Rompuy Report (or “Four Presidents’ Report”)2 proposed a road map for the creation 
of a banking union and for closer fiscal coordination between countries. The design of an integrated 
financial framework3 (one of the four essential components defined in this report) had three broad 
objectives: (i) sever the link between sovereign risk and banking risk;4 (ii) limit the effects of an 
institution’s bankruptcy on the national public finances, ensuring that the loss is borne firstly by its 
creditors, and (iii) stimulate the granting of credit in Europe. 
2 The presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank. See 
H. Van Rompuy (2012), Towards a genuine economic and monetary union. Subsequently, in June 2015, the five presidents 
(of the European Commission, the Euro Summit, the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank and the European Parliament) 
made public an ambitious plan to press ahead with Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) from 1 July 2015 and complete 
it by 2025 at the latest. 
3 The report proposes a vision for European and Monetary Union based on four pillars: (i) an integrated financial framework 
which ensures financial stability, (ii) an integrated budgetary framework with a budgetary policy at national and European 
level which combines coordination and joint decision-making, (iii) an integrated economic policy framework which fosters 
sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness, and (iv) assurance of the required democratic legitimacy and 
responsibility of decision-making in the Economic and Monetary Union. 
4 The crisis made it plain that the ability of banks to raise funds was strongly linked to the perception of the sovereign risk 
of the bank’s country of origin, which tended to further fragment the market. In addition, the assessment of the sovereign 
risk of each country was in turn strongly dependent on the perception of the health of the banks established in it, since it 
seemed to be understood that if these ran into difficulties, the Government of the country concerned would have to bail 
them out. This led to a vicious circle difficult to break and sustained by a feedback loop. The intention was to do away with 
the maxim that banks are European when they live and national when they die.
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The banking union project has three essential pillars: a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 
a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme.5 The foundation 
on which all this rests is a single legal framework known as the “single rulebook”. 
A. Single legal framework (single rulebook)
The aim of the single rulebook is to preserve the single financial services market and limit 
discretionality in its national application. It has three main features:
i) The implementation of European solvency rules, which transpose the Basel III Accord 
to European legislation in the form of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (capital 
requirements regulation – CRR), directly applicable in the Member States, and Directive 
2013/36/EU (capital requirements directive IV – CRD IV), which has to be transposed 
to national law by the Member States. The main elements of these rules, which notably 
strengthen the capital framework of financial institutions so as to limit their likelihood 
of bankruptcy, are set out in Box 4.1.
ii) European rules on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment 
firms, set out in Directive 2014/59/EU (bank recovery and resolution directive – BRRD), 
aimed at reducing the public cost of bank crises and facilitating the orderly resolution of 
non-viable institutions (see Box 4.2).
iii) Technical standards and guidelines prepared by the European banking authority (EBA), 
which supplement the aforementioned European rules (see Box 4.3).
B. Single Supervisory Mechanism
In October 2013, the European Council approved Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (SSM 
Regulation) assigning to the ECB specific tasks in the prudential supervision of credit institutions of 
the participating Member States. 
The SSM came into operation on 4 November 2014 with the objectives of ensuring an 
appropriate supervision and soundness of the European banking system and contributing to financial 
stability and integration in the euro area. It is structured as an integrated system led by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and in which the national competent authorities (NCAs) participate in the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions. 
5 Currently the SSM and the SRM are functioning, but not the Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme, the structure of which 
is being discussed in the European framework.
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— They increase and improve the quality of capital 
ratios by requiring institutions to hold a greater 
proportion of high quality capital. They introduce 
the concept of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), 
consisting of capital elements of the highest 
quality, which must be 4.5% of risk-weighted 
assets (RWAs). Furthermore, the minimum level 
of Tier 1 capital1 required is 6% of RWAs.
— Introduction of macroprudential elements whereby, 
among other things, institutions are required to 
hold buffers of top-quality capital (measured 
in terms of CET1) which heighten their resilience. 
Non-compliance with these buffer requirements 
automatically triggers restrictions on the distribution 
of dividends and on the variable remuneration of the 
staff of the institution (which has to submit a capital 
plan for returning to compliance).
— Introduction of a new supervisory tool in the form 
of the leverage ratio. This ratio relates the capital 
held by an institution to its total volume of assets. 
Since the ratio is linked to bank size, rather than 
directly to the level of risk assumed, it partially 
box 4.1 MAIN FEATURES oF EURoPEAN SoLVENCY RULES (CRR AND CRD IV)
1 Tier 1 capital consists of top-quality capital (CET1) and 
additional elements (hybrid instruments, such as some 
preference shares). In essence, Tier 1 capital comprises 
instruments able to absorb losses on a going-concern basis 
(compared with Tier 2 elements which absorb losses when 
the entity is not viable).
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box 4.1 MAIN FEATURES oF EURoPEAN SoLVENCY RULES (CRR AND CRD IV) (cont’d)
complements the solvency ratio, a concept linked 
to the risk assumed by the institution.
— Tightening of liquidity management 
requirements. Introduction of short-term and 
long-term liquidity requirements denoted “liquidity 
coverage ratio” and “net stable funding ratio”, 
respectively. The first requires an institution to have 
sufficient high-quality liquid assets for its short-
term (one month) fund outflows. The second seeks 
to ensure an appropriate funding structure, such 
that longer-term assets are funded by long-term 
sources. 
— Greater role of elements relating to institutions’ 
corporate governance (through a requirement that 
committees prioritise independent decision-
making and ensure better risk-taking) and to their 
remuneration policy (by requiring a remuneration 
policy in keeping with the risks taken).
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box 4.2 MAIN FEATURES oF EURoPEAN RULES oN RESoLUTIoN (bRRD)
The BRRD establishes a harmonised European 
resolution framework the main aims of which are to 
ensure financial system stability, reduce to a minimum 
the cost of bank crises for the taxpayer and assure the 
continuity of institutions’ critical functions. This 
framework is structured in three phases:
— Pre-crisis or preventive phase, in which institutions 
and authorities plan how to address a critical 
situation or a potential resolution. This phase 
includes most notably the following:
 i)   Preparation of recovery plans by institutions 
defining the measures they would adopt to re-
establish their financial position in a crisis. 
 ii)   Design of resolution plans by resolution 
authorities establishing the road map to be 
followed for the resolution of an institution, if 
necessary. As an integral part of these plans, the 
resolution authority carries out two important 
tasks: resolvability analysis (aimed at identifying 
and remedying, where applicable, potential 
obstacles to rapidly executing a potential 
resolution) and the determination of the 
minimum requirement for own funds and 
eligible liabilities (MREL) to be held by 
institutions to ensure loss absorbency and, 
where applicable, recapitalisation.
— Early intervention phase, in which the supervisor 
assumes additional powers supplementing the 
other supervisory measures at its disposal to 
intervene in institutions when these show signs of 
weakness but are still viable.
— Resolution phase, in which it is decided how to 
manage an institution that has reached the point 
of non-viability. Once this point has been reached 
and once private alternatives or other supervisory 
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box 4.2 MAIN FEATURES oF EURoPEAN RULES oN RESoLUTIoN (bRRD) (cont’d)
measures able to prevent this non-viability have 
been ruled out, the resolution authority assesses 
whether it is in the public interest to apply 
resolution tools (otherwise the institution has to 
be wound up by ordinary insolvency proceedings). 
— Additionally, the BRRD defines a wide range of 
resolution tools available to the resolution authority, 
such as sale of the business, transfer of assets or 
liabilities to a bridge institution or to an asset 
management company, and internal recapitalisation 
(bail-in). This latter tool extends to the bank’s 
creditors the obligation to absorb losses (together 
with shareholders) and is a keystone of the 
resolution framework. A golden rule in applying 
this measure is to take into account the no creditor 
worse off principle, i.e. that no creditor will incur 
greater losses than would have been incurred if the 
institution had been wound up under normal 
insolvency proceedings. 
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box 4.3 EURoPEAN CoMMITTEE RULES
From the regulatory standpoint, the EBA was not 
particularly affected by the entry into operation of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism in November 2014. In 
fact its regulatory role gained strength from the 
approval of new EU legislation containing EBA 
mandates for the technical development of certain 
matters. Thus the bank recovery and resolution 
directive, the deposit guarantee systems directive, the 
mortgage market directive and the payment systems 
directive entrust the EBA to draft both technical 
standards and implementation guidelines.
The EBA’s work on technical standards included 
two important areas requiring attention: the 
validation of internal risk models and the development 
of the resolution directive.
— Model validation 
 The reason for this work is that appreciable 
disparities had been detected in the calculation of 
risk weighted assets by credit institutions through 
their internal models (credit risk and market 
models), leading to a lack of market confidence 
in their reliability and to potential problems of 
competitive equality among European 
institutions. As a result, in this period the 
technical standards and the work envisaged in the 
CRDIV on comparability exercises were finalised 
and the internal model assessment methodology 
standards (finally published in June 2016) were 
developed.
— Resolution of institutions 
 The entry into force in 2014 of the bank recovery 
and resolution directive (BRRD) marked for the 
EBA the initiation of the development of the 
various technical standards mandated by the 
directive, which were largely completed in this 
period. Noteworthy are the implementing 
standards on contents and assessment of bank 
box 4.3 EURoPEAN CoMMITTEE RULES (cont’d)
recovery plans and the standard on criteria 
relating to the method for setting the minimum 
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities 
(MREL). The EBA standard seeks to harmonise 
assessment by the authorities.
The most noteworthy guidelines are described 
below:
— Guidelines on the security of Internet payments 
(EBA/GL/2014/12).
 Prepared as the implementation of the payment 
services directive, they set minimum requirements 
on the security of Internet payments which are 
obligatory for payment services providers and must 
be evaluated by supervisory authorities.
— Guidelines on common procedures and 
methodologies for the supervisory review and 
evaluation process (EBA/GL/2014/13).
 These guidelines, which specify the common 
procedures and methodologies for the supervisory 
review and evaluation process, are applicable to 
all supervisory authorities, including the SSM. 
— Guidelines on product oversight and governance 
arrangements for retail banking products (EBA/
GL/2015/18).
 These guidelines fall within the function of 
consumer protection entrusted to the EBA which 
has been increasing in importance in recent years. 
The centralisation of the data reported by 
institutions through the FINREP and COREP 
templates was achieved in 2014 upon the completion 
of the common reporting templates whose preparation 
was initiated by the CEBS in 2004. This represented 
an enormous improvement in the level of information 
on bank operations available to supervisors, with the 
consequent increase in their ability to analyse the true 
health of banks.
In 2015 the EBA started to adapt the FINREP 
templates to the new IFRS 9 accounting standard.
Finally, the strengthening of market discipline was 
another of the priorities addressed in this two-year 
period through the consolidation of the transparency 
exercises initiated in 2013 as a tool intended to 
complement stress tests.
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As a preparatory step to the start-up of the SSM, the ECB, in collaboration with the NCAs, 
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the main banking groups in the euro area. This exercise, 
which included a detailed review of the assets on bank balance sheets and a stress test, aimed to make 
the position of European banks more transparent and identify the actions which might be needed to 
strengthen their solvency. The details of this exercise are included in the following section. 
The SSM Regulation defines the role of the ECB. In accordance with this regulation, the banks 
of the countries participating in the SSM are divided into two groups: significant and less significant. 
Classification of an institution as significant is based on criteria of size (whether the value of its assets 
exceeds €30 billion), economic importance (whether its assets exceed 20% of national GDP, unless its 
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assets are below €5 billion), level of cross-border activity, whether it receives direct assistance from the 
European Stability Mechanism and, finally, whether it is one of the three main credit institutions of 
the country in question. Institutions’ classifications are reviewed at least annually.The ECB directly 
supervises the former and indirectly supervises the latter,6 the national supervisors being entrusted with 
their direct supervision. Furthermore, the ECB, in cooperation with the NCAs, has powers in respect 
of the so-called “common procedures” applying to significant and less significant banks, which basically 
include the granting or withdrawal of banking licences and the authorisation of qualifying holdings. 
Although the start-up of the SSM meant that the ECB became responsible for supervisory 
decisions regarding significant banks, the Banco de España and the other national authorities 
participate in the decision-making process through their representation on the SSM’s Supervisory 
Board and, ultimately, on the ECB’s Governing Council (see Diagram 4.1). 
Additionally, from a practical standpoint, the national authorities play an essential role in the 
supervision of significant banks in two ways: continuous monitoring and on-site inspections. 
Continuous supervision is carried out by joint supervisory teams (JSTs) consisting of ECB and NCA 
professionals who are responsible for day-to-day supervisory activity at significant banks. On-site 
inspection is carried out through specific on-site inspection visits by ECB and NCA professionals 
(generally different from those forming the JSTs, although one or two of their members may participate). 
As regards less significant banks, the Banco de España continues to be responsible for their 
direct surveillance. The ECB, in cooperation with the Banco de España and the other NCAs, works 
to ensure the uniform and consistent application of supervisory practices to these banks. 
Lastly, the Banco de España continues to have supervisory powers in the areas of prevention of 
money laundering, bank customer protection and the supervision of banking foundations and other 
non-bank financial institutions.
C Single Resolution Mechanism 
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is the second pillar of the Banking Union and has a 
dual objective: (i) to centralise resolution decision-making7 through a Single Resolution Board (SRB) 
and (ii) to ensure consistent resolution financing practices through a Single Resolution Fund (SRF). 
6 In this respect, the ECB monitors the supervision of less significant banks by the NCAs and may decide to supervise directly any 
bank of the Member States participating in the SSM in order to ensure that supervisory rules are applied consistently.
7 The SRM complements the SSM in that it meets the need to prevent Member States from separately adopting potentially 
contradictory decisions for the resolution of banking groups which may affect the overall costs of resolution. It did not seem 
reasonable to have, on the one hand, a supranational body directly supervising significant banks and, on the other, national 
resolution authorities taking measures which might not be compatible with a Europe-wide perspective.
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SOURCE: ECB. Redesigned by Banco de España.
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The SRM is governed by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of 15 July 2014. The SRM, fully 
operational since 1 January 2016, is also structured as an integrated system led by the SRB, of which 
the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States form part. The scope of 
Regulation 806/2014 is linked to that of the SSM Regulation. 
Thus the SRB is responsible for adopting all resolution decisions for banks directly supervised 
by the ECB, for other cross-border groups of less significant institutions and for any other less 
significant institution in which it has been decided to use the SRF.8 
In Spain, the institutional framework for resolution purposes (stipulated in Law 11/2015 of 18 
July 2015 which transposes the resolution directive, i.e. the BRRD, into Spanish law) distinguishes 
between preventive resolution functions, which in the case of credit institutions are entrusted to the 
Banco de España9 (which carries them out separately from its supervisory functions) and executive 
resolution functions, which are assigned to the FROB.10 
The SRF is a supranational fund financed by bank contributions. It is envisaged that in eight years’ 
time it will hold a volume of funds equal to at least 1% of the covered deposits of credit institutions 
authorised in the Member States of the Banking Union (estimated amount of approximately €55 billion).
D. key Spanish legislation in this period 
Box 4.4 sets out the regulatory provisions in Spanish law derived from the aforementioned 
European legislation and from the new framework of supervisory powers in place following the start-
up of the SSM and the SRM.
European solvency legislation and the new supervisory power allocation under the SSM are set 
forth in Law 10/2014 of 26 June 2014 on the regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions 
and in its implementing rules and regulations (Royal Decree 84/2015 of 13 February 2015 and 
Banco de España Circular 2/2016 of 2 February 2016). 
Law 11/2015 of 18 June 2015 on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms and its implementing royal decree (Royal Decree 1012/2015 of 6 November 2015) 
8 Nevertheless, the regulation allows the SRB to assume authority over any institution in order to ensure consistent 
application of the resolution rules set in EU legislation.
9 In the case of investment firms, the preventive resolution functions are assigned to the CNMV.
10 This law also changed the composition of the FROB’s Governing Committee, on which the Banco de España sits with 
four members out of the total of eleven, although it does not sit on the core committee which takes decisions affecting the 
State Budget.
box 4.4  MAIN LEgAL ChANgES IN SPAIN DERIVED FRoM ThE EURoPEAN REgULAToRY FRAMEwoRk, 
IN ChRoNoLogICAL oRDER
— 26 June 2014: Law 10/2014 on the regulation, 
supervision and solvency of credit institutions. 
— 13 February 2015: Royal Decree 84/2015 
implementing Law 10/2014 of 26 June 2014 on 
regulation, supervision and solvency of credit 
institutions. 
— 18 June 2015: Law 11/2015 on the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment 
firms.
— 6 November 2015: Royal Decree 1012/2015 
implementing Law 11/2015 of 18 June 2015 on 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions 
and investment firms and amending Royal Decree 
2606/1996 of 20 December 1966 on credit 
institution deposit guarantee funds. 
— 2 February 2016: Banco de España Circular 
2/2016 to credit institutions on supervision and 
solvency, which completes the adaptation of 
Spanish law to Directive 2013/36/EU and to 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
wrote into Spanish law the new resolution framework established by the directive on the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, thus repealing nearly all of Law 9/2012 referred 
to in the preceding chapter, which had already transposed to Spanish law some of that directive. 
4.4 ACTIONSTAKENTORESTRUCTURETHESPANISHFINANCIALSYSTEM(2014-2015)
A. Sale of FRoB and DGSCI investees
As a result of the capital injections and hybrid instrument burden-sharing exercises described in 
the preceding chapter, at 31 December 2013 the holdings of the FROB and the DGSCI in the 
institutions receiving State aid were as shown in Table 4.1 below.
In 2014 the sale of the FROB and DGSCI holdings in NCG Banco was completed, as, in 2015, 
was the sale of those in Catalunya Banc.11 Thus the resolution of both institutions was deemed to 
11 Section 3.5.C describes the supervisory actions taken at these banks.
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have concluded, complying with the commitments given under the financial assistance programme. 
Currently the State still has holdings in Bankia and BMN. A FROB press release on 15 March 2017 
announced that, based on the studies and analyses conducted, it considered that the merger of Bankia 
with BMN was the best strategy for optimising the recovery of State aid in anticipation of a future 
process of divestment. 
Sales of holdings are carried out through competitive processes aimed at maximising the sale price 
and minimising the cost for the taxpayer, as required by Law 9/2012. Before initiating the sale process, 
the FROB awards to an independent expert a contract to prepare a report analysing the various FROB 
investee management strategies (that document contains information on the best alternative for 
preventing any loss of value at these institutions). 
B. other action 
B.1. Merger of credit cooperatives
The credit cooperative sector has also undergone mergers. The main operation in the sector was 
in 2012, with the merger of two credit cooperatives which headed their respective strengthened 
institutional protection schemes: Cajamar and RuralCaja. This merger gave rise to the institutional 
protection scheme known as the Caja Rurales Unidas group. In 2014, this institutional protection 
scheme, composed of 19 credit cooperatives, underwent a significant change when Banco de Crédito 
Cooperativo (owned by the credit cooperatives comprising the group) became the head of the group. 
Since then it has directed the policies of the institutional protection scheme, which adopted the name 
of Cooperativo Cajamar group. This is the only Spanish group of credit cooperatives which, in view 
of its volume of assets, is classified as a significant bank in the SSM and thus subject to direct 
supervision by the ECB.  
DGSCIBORFDecember 2013
)a( %6.52%7.26 ocnaB GCN
)a( %4.23%0.66cnaB aynulataC
Bankia —%4.86
BMN —%0.56
TABLE 4.1 HOLDINGS OF THE FROB AND DGSCI IN BANKS RECEIVING STATE AID
SOURCES: FROB, DGSCI and Banco de España.
a This stake of the DGSCI arose from the application of the liquidity mechanism offered by it to the retail investors that had purchased hybrid instruments of the 
respective banks.
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B.2. Investigation of alleged irregular operations 
The FROB initiated or was represented in various criminal cases analysing or investigating 
alleged offences involving real estate transactions or the remuneration of former managers of financial 
institutions which received State aid. The Banco de España referred to the public prosecution service 
or the relevant court, as appropriate, several transactions suspected of constituting offences, various 
of which are under investigation, mostly by the National High Court. Detailed information on these 
legal actions is given in Annex 1 of this report.
C. Pre-SSM comprehensive assessment12 of the banking sector in November 2014
At the end of 2013, despite the efforts made from the onset of the crisis by credit institutions 
(which had raised capital of €225 billion) and Governments (which had injected €275 billion),13 
totalling 5% of European GDP, weaknesses in terms of financial market fragmentation persisted 
throughout Europe.
Against this background, the ECB, in close cooperation with the Banco de España and the 
other NCAs, conducted a detailed assessment of the euro area banking system before assuming 
responsibility for supervision in November 2014. The comprehensive assessment encompassed 130 
institutions from 19 countries, representing 81.6% of the total assets of the institutions which came 
under the supervision of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Of these institutions, 15 were Spanish 
and represented more than 90% of the total assets of deposit institutions in Spain.
The purpose of this assessment was threefold: 1) increase the transparency of European banks’ 
balance sheets so that their solvency can be more readily evaluated; 2) strengthen these balance sheets 
by correcting any shortcomings identified, and 3) raise confidence in the European banking system. 
The exercise comprised two distinct phases:14 
— The asset quality review (AqR), carried out in accordance with the methodology 
prepared by the ECB. The result of this phase consisted of a series of adjustments to the 
12 For more details, see Chapter 4 of the Banco de España’s Financial Stability Report of November 2014.
13 Note from the European Central Bank: “Note: Comprehensive Assessment, October 2013”, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
pub/pdf/other/notecomprehensiveassessment201310en.pdf
14 Taking into account that the asset assessment and the stress test overlapped in time, an additional exercise, centrally 
controlled by the ECB, was carried out to check how well the results of the two phases of the exercise were integrated with 
each other (so-called join-up test). This was done to ensure that the results of the asset assessment were appropriately taken 
into account in the stress tests.
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level of capital used to determine the starting point of the following phase (using data as 
at December 2013). For this purpose, the appropriate classification and valuation of 
financial assets was analysed. To carry out this analysis, a percentage of institutions’ loans 
and receivables was chosen which represented more than 50% of their risk-weighted 
assets (prioritising the higher-risk portfolios).
— Stress test, the methodology for which was prepared by the EBA. The objective was to 
analyse the resilience of bank solvency to two hypothetical macroeconomic scenarios: a 
baseline scenario prepared using European Commission forecasts; and an adverse scenario 
approved by the European Systemic Risk Board, which was severe but not impossible. 
The time horizon of the exercise extended from 2014 to 2016.
In the exercise, minimum thresholds for top-quality capital were set which the institutions had 
to maintain under both scenarios. In particular, banks had to comply with a minimum CET1 level 
of 8% to successfully pass the first part of the exercise (AqR) and the baseline scenario of the stress 
tests. The minimum threshold for the adverse scenario of the stress tests was set at 5.5%. 
The result of the exercise, published on 26 October 2014, was an estimated overall capital 
shortfall, calculated as the sum of individual banks’ shortfalls at December 2013, of €24.6 billion for 
the total European banks assessed, which resulted basically from the shortfalls found in the second 
part of the exercise (stress test).
Spain: 17.2 SSM: 181.7
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Nevertheless, in 2014 many European credit institutions had already adopted measures to 
strengthen their solvency in anticipation of the results of these tests. In fact the participating banks 
had increased their capital by around €40.5 billion, so only 13 institutions had to adopt additional 
measures to remedy a shortfall of around €9.5 billion.
The results of the exercise for Spanish banks were satisfactory and better than the average. Thus 
Chart 4.20 shows that the relative impact of the adverse scenario was more marked for the aggregate 
of SSM banks than for Spanish banks. Only one Spanish bank had a capital shortfall at December 
2013, although it was very small (€32 million) and, moreover, was covered by the bank itself15 before 
the results for the year were reported. 
Similarly, in the first part of the comprehensive assessment, i.e. the phase in which the appropriate 
classification and valuation of financial assets was analysed (AqR), the resulting capital adjustment 
at Spanish banks was the lowest out of all the SSM countries, as reflected in Chart 4.21. 
The results of the comprehensive assessment reflected the process of clean-up, reform and 
restructuring of the Spanish banking system carried out in the preceding years and showed that the 
balance sheets and solvency positions of Spanish banks would allow them to face the challenges 
awaiting in the short- and medium-term.16 
15 It increased its capital by around €640 million.
16 See Banco de España press release on the results of the AqR, http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/
NotasInformativas/14/Arc/Fic/presbe2014_48en.pdf
Spain:
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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5 OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS
5.1 APPRAISALOFTHERESTRUCTURINGPROCESS
The Spanish banking system withstood reasonably well the first effects of the international 
financial crisis in mid-2007 when the subprime crisis erupted in the United States, assisted, among 
other factors, by the Spanish supervisory practice that required that special investment vehicles be 
included on institutions’ balance sheets. It was not until 2009 that some credit institutions’ solvency 
became adversely affected, as the crisis heightened in the wake of the rapid deterioration of the 
international financial markets and, in a recessionary environment, the imbalances that had built up 
in Spain during the previous upturn were revealed. In the upswing the high growth of credit to the 
private sector, its concentration in the real estate sector (see Table 1.1) and the growing recourse to 
wholesale funding rather than retail deposits to finance credit growth, put the banking sector and the 
Spanish economy in a highly vulnerable position.
The supervisory instruments available at the time, developed with an essentially microprudential 
approach – strengthened in the case of Spain by the countercyclical provisions, which helped reduce 
the cost of the adjustment – proved insufficient and the vulnerabilities that had built up began to 
emerge. And this in a setting in which the institutional architecture of the euro area was still 
incomplete. In this respect, important lessons in financial supervision and regulation may be drawn 
from the crisis, affecting both the international and the domestic sphere.
In the international arena, events have shown the importance of strengthening and 
coordinating prudential regulation, which over the period was reformed in three main areas: 
redefinition and strengthening of the microprudential framework; introduction of a separate 
framework for systemically important financial institutions; and development of a new 
macroprudential regulatory framework addressing systemic risk. As described in this report, the 
new regulations imposed greater requirements on financial institutions ‒ capital ratios and 
countercyclical buffers, among others ‒ and also introduced new instruments for early identification 
of financial risks. 
It was also necessary to adapt the international institutions to what was now a globalised 
economy and a highly interconnected international financial system. This need was especially acute 
in the case of the European Union, which during those years rolled out a reform of its economic 
and financial architecture, with the introduction, for example, of the European Stability Mechanism 
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(ESM), the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) and the Banking Union within the 
euro area, currently comprising two elements, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The EU also strengthened macroeconomic surveillance with 
the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and of national fiscal frameworks and with a new 
mechanism for the prevention and correction of Member States’ macroeconomic imbalances (the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure).
In Spain, the crisis revealed the importance of promoting a more balanced growth pattern 
sustainable in the long term. Once Spain became part of the euro area, economic agents underestimated 
the significant imbalances that had built up during the expansionary period, in terms of private-
sector debt, reliance on external financing, the weight of the real estate sector in the economy, over-
valuation of the price of real estate assets and loss of competitiveness. Euro area membership carries 
the obligation to pursue economic policies that foster competitiveness and potential economic growth 
through structural reforms, and that strengthen the stabilising role of fiscal policy, ensuring 
sustainability. Also, early warning instruments had to be developed to allow any macro-financial risks 
and imbalances building up in the economy to be detected in time.
Regarding the financial system, the essential aim of the strategy adopted to withstand the crisis 
was to prevent a systemic crisis that would have prompted the collapse of a good number of institutions, 
mainly savings banks, through the spread of a crisis of confidence to the rest of the Spanish banking 
sector. Liquidating troubled institutions through insolvency proceedings would have meant the bulk 
of the losses being assumed by depositors, or by taxpayers insofar as the State had to cover deposits, 
as the DGSCI would foreseeably have been unable to cope without having recourse to State aid. This, 
in addition, would have had a devastating effect on the stability of the rest of the financial system, on 
the real economy and on employment.
The initial response was to seek private-sector solutions, demanding that institutions 
restructure their balance sheets using their own funds and improve their solvency levels, encouraging 
concentration processes that would provide efficiency gains, with capacity readjustments. In various 
cases these processes, particularly those involving savings banks, took the form of strengthened 
institutional protection schemes (IPSs). Although most of these schemes ultimately proved to be 
forerunners to mergers, it must be taken into account that, at the time, they provided a way of 
merging savings banks based in different regions. 
Concentration processes could be conducted through corporate transactions or with the 
assistance of the DGSCI, and only in the last instance and on certain conditions, through the injection 
of public funds, for which purpose the FROB was created in 2009. The provision of public capital 
was subject to certain conditions, such as capacity adjustment, efficiency gains, strengthened solvency 
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and corporate governance arrangements and, above all, stricter regulatory demands in terms of capital 
requirements (one of the international responses to the crisis). 
In the specific case of savings banks, given the regulatory constraints on their capacity to raise 
capital, the concentration processes allowed them to make efficiency gains and strengthen their own 
funds. These institutions underwent a major transformation, with a change in their legal form and, 
in effect, the virtual disappearance of the savings bank sector, as Chart  5.1 shows. However, a 
considerable amount of State aid was needed to achieve this transformation, as described in the next 
section. At present, just two, very small, savings banks remain;1 all the others have been involved in 
concentration processes, in addition to having transferred their financial business to commercial 
banks and to having been transformed into foundations, focused mainly on the pursuit of their 
welfare activities. 
As a result of these processes, between 2008 and 2015 Spanish credit institutions underwent 
extensive restructuring which included significant capacity readjustments, considerable loan write-
downs and improvements to their solvency (by generating capital internally, tapping the capital 
markets or reducing lending).
1 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Ontinyent and Colonia-Caixa d’Estalvis de Pollença.
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Capacity readjustment
The scale of the restructuring of the financial system is reflected in the sharp drop in the 
number of institutions (mainly among savings banks), down from 45 to 10 institutions/groups 
(including the 8 institutions that are now commercial banks). This readjustment is evident not only 
in the number of institutions but also in their distribution networks, which have been reduced very 
significantly in order to improve efficiency levels (see Table 5.1 and Chart 5.2).
Number of employees  Number of branchesYear
558,072266,548002
390,362580,449002
875,752498,240102
627,242348,931102
983,132309,732102
199,212725,333102
503,302718,134102
528,791129,035102
-27 %-32.3 %Change
Deposit institutions
TABLE 5.1 DECREASE IN SIZE OF BANKING NETWORK
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
CHART 5.2 CAPACITY REDUCTION
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loan write-downs
Major efforts were made to restructure bank balance sheets as a result of the asset impairment 
caused by the crisis, using institutions’ own funds and, especially, through loan loss provisions: almost 
€300 billion2 between 2008 and 2015 (which is almost 20% of total credit to the resident sector at 
the time of the outbreak of the crisis and 28% of 2015 GDP) (see Table 5.2 and the left-hand panel of 
Chart 5.3). Part of these write-downs were recognised as incurred losses on the relevant loans, which 
explains part of the decrease in the outstanding credit balance on bank balance sheets (see Table 5.3 
and the right-hand panel of Chart 5.3). 
2 The changes made in 2015 owing to the new FINREP statements mean that, for the purposes of comparison, the 2015 
figures have had to be adjusted.
TABLE 5.2 LOAN WRITE-DOWNS. TOTAL DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS. BUSINESS IN SPAIN
€m
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Charged to income
statement 15,070 38,880 57,836 87,407 172,773 199,124 217,114 229,073
Decrease in general
provisions
4,874 12,456 15,921 18,099 20,219 23,245 23,245 23,501
Charged to reserves 0 0 23,945 32,847 45,326 45,561 45,967 45,967
TOTALS 19,944 51,336 97,702 138,353 238,318 267,930 286,326 298,541
Year-by-year figures 19,944 31,392 46,366 40,651 99,965 29,612 18,396 12,215
Cumulative figures from 31/12/2007 to 31/12/2015
CHART 5.3 LOAN WRITE-DOWNS. TOTAL DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS
19,944
51,336
97,702
138,353
238,318
267,930
286,326 298,541
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1  BUILD-UP OF PROVISIONS
€m
990,000
1,190,000
1,390,000
1,590,000
1,790,000
1,990,000
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2  LENDING
€m
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
234 banco de españa
Regarding the breakdown of these write-downs by sector, while the proportion of write-downs 
against income was very similar for both commercial and savings banks (each accounting for 
approximately 46% of the total), in the case of write-downs against reserves there was a considerable 
difference (of the total written down against reserves, savings banks accounted for 81%, in line with 
the scale of mergers in the sector, and commercial banks for the other 19%). 
Enhanced solvency 
Together with the efforts made to downsize networks and write down loans, the increase in 
capitalisation is also noteworthy: the overall solvency ratio of deposit institutions rose from 10.6% at 
31 December 2007 to 13.6% at 31 December 2014; in the same period, Tier I capital rose from 7.5% 
to 11.8% (see Chart 4.19).
Determining factors in the change in Tier 1 capital include, on the positive side, the capital 
support obtained from the FROB and the DGSCI (see Table 5.5) and, on the negative side, the write-
downs made against reserves (see Table 5.2). However, capital increases subscribed by shareholders are 
also significant in the period analysed in this report, as shown in Table 5.4.  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Balance 1,795 1,777 1,782 1,715 1,538 1,392 1,328 1,274
Change in year -18   +5 -67 -177 -146 -64 -54
Lending (other resident sectors)
TABLE 5.3 DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS. CREDIT TO OTHER RESIDENT SECTORS
€m
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
TABLE 5.4 CAPITAL INCREASES AT DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS (a)
€m
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL
Capital increases 3,848 8,395 1,044 5,845 6,851 14,269 3,975 5,395 49,622
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Only considering capital increases that entailed the entry of “new” funds. For example, conversions of hybrid instruments that were issued before the period 
analysed are not included.
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In this setting it is important to note, as will be seen in the next section, that all aid provided 
by the FROB and the DGSCI was directed to groups of savings banks. Banco Gallego and Banco de 
Valencia, the only two commercial banks to receive assistance, were majority-owned by Novacaixagalicia 
and BFA-Bankia, respectively.
5.2 SUMMARYOFTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMSUPPORTMEASURES
The FROB was created, in 2009, to serve as a channel for the necessary State aid and to manage 
the process; it has been pivotal in the instrumentation of the necessary financial support3 and has seen 
its powers strengthened since its inception. The DGSCI4 has also helped fund the cost of restructuring 
the sector through institutions’ own contributions, i.e. private-sector contributions. 
Several stages may be distinguished in the restructuring process that began in 2009, each marked 
by regulatory changes driven by the changing circumstances of the crisis unfolding.
The FROB provided its first assistance in 2010 when it supported the savings banks’ 
concentration processes by subscribing preference shares (FROB I),5 but when the sovereign debt 
crisis spread across the euro area and economic activity deteriorated in 2011, new support measures 
(FROB  II) were needed to boost confidence in the solvency of the Spanish banking system.6 
Nevertheless, these efforts, accompanied in the first half of 2012 by regulatory changes aimed at 
furthering balance sheet restructuring, proved insufficient to restore financial stability.
In view of the growing contagion between sovereign and bank risk, in June 2012 the Spanish 
Government applied to the ESM for financial assistance, subject to strict conditionality, for 
recapitalisation and restructuring of a significant number of institutions.7 During this third stage, the 
FROB injected capital into nine banking groups and subscribed shares of Sareb, the asset management 
3 Prior to creation of the FROB, State aid was granted in 2008, in response to financial market tensions, through the 
programme for purchase of high-quality assets (Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets, FAFA) and the programme 
providing guarantees for new bond issues, both now defunct. In 2012 a new guarantee programme was reintroduced, as a 
result of sovereign debt market tensions and the difficulties gaining access to the wholesale funding markets facing some 
institutions. These measures entailed no net cost for the State.
4 The three sectoral Deposit Guarantee Schemes (for savings banks, commercial banks and credit cooperatives, respectively) 
were replaced in 2011 by the present DGSCI, whose chief function is still to guarantee deposits, up to a limit of €100,000 
per depositor per institution. This function also allows it to take measures to support the resolution of credit institutions.
5 For more details on these measures and the institutions concerned, see Banco de España (2016), “Briefing note on public 
financial assistance in the restructuring of the Spanish banking sector”, September.
6 Diagram 5.1 at the end of this chapter sets out chronologically the main measures taken.
7 See the Memorandum of Understanding on financial-sector policy conditionality, signed in July 2012.
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SOURCES: FROB, DGSCI and Banco de España.
a The English version of the report includes data updated to July 2017, after approval of the annual accounts of the FROB, with 2016 figures. The printed Spanish 
version of the report uses figures for 2015.
b Hybrid instruments: preference shares (participaciones preferentes) and contingent convertible bonds (CoCos).
c Value of Asset Protection Schemes (APSs) and other guarantees: value estimated by independent experts at 2016 close.
d Figures based on estimates and valuation exercises, highlighting in particular the exercise in the case of the FROB's holdings in BFA-Bankia and BMN. These 
estimates are based on the amounts recognised by the FROB in its annual accounts.
e Amount at 31 December 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
f CEISS: of the €1,129 million received in capital and hybrid instruments, €604 million correspond to CoCos outstanding. CEISS currently forms part of Unicaja Banco.
Banca Cívica: €977 million in preference shares that were redeemed when it was merged into CaixaBank.
Caja 3: €407 million in CoCos, fully redeemed.
Liberbank: €124 million in CoCos that were redeemed. 
g The DGSCI had a holding of €2.25 billion in the FROB. That investment was lost when the FROB reduced its capital to zero in 2012 (in view of the equity resulting 
from the FROB's 2011 accounts). Accordingly, part of the assistance provided by the FROB was financed by the DGSCI. 
h The DGSCI provided liquidity to retail holders of unlisted shares of institutions controlled by the FROB received as part of the hybrid instrument burdensharing 
exercises. In this respect, the FROB issued a guarantee to the DGSCI for €115 million.
i The FROB contributed €2,192 million to Sareb (part shares, part subordinated debt). That investment is recognised in the FROB's accounts for €1,497 million, 
after recording losses of €695 million (Sareb resolved to reduce its capital to zero and capitalise 60% of the subordinated debt).
j The DGSCI’s holding in the share capital of these institutions arose as a result of the liquidity arrangements it offered to retail investors who had purchased hybrid 
Capital & hybrid 
instruments (b)
APSs (c) Guarantees (c)
663,091    461,31-062,9424,22aiknaB-AFB
)4102( 354,25038,11-287065250,21cnaB aynulataC
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Adjustments for FROB's holding in Sareb (investment of €2,192 million) (i)  -695
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS 1,440
NET TOTAL -41,150
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TOTAL 9,745 10,008 389 964,91-376
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company created in 2012 as part of the conditionality required to segregate the real estate asset and 
loan portfolios from the institutions receiving support. Both the FROB and Sareb are managed by 
their respective governing bodies. The Banco de España forms part of the Governing Committee of 
the FROB, with four of a total of eleven members, but not of the core committee where the decisions 
affecting the State Budget are taken (see Section 4.3.C). In the case of Sareb, the Banco de España 
supervises its compliance with its sole purpose, its transparency and its governing bodies.  
Since 20098 a total of fourteen institutions have received capital support, for a total of €64,098 
million (see Table 5.6), of which €54,353 million corresponds to the FROB and €9,745 million to the 
DGSCI (see Table 5.5), although part of these funds have been recovered through redemptions and 
sale or resolution of institutions: in total, €4,546 million (see Table 5.6), of which €3,873 million 
corresponds to the FROB and €673 million to the DGSCI (see Table 5.5). Thus, the difference between 
these two items (€64,098 million of aid less €4,546 million of reimbursements) results in total financial 
assistance provided in the form of capital in the period analysed in this report of €59,552 million at 
the end of 2016 (5.3% of 2016 GDP).
In accordance with the approximation made by the Spanish Court of Auditors in its recent 
audit report,9 the estimate of these funds should include, in addition to the capital contributions 
indicated, the provisions set aside to meet the costs that may arise from guarantees provided in the 
concentration and sale processes, which amount, on an updated estimate, to €10,891 million in the 
case of the APSs and to €2,018 million for other guarantees (some of which already enforced, see 
Table 5.6). It would also be necessary to deduct the value of the assets owned by the FROB and whose 
8 The English version of the report includes data updated to July 2017, after approval of the annual accounts of the FROB, 
with 2016 figures. The printed Spanish version of the report uses figures for 2015.
9 “Informe de fiscalización del proceso de reestructuración bancaria, ejercicios 2009 a 2015”. The report estimates the cost of the 
restructuring process at €60,718 million; this figure includes other income and expense items not set out in detail in Table 5.5.
Total before adjustments (I) 64,098 10,891 2,018 4,546 10,402 -62,059
Total adjustments (II) -695
NET GRAND TOTAL (I) + (II) 64,098 10,891 2,018 4,546 10,402 -62,754
FROB + DGSCI
Assistance
TABLE 5.6 SUMMARY OF NET ASSISTANCE, FROB + DGSCI
 31 December 2016 (a)
€m
Capital & hybrid
instruments
(1)
APSs
(2)
Guarantees
(3)
Net assistance
(4) + (5) - (1) - (2) - (3)
Amount
recovered 
(4)
Estimated
amount
recoverable 
(5)
SOURCES: FROB, DGSCI and Banco de España.
a The English version of the report includes data updated to July 2017, after approval of the annual accounts of the FROB, with 2016 figures. The printed Spanish 
version of the report uses figures for 2015.
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sale or resolution could generate future income, with an estimated value at the end of 2016 of 
€10,402 million. As Table 5.6 shows, adjusting for these items, the funds used to support the financial 
system, in terms of the funds contributed by the FROB and by the industry through the DGSCI, 
would be an estimated €62,754 million10 (5.6% of GDP) at the end of 2016, with €41,150 million 
corresponding to the FROB and €21,604 million to the DGSCI (see Table 5.5). Naturally, this cost 
does not include the losses borne by former shareholders or by holders of preference shares 
(participaciones preferentes) or subordinated debt holders, as a consequence of the hybrid instrument 
burden-sharing exercises that formed part of the financial assistance agreement with the ESM, and 
nor does it include interest obtained and expenses incurred. 
The higher government debt caused by these interventions was estimated, at the end of 2016, 
at €51,512 million, in accordance with Eurostat data published in April 2017.11 When comparing 
this figure with the net total assistance provided (€62,754 million; see Tables 5.5 and 5.6), it should 
be noted that the government debt figure does not include the funds furnished by the DGSCI prior 
to 2012, when it was classified outside the general government sector, and nor does it include the 
provisions set aside for the guarantees provided (save for public funds that have been committed or 
paid as a result of enforcement). Net income12 generated by the assistance provided, through fees for 
guarantees, interest and dividends, and sales or reprivatisations, has also been deducted from the 
government debt figure. Lastly it should be noted that government debt is a gross concept, so it takes 
no account of the value of the assets that are still owned by the FROB and whose resolution could 
provide income in the future. 
10 This figure is the sum of the net funds provided to the financial system (€62,059 million), plus the adjustment for the 
FROB’s initial investment in Sareb (€695 million). That initial investment amounted to €2,192 million and is recognised 
on the FROB’s 2016 balance sheet for €1,497 million. This explains the adjustments reflected in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.
11 The increase in government debt has been updated using end-2016 figures (€51,512 million) with respect to the printed 
Spanish version that included end-2015 figures (€50,312 million). The digital version of this report published on the 
Banco de España website has updated the net amount of aid reflected in Table 5.6 following the approval by the FROB of 
its 2016 accounts.
12 This figure includes income from the FAFA and from the programmes providing guarantees for bank debt issues.
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DIAGRAM 5.1 TIMELINE OF MAIN MEASURES SINCE 2009
Institutions placed under official administration
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013-2016
CCM (a) CajaSur
CAM (a)
Banco de
Valencia
Banca Cívica
Unnim
Catalunya Caixa
CEISS
BMN
BFA-Bankia
Novacaixagalicia
FROB I
Measures
Acquisition of preference shares
Aims
Strengthen solvency by improving efficiency
(encourage concentration processes)
FROB II
Measures
Acquisition of shareholding
Aims
Support compliance with new system
requirements (core capital of 8%/10%)
 
Novacaixagalicia
Catalunya Banc
Unnim (a)
FROB_Financial Assistance Programme (MoU)
Other measures as part of resolution
of Novacaixagalicia
Measures
Acquisition of shares and CoCos
Segregation of impaired assets
Burden-sharing
Aims
Identifiy institutions with capital needs
Restructuring/resolution of institutions 
where necessary
BFA-Bankia
Catalunya Banc
Novacaixagalicia
Banco de 
Valencia
G
ro
up
 1
BMN
CEISS
Caja3
LiberbankG
ro
up
 2
Divestment strategy
Divestment through sale of institutions CCM to Cajastur
CajaSur to BBK
CAM to B. Sabadell Unnim to BBVA Banco de Valencia to CaixaBank
Novacaixagalicia to Banesco
Catalunya Banc to BBVA
Banco Gallego to B. SabadellRepayment of aid provided (full or partial)
Redemption in full of preference shares Banca Cívica (CaixaBank)
Redemption in full of CoCos Caja3 (Ibercaja)
Liberbank
CEISS (Unicaja)Redemption of CoCos pending
Divestment outstanding
BFA-Bankia
BMN
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a These institutions received assistance from the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS).
Banco Gallego

ANNEX 1: COOPERATION AND INITIATIVES 
OF THE BANCO DE ESPAñA WITH THE COuRTS
A1.1 CooperAtionwiththeCourts
The Banco de España’s cooperation with the courts is regulated in its Internal Rules approved 
by a Resolution of 28 March 2000, Article 20 of which expressly specifies the way in which the Banco 
de España has to meet this duty of cooperation with the judicial authorities. 
This cooperation intensified particularly from 2011, when the Banco de España began to 
receive an increasing number of requests from public prosecution services and courts (largely, 
although not exclusively, from the Public Prosecutor´s anti-corruption unit and the National High 
Court’s central criminal section) within the framework of criminal proceedings in which credit 
institutions’ officers were under investigation. These requests asked the Banco de España to cooperate 
in various ways: 
i) in view of the eminently technical matters arising, it was asked to appoint experts to 
analyse the transactions investigated in the proceedings, 
(ii) subpoenas of employees were received calling on them to act as witnesses or expert 
witnesses, and 
(iii) considerable documentation was requested, generally relating to supervisory actions at 
the institutions under court investigation. 
In early 2013, given the number and complexity of the court requests for cooperation in relation 
to the acts of credit institutions and their senior officers, a special service to attend to them had to be 
set up within the Banco de España’s legal department.
In this respect: 
— Considering only criminal proceedings, from 2011 to March 2017 the Banco de 
España received 126 requests from public prosecution services and criminal courts, 
which gave rise to the remittance of 502 reports and notes drafted by Banking 
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Supervision, of 277 copies of specifically requested employee e-mails and of 1,560 
documents of other types, relating to the supervision of institutions or to action taken 
to meet those requests. 
— Also, in the same period the Banco de España received a further 50 court requests in 
response to which 45 employees declared as witnesses, 44 employees as expert witnesses 
(regarding reports previously drafted in their supervisory work) and 35 employees as 
legal experts appointed in the proceedings themselves to issue reports on specifically 
required matters. Finally, a further six employees attended to other requests for 
cooperation or technical assistance from the public prosecution service.
A1.2 remittAnCebythebAnCodeespAñAAndtheFrobtothepubliC
proseCutionserviCeAndtheCourtsoFtrAnsACtionssuspeCted
oFhAvingCriminAlsigniFiCAnCe
Between 2010 and 2016, the Executive Commission of the Banco de España resolved on seven 
occasions to send to the public prosecution service or the courts, as applicable, a total of 70 transactions 
suspected of constituting an offence, in relation to six credit institutions. Those transactions are being 
investigated in at least twelve preliminary proceedings, mostly in the National High Court. 
For its part, the FROB has played an active role in detecting and analysing transactions of 
possible criminal significance by credit institutions receiving State aid and also in taking legal action 
against misconduct. Thus reviews were conducted on a total of 102 transactions of institutions 
relating to real estate transactions and remuneration practices, as a result of which finally 57 forensic 
reports were forwarded to the public prosecutor’s special anti-organised crime and anti-corruption 
unit. The FROB is currently represented in 21 criminal cases, mostly being heard in the National 
High Court. Notably, ten of these cases were initiated by the FROB through the administrators 
designated by it at investees and another five cases were brought as a result of forensic reports remitted 
by it to the public prosecution service.
annex 2. banco de españa 
pUblications on the cRisis 
Since 2011 the Banco de España’s website has a specific section called “The restructuring of the 
banking sector in Spain” where the information on the restructuring process published by the Banco 
de España and other national and international bodies is located. Listed below are the main publications 
of the Banco de España which have served as a basis for the preparation of this report. All the 
documentation is available on the Bank’s website.
2000-2014 Annual Report of the Banco de España.
2000-2014 Financial Stability Report.
2000-2014 Report on Banking Supervision in Spain.
11/12/2014 Statement by the Banco de España Executive Commission (on the action of the Banco de España in 
the formation of BFA_Bankia) (press release).
05/12/2014 Statement by the Banco de España (Expert report on the Bankia case, press release).
25/11/2014 La construcción de la Unión Bancaria en la UE (295 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
19/11/2014 Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España (Luis M. Linde) before the Senate Budgetary 
Committee.
13/11/2014 Mortgage foreclosure processes (briefing note).
01/11/2014 The countercyclical capital buffer in Spain: an exploratory analysis of key guiding indicators (article 
in the Financial Stability Journal).
31/10/2014 Evolución de los principales grupos bancarios españoles (2009-2014) (table).
26/10/2014 Results of the comprehensive assessment of the banking sector (press release).
26/10/2014 Press conference address by the Governor. Presentation of the results of the comprehensive assessment 
of the euro area banking system (press release).
22/10/2014 Evolución y determinantes del consumo de la UEM durante la crisis (309 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
22/10/2014 A disaggregated analysis of the determinants of the increase in lending rate spreads in Spain during 
the crisis (289 KB) (article in the Ecoonomic Bulletin).
01/10/2014 Testimony by the governor of the Banco de España (Luis M. Linde) before the Parliamentary Budget 
Committee.
23/09/2014 Los flujos migratorios en España durante la crisis (169 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
23/07/2014 Los vínculos entre crisis bancarias y soberanas en las economías emergentes (163 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
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23/07/2014 Impact of restructuring plans on lending to non-financial corporations (157 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin).
23/07/2014 The new revaluation and sustainability factor of the Spanish pension system (176 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin).
23/07/2014 La participación de las pymes y de las grandes empresas europeas en el comercio internacional de 
bienes (140 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
24/06/2014 A disaggregated analysis of recent developments in lending to corporations (136 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin)
24/06/2014 Un análisis del comportamiento reciente de la inversión en equipo y de sus determinantes (170 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
24/06/2014 Testimony by the Chairman of the Governing Committee of the FROB before the Parliamentary 
Committee on Economic Affairs and Competitiveness (appearance in the name of the FROB).
17/06/2014 Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España before the Parliamentary Committee on the 
Economy and Competitiveness in connection with the presentation of the Banco de España Annual 
Report.
12/06/2014 Nota informativa sobre ayudas públicas en el proceso de reestructuración del sistema bancario 
español (2009-2013).
06/06/2014 The Banco de España strengthens supervision of information transparency and the market conduct 
of banks (press release).
02/06/2014 Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de Espana (Luis M. Linde) before the Special Senate 
Committee for the Development of Internationalisation.
27/05/2014 Una comparación de la respuesta del sector exterior en las dos últimas recesiones (161 KB) (article 
in the Boletín Económico).
19/05/2014 Residential mortgage foreclosure processess (briefing note).
01/05/2014 Sovereign risk and financial stability (article in the Financial Stability Journal).
23/04/2014 Assessment of external imbalances and country risk perception (199 KB) (article in the Economic 
Bulletin).
25/03/2014 The world economy faced with a change in scenario. Developments, Outlook and risks (406 KB) 
(article in the Economic Bulletin).
18/03/2014 Application of Circular 4/2004 to transactions restructured as a result of refinancing agreements 
envisaged in the Insolvency Law (press release).
11/03/2014 Amendment to Banco Ceiss resolution plan approved (press release).
25/02/2014 ECB action and the Spanish economy during the first fifteen years of the euro (191 KB) (article in 
the Economic Bulletin).
21/02/2014 Statement by the Banco de España on credit institutions’ dividend policy in 2014 (press release).
18/02/2014 Draft Law on regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions (briefing note).
05/02/2014 Testimony by the Chairman of the Governing Committee of the FROB before the Parliamentary 
Committee on Economic Affairs and Competitiveness (appearance in the name of the FROB).
22/01/2014 Bank lending to Spanish corporations in terms of their size. An analysis based on the joint exploitation 
of information from the CCR and the CBI (220 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
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22/01/2014 El impacto de la inversión exterior directa sobre la productividad y el empleo del sector manufacturero 
español (2001-2010) (372 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
14/01/2014 Joint press release FROB-Banco de España: Sale of Caja Rural Comarcal de Mota del Cuervo within 
the framework of its resolution process (press release).
27/12/2013 La fragmentación financiera en la zona del euro durante la crisis (287 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
27/12/2013 Un análisis del endeudamiento de las familias a partir de la encuesta del Eurosistema sobre la situación 
financiera y el consumo de los hogares de 2010 (191 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
27/12/2013 Recent developments in non-financial corporations’ mark-ups (173 KB) (article in the Economic 
Bulletin).
04/12/2013 Testimony by the Chairman of the Governing Committee of the FROB before the Senate Committee 
on Economic Affairs and Competitiveness (appearance in the name of the FROB).
03/12/2013 The tax treatment of deferred tax assets (briefing note).
29/11/2013 The Banco de España opens to public consultation a draft circular on the allocation of unused 
general provisions (press release).
27/11/2013 Private-sector deleveraging channels: an international comparison (216 KB) (article in the Economic 
Bulletin).
27/11/2013 El funcionamiento del sistema judicial: nueva evidencia comparada (244 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
25/11/2013 Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España, Luis M. Linde, before the Senate Budgetary 
Committee.
01/11/2013 Spanish dynamic provisions: main numerical features (article in the Financial Stability Journal).
01/11/2013 La transposición de Basilea III a la legislación europea (article in the Revista de Estabilidad Financiera).
23/10/2013 An analysis of the situation of lending in Spain (211 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
04/10/2013 Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España (Luis M. Linde) before the Parliamentary 
Budget Committee.
01/10/2013 Updating of Directorate General Banking Supervision procedures (press release).
26/09/2013 Changes in household saving and consumption in Spain during the crisis (152 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin).
26/09/2013 The 2012 labour reform: an initial analysis of some of its effects on the labour market (326 KB) 
(article in the Economic Bulletin).
10/09/2013 Testimony of the chairman of the Governing Committee of the FROB before the parliamentary 
subcommittee on bank restructuring and financial clean-up (appearance in the name of the FROB).
02/09/2013 Public financial assistance in the recapitalisation of the Spanish banking system (2009-2013) 
(briefing note).
23/07/2013 The European Central Bank’s response to the crisis (180 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
23/07/2013 Developments in Spanish public debt since the start of the crisis (232 KB) (article in the Economic 
Bulletin).
23/07/2013 Variation in the cyclical sensitivity of Spanish inflation: an initial approximation (177 KB) (article 
in the Economic Bulletin).
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23/07/2013 Ajuste de los desequilibrios macroeconómicos en la UEM (220 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
27/06/2013 Statement by the Banco de España on the dividend distribution policy of credit institutions (press 
release).
26/06/2013 The Banco de España calls on credit institutions to review whether their floor clauses conform to 
Ruling 241/2013 by the Supreme Court (press release).
26/06/2013 Evolución del desajuste educativo entre la oferta y la demanda de trabajo en España (192 KB) (article 
in the Boletín Económico).
26/06/2013 Esquemas de apoyo financiero a las pymes en España (145 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
20/06/2013 Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España before the Parliamentary Committee on 
Economic Affairs and Competitiveness in connection with the presentation of the Banco de España 
Annual Report.
31/05/2013 Presentation of the Annual Report. Governor’s address to the Governing Council of the Banco de 
España (speech).
29/05/2013 Bank deposits in April 2013 (briefing note).
29/05/2013 The export activity and non-price competitiveness of European firms (184 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin). 
10/05/2013 Amendment of the resolution plan for Banco CEISS approved (press release).
10/05/2013 The new statistics on mortgage foreclosure processes (briefing note).
09/05/2013 Briefing note on the Financial Stability Report: loan refinancing and contrasting of the stress test 
conducted by Oliver Wyman in 2012.
01/05/2013 Top-down stress tests as a macro-prudential tool: methodology and practical application (article in 
the Financial Stability Journal).
30/04/2013 Criteria for the application of Circular 4/2004 in respect of loan refinancing and restructuring (press 
release).
23/04/2013 The new Budgetary Stability Law (164 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
26/03/2013 Un análisis de las diferencias entre entidades en la evolución del crédito al sector privado durante la 
crisis (140 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
27/02/2013 El ajuste de los mercados laborales europeos desde el inicio de la crisis (172 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
27/02/2013 Statistical effects on Spanish credit institutions’ balance sheets of the recent restructuring and 
recapitalisation (138 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
27/02/2013 Cambios en el capital bancario y evolución del crédito: una aproximación microeconómica (139 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
23/01/2013 Evolución reciente de la población en España y proyecciones a corto y largo plazo (161 KB) (article 
in the Boletín Económico). 
23/01/2013 Spanish non-financial corporations’ debt since the start of the crisis. A disaggregated analysis (128 KB) 
(article in the Economic Bulletin).
23/01/2013 Las medidas de política monetaria no convencionales del BCE a lo largo de la crisis (275 KB) (article 
in the Boletín Económico).
08/01/2013 Banco de España banking supervision organisation and procedures. Statement by the Banco de 
España Executive Commission (press release).
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28/12/2012 An estimation of the impact changes in the minimum wage have on employment (162 KB) (article 
in the Economic Bulletin). 
26/12/2012 Briefing note on the sale of Banco de Valencia.
20/12/2012 The recapitalisation plans for all banks requiring injections of public funds have been approved 
(press release).
28/11/2012 The EC’s approval marks the finalisation of the plans for the banks in which the FROB has a majority 
stake (press release).
28/11/2012 El impacto de la crisis económica sobre la industria española (145 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
27/11/2012 The Banco de España approves the plans for the banks in which the FROB has a majority stake 
(press release).
21/11/2012 Testimony by the Governor before the Senate Budget Committee in connection with the draft State 
Budget.
02/11/2012 The Financial Stability Board updates the list of global systemically important banks (press release).
31/10/2012 Cost of the Spanish banking sector solvency tests (press release).
31/10/2012 Information regarding the assessment of the recapitalization plans as foreseen by the Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) (press release).
23/10/2012 La evolución del balance agregado de las entidades de crédito españolas a lo largo de la crisis (145 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
23/10/2012 Dispersión salarial en España: Resultados a partir de datos de la Seguridad Social (166 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
16/10/2012 Análisis de los procedimientos supervisores del Banco de España y recomendaciones de reforma 
(report of the Comisión Interna).
04/10/2012 Testimony by the Governor of de Banco de España (Luis M. Linde) before the Parliamentary Budget 
Committee in connection with the draft State Budget.
03/10/2012 Statement on the European banking recapitalisation plan (press release).
28/09/2012 Oliver Wyman estimates the Spanish banking system’s capital needs at close to €60 billion (press release).
28/09/2012 Presentation of the Deputy Governor (Fernando Restoy). Results of the independent evaluation of 
the Spanish banking sector.
26/09/2012 Analysis of recent changes in bank deposits in Spain (140 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
26/09/2012 Nuevas herramientas para la gobernanza económica global: marco para el crecimiento y supervisión 
de desequilibrios (341 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
25/09/2012 Royal Decree-Law 24/2012 on restructuring and resolution of credit institutions (briefing note).
22/09/2012 The capital needs of Spanish banks will be known on 28 September 2012 (press release).
19/09/2012 Changes in Spanish bank deposits (briefing note).
05/09/2012 Statement by the Banco de España [regarding the liquidity situation in the Spanish financial system] 
(press release).
31/07/2012 Independent valuation of the Spanish banking system (press release).
23/07/2012 El empleo en la UEM en 2011 (153 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
23/07/2012 Un análisis sectorial de la relación entre la actividad y el empleo en la economía española (146 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
248 banco de españa
23/07/2012 The adjustment of the external imbalance in the Spanish economy (193 KB) (article in the Economic 
Bulletin).
17/07/2012 Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España (Luis M. Linde) before the Parliamentary 
Committee on Economic Affairs and Competitiveness.
11/07/2012 Statement on the implementation of the European bank recapitalisation (press release).
06/07/2012 The FROB strengthens its management bodies (press release).
27/06/2012 Sectoral change and implications for occupational mismatch in Spain (143 KB) (article in the Economic 
Bulletin).
27/06/2012 El ciclo económico y la inversión en intangibles de las empresas españolas (132 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
27/06/2012 El mecanismo de asistencia financiera para la recapitalización bancaria en la UEM (110 KB) (article 
in the Boletín Económico).
21/06/2012 Presentación del subgobernador (Fernando Restoy). Resultados de la evaluación sobre las necesidades 
de capital del sector bancario español.
08/06/2012 Methodology of the appraisers of the Spanish financial system (press release).
30/05/2012 Governor’s (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) testimony before the Senate Budgetary Committee.
29/05/2012 Statement by the Banco de España (early departure by the Governor to smooth the ongoing approval 
of banks’ recapitalisation plans) (press release).
21/05/2012 Spanish bank balance sheets to be valued by Roland Berger and Oliver Wyman (press release).
09/05/2012 Statement on BFA-Bankia (conversion of FROB securities into equity)  (press release).
17/04/2012 Testimony by the Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) before the Parliamentary Committee 
on Budget.
17/04/2012 The Banco de España approves credit institutions’ plans to comply with Royal Decree-Law 2/2012 
on the balance-sheet clean-up of the financial sector (press release).
27/03/2012 Nuevo marco de vigilancia de los desequilibrios macroeconómicos de la UE (196 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
28/02/2012 El impacto de la crisis financiera en los mercados laborales de las economías desarrolladas (217 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
23/01/2012 El informe anual de crecimiento 2012 y el Semestre Europeo: nuevos mecanismos y prioridades de 
política económica en la UE (138 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
23/01/2012 La respuesta de las empresas exportadoras españolas a los cambios del comercio mundial (2008-2010) 
(167 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
26/12/2011 Competitiveness indicators: the importance of an efficient allocation of resources (146 KB) (article 
in the Economic Bulletin).
08/12/2011 Statement on the European bank recapitalisation plan (final figures) (press release).
30/11/2011 La tasa de ahorro durante la crisis económica: el papel de las expectativas de desempleo y de la 
financiación (225 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
30/11/2011 Labour flows in the EU at the beginning of the crisis (180 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
21/11/2011 The Banco de España replaces the directors of Banco de Valencia at the request of its Board of 
Directors (press release).
01/11/2011 Los ejercicios de estrés test: experiencia reciente y reflexiones sobre su futuro (article in the Revista de 
Estabilidad Financiera).
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31/10/2011 Una actualización de la situación patrimonial de las familias en España, Estados Unidos e Italia a 
partir de los resultados de encuestas financieras (176 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
27/10/2011 Statement on the European bank recapitalisation plan (press release).
30/09/2011 The Banco de España takes stock of the financial system recapitalisation process envisaged under 
RD-l 2/2011 (press release).
30/09/2011 Presentation by the Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez): Restructuring of the financial sector. 
Results of the recapitalisation process.
28/09/2011 Los efectos de las condiciones hipotecarias sobre el consumo de los hogares propietarios de vivienda: 
una estimación a partir de la EFF (105 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
28/09/2011 The reform of the fiscal framework in Spain: constitutional limits and the new public spending 
growth rule (194 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
28/09/2011 El mercado español de deuda del Estado: desarrollos desde el inicio de la crisis (214 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
28/09/2011 The process of economic adjustment following financial crises: a historical perspective (192 KB) 
(article in the Economic Bulletin).
05/08/2011 Reformas de los sistemas de pensiones en algunos países de la UEM (215 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
05/08/2011 Los rendimientos salariales y la evolución reciente del nivel educativo (150 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
22/07/2011 The Banco de España, at the request of the Board of Directors of CAM, has replaced the institution’s 
directors in order to capitalise it and initiate a competitive procedure for its sale (press release).
21/07/2011 Note on the state of the implementation of Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 on recapitalisation following 
the stock market listings of CaixaBank, Bankia and Banca Cívica (press release).
15/07/2011 No Spanish bank is required to increase its capital as a result of the EBA stress test (press release).
21/06/2011 Governor’s (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) testimony before the Parliamentary Committee on 
Economic and Financial Affairs  - Presentation of the Annual Report, 2010.
31/05/2011 Los desequilibrios globales y el reequilibrio de la economía mundial (170 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
31/05/2011 La evolución de la cuota de exportación de los productos españoles en la última década: el papel de 
la especialización comercial y de la competitividad (193 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
06/05/2011 El comportamiento de la tasa de actividad durante la última fase recesiva (142 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
28/04/2011 Institutions send their recapitalisation plans to the Banco de España (press release).
14/04/2011 The Banco de España approves institutions’ strategies for complying with the capital requirements 
of Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 (press release).
30/03/2011 The Banco de España requires the institutions making up Banco Base to submit their new strategies 
(press release).
23/03/2011 Note on the process of restructuring and strengthening of savings banks. Situation as of March 2011 
(briefing note).
10/03/2011 The Banco de España informs 12 banks they must increase their capital to comply with the Royal 
Decree-Law (press release).
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04/03/2011 El comportamiento de los flujos brutos de capital internacional y su respuesta en los períodos de 
crisis (144 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
04/03/2011 El crédito comercial en España: importancia relativa y evolución reciente (101 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
04/03/2011 Wage adjustment to shocks in Spain (147 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
21/02/2011 Documento «Evolución y reforma de las cajas de ahorros» (report).
21/02/2011 The Royal Decree-Law enacted by the government strengthens financial system solvency and will 
enable restructuring to be completed (press release).
21/02/2011 Presentation delivered by the governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) “The restructuring of the 
Spanish banking sector and the Royal Decree-Law for the reinforcement of the financial system”.
04/02/2011 El ajuste del consumo duradero y no duradero en España durante la crisis económica (165 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
04/02/2011 La reforma de la gobernanza económica en la UEM (182 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
30/12/2010 La renta disponible de los hogares de la UEM (111 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
30/12/2010 The residential investment adjustment in Spain: the current situation (152 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin).
23/11/2010 Appearance of Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) before the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs of the Senate.
01/11/2010 La ampliación de los diferenciales soberanos en la zona del euro durante la crisis (128 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
01/11/2010 La incidencia del desempleo en los hogares (125 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
01/11/2010 Nuevos requerimientos de información sobre el mercado hipotecario: un análisis del loan to value 
(article in the Revista de Estabilidad Financiera).
01/11/2010 Las nuevas medidas de Basilea III en materia de capital (article in the Revista de Estabilidad Financiera).
05/10/2010 Testimony by the Governor, Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez, before the Parliamentary Budget 
Committee in relation to the draft State Budget for 2011.
01/10/2010 La evolución de los beneficios y la rentabilidad empresarial durante la crisis económica (107 KB)
(article in the Boletín Económico).
30/09/2010 A possible role for asymmetrical standing facilities in liquidity management (104 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin).
30/09/2010 El apoyo público al sector financiero en la zona del euro durante la crisis (145 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
06/08/2010 La evolución en España de los programas públicos de apoyo financiero al sector privado durante la 
crisis (101 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
06/08/2010 El contenido informativo de las encuestas de opinión en períodos de crisis económica (172 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
23/07/2010 Las pruebas de resistencia de la UE confirman la solidez del sector bancario español (press release).
30/06/2010 La evolución cíclica de la inversión residencial: algunos hechos estilizados (155 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
30/06/2010 Evolución reciente de la financiación a sociedades no financieras en España (124 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
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30/06/2010 Los efectos de la estabilidad laboral sobre el ahorro y la riqueza de los hogares españoles (102 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
29/06/2010 El Banco de España aprueba la integración de Caixanova y Caixa Galicia (press release).
29/06/2010 El Banco de España aprueba la integración en un SIP de CAM, Cajastur, Caja Cantabria y Caja 
de Extremadura (press release).
29/06/2010 El Banco de España aprueba la integración en un SIP de Caja Madrid, Bancaja, Caixa Laietana, Caja 
Insular de Canarias, Caja de Ávila, Caja de Segovia y Caja Rioja (press release).
29/06/2010 El Banco de España aprueba la integración en un SIP de Caja Murcia, Caixa Penedés, Sa Nostra y 
Caja Granada (press release).
29/06/2010 Progress report on the restructuring of the Spanish savings banks (briefing note).
22/06/2010 Testimony of the Governor of the Banco de España to the Parliamentary Committee on Economic 
and Financial Affairs on the occasion of the presentation of the 2009 Annual Report.
26/05/2010 El Banco de España somete a consulta la modificación de su Circular Contable (press release).
22/05/2010 The Banco de España replaces the directors of CajaSur (press release).
01/05/2010 Cyclical migration patterns (115 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
01/05/2010 Debt of Spanish non-financial corporations. Development over time and comparison with the euro 
area (145 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
01/05/2010 El empleo en la UEM en 2009 (118 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
01/04/2010 Las reformas microeconómicas en el área del euro (220 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
30/03/2010 Employment fluctuations in a dual labour market (109 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
30/03/2010 La financiación del comercio y la evolución del comercio internacional durante la crisis (150 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
25/03/2010 El Banco de España aprueba la integración de Caixa Manlleu, Sabadell y Terrassa (press release).
25/03/2010 El Banco de España aprueba la integración de Caixa Catalunya, Manresa y Tarragona (press release).
25/03/2010 El Banco de España aprueba la integración de Caja Duero y Caja España (press release).
17/02/2010 El Banco de España publica la Guía del proceso de revisión de capital (press release).
04/01/2010 Evolución de la composición de la cartera financiera de los hogares en España en el contexto de la 
crisis financiera internacional (130 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
04/01/2010 A comparison of recent real estate cycles in Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom (124 KB) 
(article in the Economic Bulletin).
30/12/2009 Determinantes principales de la decisión de exportar de las empresas españolas (137 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
23/11/2009 Governor’s (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) testimony before the Senate Budgetary Committee.
03/11/2009 El Banco de España aprueba el proyecto presentado por Caja Castilla-La Mancha para su integración 
con Cajastur (press release).
02/11/2009 International debt markets after the financial crisis (171 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
20/10/2009 Determinantes y características de las empresas de alto crecimiento en España (133 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
06/10/2009 Governor’s (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) testimony before the Parliamentary Budget Committee.
30/07/2009 The functioning of the labour market and unemployment growth in Spain (193 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin).
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29/07/2009 El Banco de España aprueba el plan de actuación presentado por Unicaja y CajaSur para afrontar su 
proceso de integración (press release).
14/07/2009 La Comisión Rectora del FROB celebra su primera reunión (press release).
23/06/2009 Appearance of the Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) before the Parliamentary Committee 
on Financial Affairs - Presentation of the Annual Report, 2008.
01/06/2009 Nuevo convenio de cooperación entre la Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores y el Banco de 
España (adaptación a Directiva MiFID y Basilea II) (press release).
01/06/2009 La instrumentación de la política monetaria del Eurosistema y la crisis financiera (215 KB) (article 
in the Boletín Económico).
01/05/2009 Una aproximación a las características de las empresas exportadoras españolas (147 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
01/05/2009 Survey of non-financial corporations on conditions of access to credit (116 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin).
01/05/2009 The economic and financial crisis, policy responses and their impact on public finances. A global 
perspective (204 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
29/04/2009 La creación de empleo de las empresas pequeñas en España (127 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
22/04/2009 Comunicado del Banco de España (desmentido de una supuesta lista de siete cajas de ahorros en 
problemas) (press release).
02/04/2009 Testimony of the Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) before the Parliamentary Committee on 
Financial Affairs o explain the recent decisions adopted in relation to CCM.
29/03/2009 Banco de España replaces directors of the Caja Castilla La Mancha (press release).
02/03/2009 La encuesta sobre formación de salarios de las empresas españolas: nueva evidencia sobre la relación 
entre precios y salarios, y la respuesta de las empresas a perturbaciones económicas (119 KB) (article 
in the Boletín Económico).
25/02/2009 Comparecencia del gobernador (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) ante la Comisión de Economía y 
Hacienda del Congreso para informar de la gestión desarrollada por el Banco de España para el 
Fondo para la Adquisición de Activos Financieros y del análisis de los flujos de crédito.
01/02/2009 The challenges the international financial crisis poses for the Spanish economy (140 KB) (article in 
the Economic Bulletin).
05/01/2009 European labour market reforms in the period 2000-2006 (144 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
26/12/2008 La inversión empresarial en España y la posición financiera de las empresas (143 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
26/12/2008 Changes in the loan-deposit gap and in its funding in the current decade (123 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin).
28/11/2008 Las consecuencias de la indiciación salarial sobre la inflación (135 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
26/11/2008 El Banco de España aprueba una revisión de la Circular Contable (reforma cobertura genérica) 
(press release).
19/11/2008 Appearance of Governor Miguel Á Fernández Ordóñez before the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
of the Senate.
01/11/2008 El papel del modelo «originar para distribuir» en la crisis financiera de 2007 (article in the Revista de 
Estabilidad Financiera).
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07/10/2008 Testimony of the Governor of the Banco de España (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) to the 
Parliamentary Budget Committee.
30/07/2008 Una primera estimación del impacto económico de una reducción de las cargas administrativas en 
España (149 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
30/07/2008 El precio de la vivienda y la reasignación sectorial del empleo: evidencia internacional (251 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico). 
24/06/2008 Appearance of the Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) before the Parliamentary Committee 
on Financial Affairs. Presentation of the Annual Report, 2007.
17/06/2008 Acuerdo de cooperación sobre estabilidad financiera transfronteriza (press release).
01/06/2008 Una aproximación al componente transitorio del saldo público en España (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
23/05/2008 El Banco de España aprueba la nueva Circular sobre Recursos Propios de las Entidades de Crédito 
(press release).
01/05/2008 Regulación e innovación en la reciente crisis financiera (article in the Revista de Estabilidad Financiera).
01/05/2008 La titulización de activos por parte de las entidades de crédito: el modelo español en el contexto 
internacional y su tratamiento desde el punto de vista de la regulación prudencial (article in the Revista 
de Estabilidad Financiera).
02/04/2008 Las entidades de depósito españolas afrontan desde una posición de solidez el período de turbulen-
cias financieras internacionales (press release).
20/02/2008 El Banco de España reitera la solidez y solvencia del sector bancario español (press release).
01/12/2007 Evolución reciente de la tasa de actividad de la economía española y retos futuros (114 KB) (article 
in the Boletín Económico).
01/12/2007 La titulización en España: principales características (116 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
23/11/2007 Appearance of Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) before the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs of the Senate.
09/10/2007 Testimony of the Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) to the Parliamentary Budget Committee.
27/09/2007 Appearance of the Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) before the Committee on Financial 
Affairs of the Senate to assess the economic situation in the face of financial market instability.
18/09/2007 Testimony of the Governor (Miguel Á. Fernández Ordóñez) to the Parliamentary Committee on 
Financial Affairs.
17/09/2007 Comunicado del Banco de España (Desmentido de las publicaciones del presidente de Northern 
Rock sobre la ELA a entidades españolas) (press release).
25/06/2007 El Banco de España aprueba los primeros modelos avanzados para el cálculo de los requerimientos 
de recursos propios (press release).
01/04/2007 La respuesta a la consulta del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda en cumplimiento del artículo 8.2 
de la Ley General de Estabilidad Presupuestaria y la difusión de las proyecciones macroeconómicas 
del Banco de España (132 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
01/02/2007 Un análisis intertemporal de los saldos de la balanza por cuenta corriente de los países de la zona del 
euro (280 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
08/01/2007 Estimates of the potential growth rate of the Spanish economy (118 KB) (article in the Economic 
Bulletin).
29/12/2006 Arranca el proceso consultivo de la nueva circular de solvencia (press release).
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01/12/2006 El Banco de España y la evaluación del sistema financiero (article in the Notas de Estabilidad Financiera).
30/10/2006 La cuota de los productos españoles en los mercados internacionales (138 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
30/10/2006 Competencia y ajustes de precios en España y en el área del euro (127 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
29/09/2006 Actualización de las estimaciones de la tasa de desempleo estructural de la economía española (109 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
30/07/2006 Características de la reciente expansión inmobiliaria en una perspectiva de medio plazo (124 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
30/07/2006 Macroeconomic divergences between euro area countries: size, causes and implications (125 KB) 
(article in the Economic Bulletin).
29/06/2006 House prices in Spain: is the evidence of overvaluation robust? (75 KB) (article in the Economic 
Bulletin).
29/06/2006 Una nota teórica sobre el papel del acceso al crédito en el comportamiento del precio de la vivienda 
(67 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
21/06/2006 El Banco de España aumenta la transparencia supervisora a través de Internet (press release).
01/05/2006 La posición relativa de la banca española en el contexto europeo (article in the Revista de Estabilidad 
Financiera).
28/04/2006 La posición financiera de las pequeñas empresas españolas (74 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
28/03/2006 La construcción en España (104 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
28/03/2006 La interacción entre el precio de la vivienda y el crédito a hogares destinado a su adquisición (54 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
28/03/2006 La financiación del déficit exterior de la economía española (104 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
28/12/2005 Nuevos instrumentos de titulización de pasivos empresariales: características e implicaciones (86 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
28/11/2005 Inflation differentials in the euro area: the case of the Spanish economy (95 KB) (article in the 
Economic Bulletin).
01/11/2005 El FSAP, un instrumento para la estabilidad y el desarrollo (article in the Revista de Estabilidad Financiera).
28/10/2005 Heterogeneidad en los mercados de trabajo regionales (97 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
29/09/2005 Las decisiones de gasto de las familias españolas y sus principales determinantes (95 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
29/07/2005 El Banco de España permitirá computar como recursos propios de primera categoría las participaciones 
preferentes con step up moderados (press release).
29/07/2005 La evolución del endeudamiento de las Administraciones Públicas: 2000-2004 (68 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
30/05/2005 Efectos de la riqueza inmobiliaria sobre el consumo: resultados a partir de la Encuesta Financiera de 
las Familias (77 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
30/05/2005 Indicadores de accesibilidad y esfuerzo en el mercado de la vivienda (77 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
28/04/2005 The wealth of Spanish households: a microeconomic comparison with the United States, Italy and 
the United Kingdom (112 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
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28/04/2005 Inflación, productividad y márgenes sectoriales (62 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
28/03/2005 Los determinantes de la financiación de las sociedades no financieras españolas (83 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
28/02/2005 Inmigración: desarrollos recientes y consecuencias económicas (78 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
28/01/2005 Un indicador sintético de presión financiera para las empresas españolas (135 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
22/12/2004 El Banco de España aprueba la nueva Circular Contable (press release).
13/12/2004 Nota informativa del Banco de España (Decisión sobre el cargo de prejubilaciones y jubilaciones 
anticipadas contra las reservas de libre disposición) (press release).
01/12/2004 Las implicaciones del endeudamiento de los hogares sobre el consumo privado (61 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
01/12/2004 Las series de stock de capital humano y tecnológico en los indicadores de convergencia real (73 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
24/11/2004 Governor’s J. Caruana testimony before the Senate Budgetary Committee.
01/11/2004 Survey of Household Finances (EFF): description, methods, and preliminary results (200 KB) 
(article in the Economic Bulletin).
01/11/2004 La presión financiera y el comportamiento reciente de la inversión productiva privada en España 
(137 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
26/10/2004 El Banco de España distribuye el borrador de la nueva Circular Contable (press release).
13/10/2004 Testimony by the Governor J. Caruana before the Parliamentary Budget Committee in connection 
with the draft State Budget for 2005. 
30/06/2004 Testimony by the Governor J. Caruana of the Banco de España before the Parliamentary Committee on 
Economic Affairs and Competitiveness in connection with the presentation of the Banco de España 
Annual Report.
01/06/2004 The effects of EU enlargement on the Spanish economy: productive structures and trade flows (125 KB)
(article in the Economic Bulletin).
01/06/2004 La carga financiera de las familias españolas: un primer análisis desagregado (113 KB) (article in the 
Boletín Económico).
01/05/2004 Estabilidad financiera y el diseño de la política monetaria (89 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
01/04/2004 Créditos hipotecarios a tipo de interés fijo frente a tipo variable: comparación de riesgos e implicaciones 
macroeconómicas (160 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
01/03/2004 La evolución de la composición de los pasivos de las sociedades no financieras españolas (145 KB) 
(article in the Boletín Económico).
05/01/2004 Demanda de trabajo, contratos temporales y factores financieros (46 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
27/11/2003 Governor’s J. Caruana testimony before the Senate Budgetary Committee.
26/11/2003 El impacto de la situación financiera de las empresas sobre la inversión y el empleo (67 KB) (article 
in the Boletín Económico).
07/10/2003 Testimony by the Governor, J. Caruana, before the Parliamentary Budget Committee.
25/09/2003 House prices in Spain (92 KB) (article in the Economic Bulletin).
25/09/2003 The determinants of competitiveness and its indicators for the Spanish economy (227 KB) (article 
in the Economic Bulletin).
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18/06/2003 Testimony by the Governor, J. Caruana of the Banco de España before the Parliamentary Committee 
on Economic Affairs and Competitiveness in connection with the publication of the Annual Report.
26/05/2003 La nueva reforma del IRPF. Principales modificaciones y análisis de sus efectos (250 KB) (article in 
the Boletín Económico).
26/05/2003 Comparative analysis of export demand for manufactures in the euro area countries (218 KB) (article 
in the Economic Bulletin).
24/04/2003 Determinantes del crecimiento del crédito a los hogares en España (167 KB) (article in the Boletín 
Económico).
24/04/2003 Algunas características del crecimiento de la economía española en la década de los noventa desde 
una perspectiva sectorial (102 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
26/03/2003 ¿Aprovechan los hogares la revalorización de su riqueza inmobiliaria para financiar un aumento del 
consumo? (132 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
22/01/2003 Los efectos de las modificaciones de las condiciones financieras sobre el comportamiento de las 
empresas españolas (54 KB) (article in the Boletín Económico).
16/10/2002 El subgobernador del Banco de España afirma que las inversiones en América Latina no cuestionan 
la «rentabilidad, saneamiento y estabilidad» de la banca española (press release).
11/10/2002 Jaime Caruana alerta contra una reacción excesiva ante la crisis de algunos países latinoamericanos 
(press release).
08/10/2002 Testimony by the Governor, J. Caruana, before the Parliamentary Budget Committee.
08/05/2002 Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España, J. Caruana, before the Parliamentary Committee 
on Economic Affairs.
01/03/2002 La provisión para insolvencias en las entidades de crédito. Presente, futuro y pasado (article in the 
Notas de Estabilidad Financiera).
14/11/2001 Governor’s (J. Caruana) testimony before the Senate Budgetary Committee.
20/11/2000 Governor’s (J. Caruana) testimony before the Senate Budgetary Committee.
